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Thesis abstract
Workers and firms face substantial uncertainties about their prospects 
in the labor and product markets. The first three chapters of this thesis analyze 
how firing costs affect firms’ behavior and workers’ outcomes in the face of 
uncertainty about match quality and changing economic conditions. In the 
final chapter, I show how macroeconomic policy can reduce the risks 
associated with changing economic conditions.
First, I examine a 1999 UK reform that lowered from two years to one 
year the tenure necessary for a worker to be able to sue their employer for 
unfair dismissal. After the reform, we observe a significant decrease in the 
firing hazard for workers with zero to two years tenure relative to the control 
group, and no overall increase in unemployment. Using a simple model based 
on the assumption that firms learn about match quality over time, I show that 
the empirical results are consistent with increased match quality after the 
reform.
Second, I generalize the simple model developed in the first chapter. In 
particular, I allow for match quality to change over time. The model is useful 
to understand and predict how firing costs and various forms of uncertainty 
affect the separation hazard.
Thirdly, I analyze the implementation of unfair dismissal legislation by 
judges in the UK. Judges seem to compromise between workers’ and firms’ 
interests. If workers are unemployed, judges decide more often in their favour 
when unemployment rates are higher. The reverse is true when workers have 
found a new job.
Finally, in work co-authored with Philippe Aghion, we examine 
whether the government borrowing and spending more in recessions can 
increase growth by relaxing economic agents* credit constraints. Using a panel 
data of OECD countries, we find that indeed countercyclical public debt 
policy is more growth enhancing when private credit is less abundant.
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Introduction
Two of the most important uncertainties faced by economic agents are 
firms’ uncertainties about the demand for their products and workers’ 
uncertainty about the demand for their labor. When negative shocks occur, 
firms risk going bankrupt and workers becoming unemployed. As long as 
agents have sufficient cash or the ability to borrow to cushion negative shocks, 
this is not a major concern. Often enough, however, considerations of credit 
constraints and limited ability to pay play an important role, making the 
provision of insurance through private or public means desirable.
It has been long recognized that workers are typically more financially 
constrained than firms. This makes it potentially efficient to make firms 
participate in the insurance of workers against job loss. One of the ways of 
providing insurance against job loss is to mandate firms to compensate 
workers who are dismissed for no fault of their own. If workers sue their 
employer for unfair dismissal and the ground for the dismissal is found to be 
“unfair”, then employers must pay an even greater compensation. The 
imposition of such firing costs may however conflict with the objective of 
insuring firms against bad shocks, since job destruction is more likely to occur 
when firms face adverse economic conditions. Wouldn’t the imposition of 
firing costs on firms who already face adverse economic conditions lead to 
more bankruptcies and ultimately more workers losing their jobs?
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Firing costs are however but one aspect of the costs faced by firms 
when economic conditions are deteriorated. Another important difficulty is 
that credit constraints are usually not constant over the cycle; instead, firms 
typically find it harder to borrow precisely when the economy is doing badly. 
This implies that, during a recession, firms are limited in their ability to invest 
in order to develop new products and technologies, and catch up on profits 
once the economy recovers. The government can improve this situation by 
borrowing and spending more when economic conditions are bad. This can 
release firms’ credit constraints through various channels, such as demand 
stimulation or investors’ confidence building.
This thesis addresses some of the questions raised by firing costs and 
countercyclical macro policies. In the first three chapters, I analyze the 
economic impact of firing costs, focusing on firms’ behavior, workers’ 
outcomes, and judges’ decisions about whether to impose firing costs on 
firms. In the last chapter, in work co-authored with Philippe Aghion, I analyze 
how credit constraints affect the impact of countercyclical macro policies on 
economic growth.
From a theoretical perspective, firing costs have an ambiguous effect 
on productivity and employment. On the employment side, firing costs could 
either increase or decrease employment. Indeed, firing costs dissuade firing 
and thus partially insure workers against the prospect of being fired. At the 
same time, firing costs can reduce hiring: if a firm knows that in the future it 
may have to fire a worker and pay firing costs, it is more reluctant to take on 
that worker today. Firing costs also have an ambiguous effect on productivity. 
On the one hand, in as much as they provide insurance, they can motivate the
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worker to invest in specific human capital. On the other hand, because firing 
costs make the threat of dismissal less credible, workers may work less hard 
and/or demand higher wages, which would have a detrimental effect on 
productivity and/or employment. Adding to these theoretical ambiguities, the 
empirical literature has not been able to come to a strong conclusion regarding 
the effects of firing costs on either employment or productivity.
This thesis contributes to this literature both from an empirical and a 
theoretical perspective, filling two important gaps in the previous literature. 
First, the literature has been neglecting the fact that firing restrictions are 
typically only imposed for workers that have reached a given tenure with their 
current employer, i.e. there is a probationary period during which employers 
can fire at will1. Such is the case in particular in the United Kingdom, where 
unfair dismissal legislation requires workers to have been continuously 
employed for at least one year in order to be entitled to claim unfair dismissal. 
In chapters 1 and 2, I analyze, both theoretically and empirically, how the 
introduction of a probationary period affects firms’ hiring and firing behavior. 
I also investigate empirically the impact of such a probationary period on 
workers’ outcomes in the labor market (chapter 1). The theoretical analysis 
assumes that firms learn about match quality by observing the worker’s 
behavior over time. Moreover, match quality is allowed to evolve over time 
(chapter 2). Compared to no firing costs, the introduction of a probationary 
period2 increases the firing hazard (i.e. the probability that a worker is fired at 
some tenure t given that they have not been fired before) just before the end of
1 Depending on the specific country and legislation, there may exist some restrictions to firing 
during the probationary period, but these restrictions are typically much less stringent than 
after the end of the probationary period.
2 I.e. no firing costs till the end of the probationary period and positive firing costs thereafter.
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the probationary period, and decreases it afterwards. Chapter 2 also 
investigates the effects of various forms of uncertainty about match quality on 
firms’ optimal firing strategy, and on the firing hazard. The empirical analysis 
in chapter 1 draws on a change in British law in 1999, whereby the 
probationary period was reduced from two years to the current one year. After 
the reform, we observe a significant decrease in the firing hazard for workers 
with zero to two years tenure relative to workers with two to four years tenure, 
and no overall increase in unemployment. The calibration of the theoretical 
model reveals that firms recruit better workers after the reform, and also 
monitor workers somewhat better. Hence the results are consistent with an 
increase in match quality after the reform.
Second, the literature on firing costs has typically been concentrating 
on de jure legislative provisions, largely overlooking the fact that the concrete 
implementation of the law by judges may matter just as much as the letter of 
the law. Thus, in chapter 3 ,1 look at the determinants of judges’ decisions in 
unfair dismissal cases in the UK, focusing in particular on the influence of 
economic conditions. The effect of economic conditions on the 
implementation of firing costs is important in as much as it can lead to firing 
costs being de facto pro or counter cyclical, even though they may have not 
been explicitly designed to depend on economic conditions. I find that a 
higher unemployment or bankruptcy rate makes judges more likely to decide 
in favor of firms, thus exempting them from firing costs. Only if the worker is 
unemployed are judges more likely to decide in the worker’s favor when 
unemployment rates are higher. These findings are consistent with firing costs 
being made more pro-cyclical by judges’ decisions, and with judges weighing
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firms’ and workers’ welfare when making their decision. In particular, judges 
seem to be sensitive to the fact that firms are credit constrained and thus have 
a limited ability to pay during recessions.
While judges taking into account firms’ credit constraints may 
contribute to limiting the risk of bankruptcy, this effect cannot be very large. 
Indeed, judges’ actions cannot do much about the existence of a recession or 
credit constraints in the first place. To limit the negative effect of recessions, 
macroeconomic policy has long been seen as the tool of choice. In particular, 
there has been a long established tradition of Keynesian inspiration according 
to which countercyclical macro policy can enhance growth: the idea is that the 
state should stimulate demand during recessions to alleviate the adverse 
effects of these recessions and encourage recovery. More recently, there has 
been a growing skepticism as to whether such policies are really efficient. In 
particular, it has been argued that macroeconomic policies can at best have a 
short run effect but that long term growth is governed by institutions. 
However, this debate has been neglecting two important issues. First, such 
claims of efficiency or inefficiency of countercyclical macro policies need to 
be not only backed by theory but also tested empirically. The ability to 
perform meaningful empirical tests has however been limited by the 
challenges posed by the measurement of the countercyclicality of macro 
policies. Second, the efficiency of countercyclical macro policies may depend 
on a number of factors, and in particular the degree of financial constraints 
faced by the economy, i.e. the degree of financial development. Indeed, if 
credit constraints are a serious problem and firms are more credit constrained 
during recessions, then investments in new products and technology are
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limited during recessions, precisely when their opportunity cost is lower. 
Thus, a countercyclical macro policy, by supporting firms during recessions, 
can encourage investments that enhance long-run economic growth. My paper 
written with Philippe Aghion (chapter 4) sheds new light on these questions. 
We first address the challenging issue of providing yearly measures of the 
countercyclicality of debt policy. We use a series of different measures and 
provide a new methodology for estimating the cyclicality of debt policy. 
Second, we analyze whether the effect of countercyclical debt policy depends 
on financial development and find that this is indeed the case. Specifically, the 
less private credit an economy is able to count upon, the more growth- 
enhancing is countercyclical public debt policy. This has important 
consequences for policy making in the European Monetary Union: thus, our 
results imply that making public debt policy more countercyclical could 
increase economic growth in the EMU.
The thesis is structured as follows. In chapter 1 ,1 focus on the analysis 
of the impact of a British reform that lowered from two years to one year the 
tenure necessary for a worker to be able to sue their employer for unfair 
dismissal. In chapter 2 ,1 analyze a general model of relationship dissolution, 
focusing in particular on the impact of uncertainty and separation costs on the 
hazard of separation. Chapter 3 analyzes the determinants of judges’ decisions 
in unfair dismissal cases in the United Kingdom. Finally, chapter 4 explores 
the role of financial development in explaining the impact of countercyclical 
macro policies on economic growth.
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Chapter 1
Shortening the Tenure Clock: The Impact of 
Strengthened U.K. Job Security Legislation1
Ioana Marinescu
Abstract:
Even in countries with stringent job protection, workers typically only benefit 
from job security once they have worked at their employer beyond a minimum 
qualifying (or probationary) period. This paper analyzes how such a 
probationary period influences firms' behavior and workers' outcomes. I 
specifically examine a 1999 British reform that lowered from two years to one 
year the tenure necessary for a worker to be able to sue their employer for 
unfair dismissal. I first construct a model based on the assumption that firms 
learn about match quality over time. The model predicts that, after the reform, 
the hazard of firing workers between 1 and 2 years tenure decreases relative to 
the hazard beyond 2 years in all cases. Moreover, if, to avoid keeping lemons 
beyond the shorter qualifying period, firms react by recruiting workers more 
carefully, the hazard between 0 and a few months is predicted to decrease 
relative to the hazard beyond 2 years; an increase in monitoring has the 
opposite effect. Cox proportional hazard regressions show that the reform 
decreased the firing hazard between 0 and 2 years relative to the hazard 
between 2 and 4 years by about 30%. The calibration of the model reveals an 
increase in both recruitment and monitoring efforts, hence match quality. 
Consistent with an increase in match quality, I find that low tenure workers are 
more likely to receive training after the reform. Lastly, the reform has no 
detectable impact on unemployment duration, wages or employment.
1 Parts of this paper at a much earlier stage were included in my PhD defended in June 2005 at 
the EHESS, Paris.
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1 Introduction
US “employment at will” -  the right for employers to dismiss workers 
whenever they want and for whichever reason, i.e. “at will” -  is often 
contrasted with European job security legislation. In particular, job security is 
commonly portrayed as one of the causes of high unemployment and slow 
growth in Europe. However, the difference between US and European job 
security legislation is not quite as stark as it would seem at first glance. For 
example, in the US, there are quite a few exceptions to the employment at will 
rule. Some of them are due to law and jurisprudence, such as anti- 
discrimination laws, and others to custom, such as the institution of tenure in 
US universities. Still, the majority of the workforce in the US remains under 
“employment at will”. By contrast, in Europe, and in most developing 
countries, employers can generally only fire workers for a “fair” reason. 
However, it is usually not the case that workers benefit from such job security 
from day one of the employment relationship. Instead, they are only granted 
full job protection rights once they have worked for their employer for the full 
length of a probationary period. Even in countries with high firing costs, 
dismissal costs are thus usually very low in the beginning of the employment 
relationship, and they significantly increase with tenure.
Conditioning employment protection on workers having reached a given 
tenure can be seen as a way to tackle the trade-offs generated by firing costs, 
combining the best of employment at will and job security. Indeed, on the one 
hand, firing costs may reduce the burden of economic downturns by making 
firms internalize the social costs of firing. Moreover, firing costs can increase 
productivity either by resulting in better job matching or by stimulating 
investment in human capital (Malcomson 1999). And, for risk averse workers, 
job security is a benefit in itself. On the other hand, higher firing costs will 
tend to reduce hiring in as much as they increase the cost of labor (for a 
theoretical illustration of the trade-off, see Bertola (1992)). High firing costs 
may also prevent the sorting of workers into the jobs they are best suited to, 
thus reducing productivity (Blanchard and Katz 1997).
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A probationary period mitigates the latter problem, since firms can fire 
workers unsuited to the job at low cost at the beginning of the employment 
relationship. The institution of a probationary period is also related to the “last 
in, first out” rule, which requires that, when a firm lays off workers, it should 
first lay off those with lowest tenure on the job. This rule allows firms to 
adjust their workforce at lower cost, while preserving most workers’ job 
security. Tenure-dependant job protection is thus a measure that can balance 
workers’ and firms’ objectives.
This paper analyzes a specific example of a probationary period 
provision in the United Kingdom. The right for dismissed workers to sue their 
employer for unfair dismissal is only granted after a given tenure on the job: 
before June 1999, this required tenure was two years, and after June 1999 it 
was reduced to one year. This source of variation allows me to shed light on 
two questions. First, what are the effects of having such a probationary period2 
on firms’ firing behavior? Second, what is the impact of a reduction in the 
probationary period on firms’ personnel management practices and workers* 
labor market outcomes? The answers to these questions are of particular 
interest in the context of European employment policies. Indeed, many 
European countries developed fixed-term contracts to allow for a probationary 
period without directly altering their protective legislation, and France, taking 
a further step, introduced in August 2005 a new employment contract, the 
CNE (“contrat nouvelles embauches”, i.e. “contract for new hires”). The latter 
allows firms with less than 20 employees to benefit from a 2 years 
probationary period during which employment is almost at will, while 
standard job protection is granted after the end of the probationary period. In 
the early days of 2006, the French government proposed to extend the CNE, 
allowing all firms to hire employees below 26 years old under a CNE type 
contract. This was named the CPE (“Contrat Premier Emploi”, i.e. first job 
contract). The CPE was seen by lots of people as a step towards complete 
liberalization of the labor market and was thus opposed by millions of 
demonstrators. As a result, the proposal was not surprisingly withdrawn. The
2 From a strictly legal point of view, the change in unfair dismissal rights is not equivalent to a 
change in what is legally defined as the probationary period (which in fact plays a very minor 
role in UK law). But this terminology is useful to conceptualize the problem.
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German government led by Angela Merkel also plans to increase the 
probationary period from 6 months to 2 years, but the law has not yet been 
enacted.
A large and well-established body of literature relates firing costs and 
employment across countries (Djankov et al. 2004) or across countries and 
time (Lazear,1990, OECD 1999, Heckman and Pages 2003, Nickell, Nunziata, 
Ochel 2005), typically yielding inconclusive results. Pierre and Scarpetta 
(2004), while still relying on cross-sectional variation, use micro-data on 
firms. They show that firms in countries with more stringent employment 
regulations report being more hindered by these regulations, and that firms 
react to more stringent regulations by providing more training and resorting 
more to temporary employment. Although very valuable, such cross-sectional 
evidence may still be plagued by omitted variable biases, in as much as there 
are many unobservable country-specific factors that may be correlated with 
both firing regulations and firms* characteristics and behaviors.
It is thus important to examine the impact of variations in statutory firing 
costs within a single country. In recent years, several studies have used micro 
data to assess the consequences of changes in the regulation for one given 
country (e.g., Hunt 2000, Blanchard and Landier 2001, Kugler 2004, Kugler 
and Pica 2005). Most studies, whether cross-country or within countries, focus 
on the costs firms have to bear with certainty when firing under the regulations 
in place, setting aside the possibility of further intervention by labor courts. An 
exception is the study by Autor, Donohue and Schwab (2004) on the United 
States: using regional and temporal variation, they find a negative impact of 
one wrongful discharge doctrine, the implied-contract exception, on states’ 
employment-to-population ratios. The implied-contract exception arises when, 
through words or actions, an employer implicitly promises not to terminate a 
worker without a good cause. Thus, the implied contract exception, a 
privately-granted right not to be unfairly dismissed, slightly reduces 
employment.
The timing of separations and the resulting duration of jobs have been 
subjected to both theoretical and empirical studies. A classic model by 
Jovanovic (1979) predicts a rise followed by a fall in the probability of 
separation with tenure. Productivity is job-specific and time-invariant; it is not
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known ex ante but becomes progressively evident as workers and firms 
observe output in succeeding periods. The probability of separation increases 
initially with the elapsed time because, as knowledge becomes more precise, 
the value of separating increases relative to the value of waiting to leam more 
about the real productivity of a job match whose current productivity is low. 
After some time, observed separation decreases because only the more 
productive matches remain. Farber (1994) empirically verifies Jovanovic’s 
prediction about the relationship between tenure and separations. Using the 
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, he shows that the monthly hazard of 
job separation initially increases with time spent on the job, peaks at 3 months, 
and decreases thereafter.
Here, I introduce three new elements of analysis. First, like Autor et al. 
(2004), I focus on labor courts’ induced firing costs, and more specifically on 
the right not to be unfairly dismissed. But, instead of only examining the 
indirect effects of firing costs on employment, I directly analyze the effects of 
these costs on the probability of workers getting fired at different tenures. 
Second, I analyze the impact of firing costs on the timing, and not only the 
level, of firing. Third, I give this analysis a formal theoretical basis.
To test for the economic impact of a probationary period3, I use the 
change in UK law mentioned above. Thus, the number of months necessary to 
qualify, or qualifying period, was lowered from 24 to 12 months for any 
termination (dismissal or redundancy) occurring after the 1st of June 1999. 
Employees with 12 to 23 months of tenure were not protected before the 
reform whereas they had the right to claim unfair dismissal if fired after the 
reform, implying that their probability of being fired should diminish after the 
reform. Employees with more than 24 months of tenure should be, in 
principle, relatively unaffected by the reform, and could be used as a control 
group. Employees with less than 12 months tenure may be affected by the 
reform if, for example, employers screen better after the reform to avoid a 
potential trial in the event of termination after the shorter qualifying period.
3 While I am examining a tenure-dependant firing cost, another strand of literature examines 
the effect of a tenure-dependant quitting cost. Thus, in Canada, the tenure on the job necessary 
to qualify for unemployment benefits has varied, and a series of papers studies the effect of 
those changes on job duration (Baker and Rea, 1998, Christofides and McKenna, 1996).
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The formal model I develop in Marinescu (2005) and summarize in section 3 
gives further insights about the possible consequences of the reform on the 
firing hazard. The model’s setup is very similar to Jovanovic’s 1979 model, 
but some simplifying assumptions make it tractable, and suitable for 
calculating the impact of firing costs and other parameters on the hazard of 
firing. The model allows predicting how the hazard of firing should change 
after the reform if firms keep their personnel management policies fixed and 
only react to the shorter probationary period. The model also predicts how the 
firing hazard changes if firms react to the reform by increasing their 
recruitment or monitoring efforts, and it shows that these two strategies have 
significantly different effects. Thus, a higher recruitment effort implies a lower 
firing hazard for workers with 0 to a few months tenure, while a higher 
monitoring effort implies a higher firing hazard for these same workers.
The empirical analysis of the firing hazard uses duration models on the 
2-quarters Labour Force Survey longitudinal datasets. A simple Kaplan-Meier 
estimate reveals that the firing hazard is indeed lower after the reform for 
employees with 12 to 24 months of tenure. The hazard is also found to be 
lower for employees with 0 to 12 months of tenure, which is consistent with 
firms having increased their recruitment efforts after the reform. Calibrating 
the model to fit these Kaplan-Meier estimates, I show that recruitment efforts 
must have indeed increased substantially after the reform, while monitoring on 
the job must also have increased slightly. Using all employees with more than 
24 months of tenure as a control group in a Cox proportional hazard model, I 
find that the reform has a significant and large negative impact on the hazard 
of termination for those employees with 12 to 23 months tenure, and also for 
those with 0 to 11 months tenure. This result also holds if the control group is 
limited to employees with 26 to 48 months tenure. The estimated reduction in 
the firing hazard for workers with less than 2 years tenure relative to those 
with 2 to 4 years tenure is around 30%, with some small variation depending 
on the specification and the tenure sub-group considered. Lastly, I show that 
while most demographic and educational groups are similarly affected by the 
reform, the latter has a distinctive effect on university educated workers. After 
the reform, firms do not seem to increase recruitment efforts targeted at this
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latter group; instead, there is evidence consistent with a moderate increase in 
monitoring efforts.
I next look at the effects of the reform on wages, training, and the 
duration of unemployment. While this analysis is useful to better gauge the 
total impact of the reform on the economy, one should note two related 
caveats. First, the analysis lacks a firm theoretical basis as the theory 
developed in section 3 of this paper does not make direct predictions about 
these outcomes, and second, it is empirically weaker in as much as it is 
relatively hard to find reasonable control groups to identify the effects of 
interest. With these caveats in mind, results are as follows. First, no significant 
effect on wages can be established. Second, workers with 0 to 11 months 
tenure are significantly more likely to get training. The increase in training is 
consistent with an increase in match quality stemming from better recruitment 
and monitoring. Lastly, the reform was not associated with an increase in the 
duration of unemployment, but coincided instead with a decrease in 
unemployment duration for affected workers.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the tenure 
restriction to the right not to be unfairly dismissed is put into historical 
perspective. Section 3 presents the theoretical hypotheses to be tested, drawing 
on a model of learning about match quality. Section 4 describes the data, 
presents the main empirical results about the firing hazard, and analyzes the 
impact of the reform on the firing hazard of various sub-groups of the labor 
force. Section 5 analyzes the impact of the reform on wages, training and the 
duration of unemployment. Section 6 concludes.
2 The unfair dismissal qualifying period: historical 
background
The right not to be unfairly dismissed, introduced in most western 
European countries in the early 1970’s, is usually restricted in several ways. 
One of the main restrictions is that employees must have a minimal period of
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continuous employment to fully qualify for this right4. In the UK, after Labour 
came to power in 1997, this qualifying period was lowered from 24 to 12 
months by the 1999 Unfair Dismissal and Statement of Reasons for Dismissal 
(Variation of Qualifying Period) Order. This measure was part of a package 
destined to promote new labor practices. In the May 1998 Fairness at Work 
white paper (www.dti.gov.uk/er/faimess/), the New Labour government gave 
the following justification for the reduction in qualifying period:
“As the economy becomes more dynamic, leading to more 
frequent job changes, the Government is concerned that this 
period is too long and a better balance between competitiveness 
and fairness would be achieved if it were reduced: employees 
would be less inhibited about changing jobs and thereby losing 
their protection, which should help to promote a more flexible 
labour market; more employers would see the case for 
introducing good employment practices, which should 
encourage a more committed and productive workforce. Some 
employers claim that a long qualification period is needed to 
allow mistakes made in recruitment to be rectified without
4 For example, in France, while employees on unlimited term contracts (CDI) can always sue 
for unfair dismissal, they are only legally entitled to a minimum compensation for unfair 
dismissal if they have 2 or more years of tenure. This condition was set in 1973 when unfair 
dismissal legislation was first introduced, and has never been changed since. The introduction 
of the CNE contract in August 2005 could however be seen as an attempt to change this state 
of affairs since under that contract employees cannot sue their employer at all during the first 
2 years of tenure, but the contract is identical to a CDI after two years of tenure. In the United 
Kingdom, the qualifying period is strict: employees cannot sue their employer for unfair 
dismissal if they have less than the minimum required tenure. Unlike France, the UK 
experimented a lot with the length of the qualifying period. Thus, while the initial 1971 
(Industrial Relations Act) qualifying period had also been set to 24 months, it subsequently 
changed 7 times (Davies and Freedland 1993). Initially, all parties agreed to lower 
progressively the qualifying period so that all employees could be covered, and so by March 
1975, the qualifying period had been reduced to 6 months. The main reason why the 
diminution in the qualifying period was to be progressive was that the newly created Industrial 
Tribunals could not immediately cope with a huge caseload.
However, by the end of the 1970’s, and in particular after Mrs. Thatcher became prime 
minister in 1979, the terms of the debate changed. The right of employees to claim unfair 
dismissal was seen as a burden to businesses, in particular to small ones. By the time Mrs. 
Thatcher came to power, the qualifying period was down to 6 months. She immediately 
increased it to 12 months with the 1979 unfair dismissal (variation of qualifying period) order. 
Then the 1980 Employment Act increased this qualifying period again to 24 months for firms 
with less than 20 employees. Lastly, the 1985 “Unfair dismissal (variation of qualifying 
period)” order increased the qualifying period to 24 months for firms with more than 20 
employees as well, which meant that by 1985 the qualifying period was 24 months for all 
employees.
19
heavy costs. The Government accepts such mistakes happen 
but believes that the present period is longer than is needed to 
allow them to come to light and be dealt with. For all these 
reasons, and to increase protection against arbitrary dismissal, 
the Government therefore proposes to reduce the qualifying 
period to one year.”
Thus, the reduction in the qualifying period is mainly seen as compensation 
offered to workers in exchange for their consent to a more flexible 
organization of the labor market.
Finally, one should note that the Labour government introduced a series 
of other labor market reforms that may potentially affect estimates of the 
impact of the change in the qualifying period for the right to claim unfair 
dismissal5. First, a National Minimum Wage was implemented in April 1999, 
and I will be correcting for this when relevant. Important new regulation has 
also been passed concerning parental leave and dependent care leave 
(Employment Relations Act 1999, and Maternity and Parental Leave 
Regulations 1999) and sex discrimination (Sex Discrimination (Gender 
Reassignment) Regulations 1999). These regulations mainly affect women, so 
it will be crucial to check whether estimated effects are driven by the female 
labor force. Lastly, the Employment Relations Act 1999 increased the limits 
on the awards workers who win a trial for unfair dismissal can get at court. 
However, the previous limit was already not binding: 95% of the awards 
workers obtained in 2003 (computed from the Survey of Employment 
Tribunal Applications, 2003, available on www.data-archive.ac.uk) were 
lower than the limit prevailing before 1999. It is therefore unlikely that this 
change has affected firms’ behavior. Thus, while the regulatory activity had
5 The right not to be unfairly dismissed is but one aspect of employment law regulating the
termination of contracts of employment. Other important components are the notice period
and the severance (or redundancy) pay rules. These latter features also depend on the tenure of
the employee on the job, or more precisely continuous employment. The notice period is at
least 1 week for more than 1 month and up to 2 years tenure, and at least 2 weeks for more
than 2 years tenure, plus one additional week’s notice for each further complete year of
continuous employment for a period of less than 12 years’ continuous employment; and at 
least 12 weeks’ notice if the employee has been employed by the employer continuously for
12 years or more. Redundancy pay is only granted after two years of continuous employment 
and if the employee was fired for economic reasons. These features of employment law did 
not change in 1999, so it is important to bear in mind that the two years tenure may still be a 
meaningful juncture affecting firms’ firing policies.
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been intense at the time of the reform concerning the qualifying period for 
unfair dismissal, it seems feasible to identify its independent effects.
3 Model of the impact of firing costs on the timing of 
firing decisions
The right to claim unfair dismissal introduces a discontinuity in the cost 
of firing as a function of tenure on the job: when tenure becomes larger than 
the qualifying period, firing costs are suddenly augmented by the expected 
costs to the firm of possible unfair dismissal claims. The model I use is based 
on firm’s learning about match quality, a hypothesis whose implications were 
first formally derived by Jovanovic(1979) and that was recently shown by 
Nagypal(2004) to be a driving factor of the empirical job separation hazard.
In what follows, I use a model based on dynamic programming 
developed in Marinescu (2005) to form testable hypotheses regarding the 
possible effects of a shortening of the qualifying period on the hazard of firing. 
The model’s aim is to derive the firing hazard stemming from firms’ optimal 
firing behavior in response to a set of parameters among which figures 
crucially the firing (and hiring) cost. The model necessarily involves many 
simplifications relative to actual firms’ firing behavior. I defer a discussion of 
the model’s limitations to Section 3.5.
3.1 Assumptions
When a firm and a worker begin their employment relationship they do 
not perfectly know their match quality6 but learn about it over time. The 
worker is assumed to be passive in this model: the firm alone makes 
separation decisions.
The timing of events within each period p is formalized as follows:
6 In what follows, I use the term “match quality”, which given the literature usage suggests 
that match quality is idiosyncratic. However, as explained in section 3.5,1 do not need for the 
purpose of this model to take a stance with respect to whether match quality is indeed 
idiosyncratic. Therefore, I could just as well use the term “worker quality” rather than “match 
quality”.
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The set o f  possible actions the firm can take is “fire the current worker 
and hire a new one”, or “keep the current worker”. Therefore, in this simple 
version of the model, unemployment or the overall level of labor demand are 
not modeled. Instead, the focus is on the efficiency and timing o f the matching 
process.
The state o f the world is defined by a vector of two variables: the tenure 
of the current worker, and the quality of the firm-worker match. The tenure 
variable is perfectly observed by the firm. Moreover, tenure cannot be higher 
than some tenure tmax, which is to be conceived of as the retirement tenure. 
Match quality can be either good or bad7: a good match means that the worker 
is adequate for the job, whereas a bad match means that the worker is 
inadequate. I assume that a proportion q of the matches is good whereas a 
proportion l-q  is bad.
Match quality is not perfectly observed. Instead, at each period, the firm 
observes a normally distributed8 signal about the quality of the match. The 
signal for a good match is normally distributed with mean 1 and variance <j 2, 
whereas for a bad match it is normally distributed with mean -1 and variance
normal distribution. Using Bayes' rule, one can then compute all possible 
beliefs b(s,t) (see appendix 1 for the equation).
Using the Bellman equation, I can now specify the value as a function of 
the current belief. As in Jovanovic (1979), I assume that the firm only employs 
labor and has constant returns to scale. The actual per period return to a good 
match is 1 whereas the per period return to a bad match is 0. Moreover, the 
wage is fixed and set to 09. Setting the wage to 0 rather than another constant 
does not entail any loss of generality given that labor demand is fixed in this 
economy and firms all pay the same wage. So if the firm keeps the worker, its 
expected return will be exactlyb(syt). If the firm fires the worker, it gets the 
expected value of a new worker and incurs a separation (hiring and firing) cost 
c{t) which is a function of the tenure t of the current worker. I assume
c^ma) ~ c0) > i-e- when the worker retires, the firing cost is the same as the 
one incurred at tenure 1. This is because, at tenure 1 as at retirement, the 
separation cost consists mainly of the hiring cost of a new worker.
Let V* (b(s,t)) be the value (i.e. the expected discounted future reward) 
of the match to the firm obtained when the firm follows the optimal policy.
The value of a worker to the firm if the firm keeps this worker (action 
K  ) is given by:
V(b(s,t),K) = 6(j,/) +
+00
s. {(1 -  b(s,t)) J a m *  v ' ( K s  \ t + 1))*’+
i  (i
+ 0 0
K*,t)
- 0 0
The first line of equation 1 represents the immediate reward for keeping 
the worker, whereas the two following lines represent future rewards if 
keeping the worker at the current period, and are thus preceded by the discount 
factor d. The second line represents the future rewards if the match is bad
9 One can also readily specify the wage to be a fixed share of the expected per period return, 
as would be the case with Nash bargaining. Qualitative results do not change when making 
this assumption.
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weighted by the corresponding b e l i e f ! w h e r e a s  the third line 
represents the future rewards if the match is good weighted by the 
corresponding belief . For each of the two possible match qualities, the 
belief at the next period depends on the sum of signals s' that the firm will 
have observed by tenure/+ 1, or equivalently on the signal at period f + 1. 
Given my assumptions, if real match quality is bad and the sum of 
observations is s (line 2 of equation 1), the probability of reaching a given s' 
is given by a normal distribution f b with mean s -1  * (1 -  b(s,t)) and variance
17 1 (remember that the mean of the per period signal for the low quality match 
is -1). A symmetric reasoning applies if the match is good and gives rise to 
line 3 of equation 1.
Alternatively, if the firm fires the worker (action F  ), the value is:
F ( ^ ,0 ,F )  = F _ - c ( / )  (2)
i.e. it is the value of a new worker minus the firing costs. Note that the value if 
fire only depends on the tenure due to the existence of tenure-dependent firing 
costs.
Given the values for keep and fire, the optimal value is given by the 
Bellman equation:
V \b(s,t)) = max(V(b(s,0,K),r(b(s,t),F)) (3)
Using dynamic programming and the appropriate Matlab code, the 
optimal policy of the firm is computed (see Marinescu(2006b) for the 
technical details). The policy can be expressed as a belief threshold r(t) for 
each tenure t such that if the firm’s belief is equal to or above r (/), then the 
firm keeps the worker, and otherwise it fires the worker.
The model so far has described the behavior of a representative firm. 
The behavior of infinitely many single-job firms can be represented by 
integrating the behavioral response of the firm over all the possible 
combinations of tenure t and sum of signals s, given the assumed distributions. 
Thus, under the assumptions I use, it is possible to compute the firing hazard
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using the appropriate Matlab code. At tenure 1, the distribution of possible 
beliefs is computed given the assumed distributions. Then the hazard of firing 
at tenure 1 is the integral of the belief distribution from 0 to the firing 
threshold r ( l) . At tenure 2, a set of possible signals is observed, which leads 
to a new distribution of possible beliefs, and the firing hazard is again the 
integral of the belief distribution from 0 to r(2). And so on for each 
subsequent tenure (see Appendix 1 for the equation). Note that the 
computation does not rely on simulation, i.e. the technique used does not 
involve drawing a large number of matches in conformity with the distribution 
and then averaging over the results. Instead, equations directly use the 
definitions of probability distributions, and computations rely on an 
approximation of the normal distribution of the signal by a finite number of 
points.
3.2 Parameters
I now proceed to examine the effects on the hazard rate of termination of 
a discontinuity in firing costs (with higher firing costs after a given tenure) and 
how the hazard rate changes when the length of the probationary period 
changes. I thus model the potential effects of the 1999 reform within the 
framework of this model.
I choose a benchmark case for clarity of exposition. The parameters 
were chosen so that the shape of the hazard curve is similar to the hazard of 
firing observed in the United Kingdom in 1996-1999 (shown in Figure 8). 
Moreover, in this benchmark case, I pay attention to choosing parameters so 
that the variations in these parameters show sufficiently large effects to be 
clearly visible on graphs. When analyzing actual data, I will directly fit the 
theoretical hazard curve to the empirical one and derive the underlying 
parameters.
The parameters of the benchmark case are as displayed in Table 1. A 
firing (and hiring) cost of 7 corresponds to 7 months of output. Note that an 
increase in the maximal tenure does not change the hazard of firing for tenures 
1 to 50, tenures on which I will be focusing.
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I introduce a tenure-dependant firing cost in the following form. The 
firing cost is 7 before the end of the probationary period, and 9 thereafter. I 
start with analyzing the effects of different lengths of the probationary period.
3.3 Variation in length of the probationary period
The hazard of firing is determined by two factors: the firing threshold 
r{t) expressed in terms of belief, and the distribution of the firm’s belief. The 
latter distribution is itself determined by two factors: the distribution of match 
quality embodied in the q parameter giving the proportion of good matches, 
and the distribution of signals engendered by the variance a 2. Let us first 
consider the case where the firing cost does not vary with tenure but is instead 
fixed at 7. The firing hazard is plotted in Figure 1. It is first increasing and 
then decreasing in tenure, as in Jovanovic(1979). In Figure 2, I plot the 
distribution of firms’ beliefs at different tenures, after they have observed the 
signal at that tenure and before they fire. First, note that at tenure 1, right 
before firms have their first opportunity to fire, the distribution of beliefs 
about match quality is roughly normal with a mean of 0.5, corresponding to 
the q I specified. Now, up to tenure 4810, the firing threshold is constant at .22, 
i.e. if the probability that the match is good is 22% or more, the firm keeps the 
worker, and otherwise it fires. The firing range of belief is shaded in Figure 2. 
As already mentioned, the firing hazard is the integral of the belief distribution 
below the threshold11, i.e. in the shaded area. This explains why, as tenure 
increases, the distribution moves away from normality: indeed, as firms fire 
the worst-performing workers, they truncate the lower tail of the distribution. 
Thus, as tenure increases, the distribution of belief in the neighborhood of .5 
flattens and its mean moves towards 1: this is because in the long run, firms 
only keep workers whose match quality is almost certainly high. The shape of 
the belief distribution by tenure also helps to understand why the firing hazard
10 The firing threshold changes slightly thereafter because the firm anticipates that the worker 
is going to retire after 200 months.
11 The reader may have noticed that these integrals at different tenures do not perfectly square 
with the firing hazard plotted in Figure 1. This is because the computation of the hazard is 
based on the “sum of observations” statistic. While this latter statistic translates unequivocally 
into a given belief (see the formula for the belief in appendix 1), converting a distribution in 
terms of sum of observations to a distribution in terms of belief entails a certain degree of 
approximation because of the discretization used for the “sum of observations" statistic.
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first increases and then decreases with tenure. Indeed, if firms never fired 
anyone, the belief distribution would be more and more concentrated at 0 and 
1 with increasing tenure. This is because as firms observe more and more 
signals, they improve their inference about whether a match is good or bad, 
and thus after an infinite number of observations, the belief distribution would 
be two-peaked with a density of .5 (because of the parameter q=.5) at 0, .5 at 
1, and 0 everywhere else. Thus, in the absence of firing there would be more 
and more workers below the firing threshold with increasing tenure, so that the 
potential firing hazard would monotonically increase with tenure. This 
explains why the firing hazard first increases with tenure: more and more 
matches are discovered to be of bad quality as tenure increases. But as firms 
always dissolve the worst quality matches, eventually a large proportion of 
matches will actually be good and so there will be very few workers for whom 
the belief can fall below the firing threshold. This is why the firing hazard 
eventually decreases.
What is the effect of the introduction of a probationary period? To 
illustrate this effect, I assume that at tenure 24, the firing cost goes from 7 to 9. 
This only affects the firing hazard through the threshold, and not through the 
parameters determining the belief distributions since cr2 and q remain 
unchanged by assumption. With a higher firing cost after 24 months, the 
threshold will obviously decrease for tenures greater than 24 months, i.e. as 
firing is more expensive, firms keep workers with lower believed match 
quality. So the threshold after the end of the probationary period will be lower 
with a probationary period than without. What happens to the threshold before 
the end of the probationary period? First, at low tenure, the threshold for firing 
is the same as in the absence of a probationary period. This means that the 
hazard will also be exactly the same at low tenure, as seen in Figure 1. Then, 
as tenure increases, firms anticipate that there will be a higher firing cost in the 
near future, so they increase their threshold before the end of the probationary 
period, thus firing preventively a group of workers whose match quality is 
fairly low and who would otherwise be likely to get fired at higher cost after 
the end of the probationary period. This is what creates the spike and the 
trough in the firing hazard with 24-months probationary period seen in Figure
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1: indeed, right before the end of the probationary period, more workers get 
fired because of the higher firing threshold, whereas right after the end of the 
probationary period, less workers get fired because the threshold is lower and 
those who were most likely to fall below it have been fired preventively. 
While it is the case that the firing threshold is lower in the post-probationary 
period, the firing hazard at tenures higher than 35 is almost the same as in the 
absence of a probationary period: this is because at that point very few 
workers get fired, for example when one looks at the distribution of beliefs at 
tenure 35 in Figure 2, one can see that the area between .22 and .2 (that is, the 
threshold at tenure 35 with a 24 months probationary period) is fairly small, 
and so moving the threshold down to .2 has a relatively small effect compared 
to, say, the same downward move of the threshold occurring at tenure 5.
What is the effect of a shortening of the probationary period? The firing 
cost is assumed to increase from 7 to 9 at tenure 12. This implies that the 
firing threshold will decrease earlier due to higher firing costs setting in 
earlier, and so the increase in the firing threshold before the probationary 
period will also occur earlier. For the shape of the firing hazard, this implies 
that while the firing hazard will remain exactly the same at very low tenure, 
the spike and trough will occur earlier, while there will be little effect on the 
firing hazard at high tenures, which is what can be seen in Figure 1.
This analysis however does not take into account the fact that firms 
could be endogenously reacting to the shortening of the qualifying period by 
increasing the quality q of matches when hiring, or by increasing the intensity 
of monitoring on the job and thus decreasing cr2. Intuitively, both strategies 
would reduce the probability that firms should have to fire after the end of the 
probationary period. That this can be an optimal reaction on the part of firms 
is further confirmed by the following consideration. In computations not 
reproduced here, I found that, starting from the reference case, the marginal 
gain (as measured by the change in the value of a new worker) of increasing 
either recruitment or monitoring intensity is greater with a shorter 
probationary period. This implies that, for a given marginal cost of these 
technologies, firms should be more willing to invest in them after the reform. 
Moreover, increasing the recruitment intensity yields a higher marginal gain
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than increasing the monitoring intensity. Thus, if the marginal cost of 
recruitment effort is not much greater than the marginal cost of monitoring 
effort, we expect firms to increase recruitment intensity more than monitoring 
intensity after the reform.
3.4 Endogenous response: modification of the quality of 
recruitment or monitoring
I study here the effects on the firing hazard of increasing the recruitment 
quality q from .5 to .7 or increasing the monitoring intensity, i.e. decreasing 
cr2 from 16 to 4. The corresponding curves are plotted in Figure 3.
An increase in recruitment quality results in a decrease in firing at all 
tenures. This effect can be decomposed in two elements (which are in fact 
jointly determined, and only separated for the purpose of exposition). First, the 
increase in q increases the firing threshold from .22 to .34 in the 8 first months 
of tenure, which, for the belief distributions with q=.5, would imply more 
firing. But second, the increase in q changes the shape of the belief 
distribution by tenure as shown in Figure 4, i.e. it changes how likely it is that 
the firm holds a belief below the threshold. Figure 4 shows that the means of 
die distributions are shifted rightwards, so that the lower tails of the belief 
distributions are thinner, which implies less firing. To understand why, as can 
be seen from the hazard curves in Figure 3, the effect on the belief distribution 
dominates the effect on the threshold, we must consider the following. First, 
note that the firm’s belief exclusively depends on the sum of observations for 
a worker. Therefore, the threshold may also be equivalently expressed in terms 
of sum of observations. The threshold expressed in terms of sum of 
observations goes from -10 to -12 when recruitment effort increases 
(remember that a good match generates on average an observation of 1 per 
period whereas a bad match generates an observation of -1). In other terms, 
firms wait for more negative observations before they fire someone. This is 
intuitive because now they have a higher prior: they know that 70% instead of 
50% of matches are good. Therefore any bad observation is more likely to be 
just noise. The fact that the threshold goes down in terms of sum of 
observations also implies that it is less likely that someone gets fired in
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general, because it is less likely that the sum of observations be below -12 
rather than below -10: indeed with half good matches and half bad matches as 
in the reference case, the average observation will be 0; moreover, with an 
increase in recruitment efforts there are not 50% but 70% of good matches so 
it is even less likely that the sum of observations for a worker shall fall below - 
12. Therefore, the hazard of firing should fall. So why is the threshold 
expressed in terms of belief higher? This is because while firms wait for more 
negative observations before they fire someone, at the same time they know 
that there are more good matches in the population of potential employees: 
this therefore makes them slightly more demanding on the current employees.
By contrast, an increase in monitoring results in an increase in firing at 
low tenures and a decrease in firing at high tenures (Figure 3). This results 
again from two effects. First, the firing threshold decreases from .22 to .12 in 
the first 8 months, which for the belief distributions wither2 =16, would 
imply less firing. Second, the shape of the belief distributions changes, as 
shown in Figure 5: the distributions are flatter than before in the neighborhood 
of .5. To understand why this is the case, let’s take the distribution at tenure 1, 
before the firm has had any chance to fire. This distribution is flatter because 
the signals are more informative than before: so, instead of having the belief 
distribution highly concentrated around .5, which is the prior over the 
population of hired workers, the belief distribution has more weight on its 
tails, because even after one signal firms are already quite certain that some 
matches are bad while others are good. This change in the shape of the 
distribution entails more firing at low tenures, because now for any threshold 
below .5, there are more workers below this threshold at low tenures. But 
eventually, because firms can quickly get rid of bad matches, the hazard of 
firing gets lower. In this case, when expressing the threshold in terms of sum 
of observations, this threshold goes up to from -10 to -4. With an unchanged 
proportion of good matches (50%), it is more likely that a random worker has 
a sum of observations below -4 instead of below -10. Therefore, at low tenure, 
when firms did not yet get to fire many people so that the population of 
employed workers is still similar to the population of employable workers, it is 
more likely that someone gets fired. The firing hazard is thus higher at low
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tenure. So then why does the belief threshold go down? This is because as 
firms get more precise information every period, they can afford to wait a little 
bit longer to be really sure that a match is indeed likely to be bad and therefore 
worth terminating.
It is also possible to compute the value of a new match under higher 
recruitment or monitoring efforts, and compare it to the value in the reference 
case. Thus, if the firm increases recruitment or monitoring effort at no cost, 
then all other things equal the value of a new match increases. With higher 
recruitment efforts, by definition the firm gets better matches on average from 
day one of the employment relationship, whereas with higher monitoring 
efforts the firm eventually gets better matches as it is better able to detect and 
dissolve the bad matches once the employment relationship has begun. 
Moreover, both increasing the recruitment effort and the monitoring intensity 
indeed decrease the hazard of firing after the probationary period but they 
have opposite effects on firing at low tenure (i.e. for tenures between 0 and a 
few months) : while an increase in recruitment effort decreases firing at low 
tenure, an increase in monitoring increases it.
3.5 Limits to the model
The first limit to the model developed above is that match quality can 
only take two values, good or bad. However, in Marinescu (2005), I show that 
the qualitative implications of the model are preserved if one uses a more 
continuous distribution, such as for example a normal distribution. Second, 
there is no explicit cost for the firm of increasing recruitment efforts or 
monitoring. In the absence of recruitment and monitoring costs, firms could 
completely change the parameters so that uncertainty would no longer be a 
problem, and they would only get good matches. In reality, these efforts are of 
course costly and the reduction in uncertainty and increase in match quality 
will only be obtained if cost-effective. Note however that the costs of these 
efforts can be viewed as part of the separation cost if assumed to be a fixed 
cost per match.
A more important limitation of the model is that it relies on partial 
equilibrium analysis. Thus, I am not modeling the influence of the behavior of
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one firm on other firms’ behavior, nor the aggregate demand for labor. 
Therefore, I do not need to take a stance with respect to whether match quality 
is in fact idiosyncratic (Jovanovic 1979) or whether there is some symmetric 
(Gibbons, Katz, Lemieux, and Parent 2005, Moffitt and Jovanovic 1990) or 
asymmetric learning about general ability (Gibbons and Katz 1991, 
Schoneberg 2004). Nevertheless, the nature of the information imperfection 
about match quality may have important effects when evaluating the overall 
efficiency and welfare effects of a change in firing costs. For example, if firing 
costs get higher and there is asymmetric learning about quality, then all else 
equal, the believed average quality of terminated matches diminishes, 
implying that terminated workers have lower reemployment probabilities. 
However, in this model I am focusing on what drives firms’ firing behavior, 
and it is only when looking at other outcomes such as unemployment duration 
in the empirical analysis that I will briefly consider the implications of 
different possible hypotheses about match quality.
3.6 Main conclusions drawn from the model
The main conclusions drawn from die model are summarized in Table 2. 
Note that it is not possible to determine in the general case what happens for 
workers who have tenures just below 12 months: indeed, the shortening in the 
probationary period implies that there should be a spike before 12 months, but 
if other parameters such as q or cr2 change then this spike may lie below the 
curve corresponding to a 24 month probationary period. For the purpose of 
empirical analysis, the most important lesson from the theory is that it is by 
looking at workers with low tenure that one can hope to distinguish among the 
different scenarios summarized in Table 2. It is moreover important to note 
that while the absolute size of the effects of large changes in recruitment and 
monitoring efforts on the hazard of firing for workers with 0 to 24 months 
tenure is large, effects are very limited for workers with more than 24 months 
tenure (see Figure 3). This implies that, form a theoretical perspective, 
workers with more than 24 months tenure should form a reasonable if 
imperfect control group.
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4 The impact o f the reform on the firing hazard
Before moving on to the description of the micro dataset used in this 
paper, it is useful to first have an idea of the macroeconomic context in which 
the reform takes place. I thus plot in Figure 6 the evolution of the 
employment-to-population ratio in the United Kingdom in the long run. The 
focus of this paper, the 1999 reform, occurs during a phase of steadily growing 
employment in the UK, and the reform does not have any immediate impact 
on the growing employment trend. While employment growth does slow down 
from August 2000 onwards, it is difficult to attribute this to the reform. By the 
beginning of 2005, the employment to population ratio reaches an almost all 
time high; it is only surpassed by the values observed before 1976. Thus, it is 
unlikely that the 1999 reform has had any major impact on average labor 
demand in the British economy.
4.1 Data
The British Labour Force Survey (LFS) is administrated each quarter 
and contains questions similar to the Current Population Survey in the US. It 
covers women from 15 to 59 years old, and men from 15 to 64 years old at the 
date of the first interview. It is a rotating panel, and each household12 remains 
in the sample for 5 months. This paper uses the 2-quarters Labour Force 
survey longitudinal datasets13 from March 1996 to September 2004. These 
datasets are put together by the UK Office of National Statistics and they 
contain all occurrences of individuals in the LFS being observed in two 
consecutive quarters.
The right to claim unfair dismissal only applies to employees (i.e. not 
self-employed, of course!) in permanent jobs working usually more than 16 
hours a week. I therefore restrict my main sample14 to those employees. In 
principle, workers on fixed-term contracts also have the right to claim unfair 
dismissal, but before 1999 (Employment Relations Act), they could 
contractually waive this right. Moreover, the majority of employees on fixed
12 Households in the sample are identified by their addresses so people who move during the 
survey drop out of the sample.
13 Full documentation about the datasets can be found on www.data-archive.ac.uk
14 A different sample will be used to study the duration of unemployment.
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term contracts have a tenure inferior to 2 years, which makes identifying the 
probability of being fired after 2 years difficult. Altogether, this means that 
analyzing the effects of the reform for this group would not be as instructive as 
for permanent workers. I therefore perform the analysis on the latter group 
only15.
Because the dataset is a panel, a job can be observed for two or more 
consecutive periods. I only keep the first observation for each job. Thus 
several jobs held by the same person can be present in the sample, but not the 
same job observed at two or more different points in time. When it is possible, 
I will therefore cluster by person, and when not I will only keep the first job 
observed for each person.
Having defined the relevant group of workers, I also have to compute 
their tenure. The date of hiring is present for more than 99% of currently 
employed workers along with the date of the interview. In most cases, both the 
year and month of hiring are known, which allows for the computation of the 
tenure in months. When only the year of hiring is known, and the worker has 
less than 4 years tenure, I drop the observation because monthly precision is 
important in that range; otherwise I keep it and assume the month of hiring 
was January (this is random with respect to each job). For workers who 
separate from their jobs, the tenure at separation can also be calculated. For 
those who are still unemployed by the second quarter, the date when their last 
job ended is present. If however workers have found a new job, the date when 
they left their last job is not present, so it has to be imputed. The distribution 
of completed unemployment spells lasting 3 months or less and beginning and 
ending with employment has 3 months as a mode. Therefore, I assume that if a 
worker separated from the job he was holding in the first quarter and found a 
new job by the second quarter, then he separated from the first job during the 
month of the first interview, i.e. I make the unemployment spell as long as 
possible in order to conform with the distribution of completed unemployment 
spells. Using the hiring date workers provided in the first quarter of
151 performed the analysis of the impact of the reform on employees on temporary jobs, i.e. 
fixed term contracts, seasonal work and agencies, and found that there is no impact of the 
reform (results not reproduced here).
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observation and the date when they left their job or the imputation thereof, I 
can thus compute their tenure in months at the moment of termination.
What are the potential tenure sampling problems? The sample of jobs is 
what is traditionally called in the duration literature a stock sample with 
follow-up: one observes the tenure of workers in employment at the date of 
the first interview (stock sample), and then whether they separate by the 
second interview (follow-up). This causes two problems. First, long tenures 
are overrepresented in the sense that one observes a higher proportion of high 
tenure workers in the sample than would be observed in a flow sample, i.e. in 
a sample where one can follow workers from day one of their job. Indeed, all 
the jobs that started x years before the first period of observation and ended in 
the meantime are not observed. However, it is possible to correct for this bias 
in survival analysis by specifying the date of entry in the study, which in this 
case will be the date of the first interview16. Second, the follow-up also causes 
a small problem if a job begun and ended during the 3-months period between 
two interviews. In that case, I make a wrong inference about which job was 
left and when: indeed, I will be assuming that the job left by the second 
quarter was the job observed at the first quarter, whereas in fact it was another 
short job that followed in the meantime. To document the prevalence of such a 
problem, I compare the characteristics in terms of occupation and industry of 
the last job held as described in the second quarter interview with those of the 
job that was held in the first quarter. As it happens, when the information on 
both jobs is available, there is a discrepancy in only 4% of the cases, and I 
decide to drop these latter cases.
If a worker left his job in the previous quarter, he is prompted to indicate 
the reason why the job ended among a list of the following possibilities: 
dismissed, made redundant, temporary job finished, resigned, gave up for 
health reasons, took early retirement, retired, gave up for family or personal 
reasons, other reason. When using duration models to explain a given type of
16 To be precise, I use as date of entry in the study the date of interview minus one month. 
This is because Stata drops all observations for which a failure is observed at the date of entry, 
and I just mentioned how some workers either lost their job during the month of their first 
interview or otherwise were assumed to have done so. The whole small subtlety occurs 
because we have discrete time steps that are long enough (one month) to contain both the 
interview and the job loss.
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separation, I treat other types of separations as censoring. In this section, I 
mainly focus on workers who were fired, i.e. dismissed or made redundant, 
since they are the ones directly affected by the law.
To summarize, the main sample consists of employees in permanent 
jobs usually working more than 16 hours per week and having a known tenure. 
Table 3 gives summary statistics for the sample used. Note that among the 
reasons given by workers for leaving their last job, dismissals and 
redundancies represent a sizeable 21.7%, a proportion comparable to the 
“other” category (22.4%) but lower that quits (35.6%). Since the question 
involves self-reporting, the distinction between dismissals and redundancies 
has to be taken with skepticism: indeed, workers may prefer to report that they 
were laid off rather than discharged. It is somewhat puzzling that the end of a 
temporary job is a reason quoted by 3.4% of workers although the sample 
includes permanent jobs only; however, while the question asking about 
permanent jobs prompts the worker to clearly indicate if the job is objectively 
temporary rather than temporary because he intends it to be temporary, this 
distinction is not insisted upon in the question about the reason for leaving the 
last job. Therefore, it could be that these workers meant that that job was 
temporary for them.
I now focus on workers who were fired.
4.2 A first look at firing rates by tenure
Assuming, consistent with the model, that workers with more than 24 
months tenure are a reasonable control group, I plot the raw monthly job loss 
rate by tenure range in Figure 7. The raw job loss rate is defined as the number 
of employees who lost their job through dismissal or redundancy over the total 
number of employees in the sample. Although there is a lot of month-to-month 
variation, one observes that globally the job loss rate of the control group (the 
more than 24 months tenure) is stable during the period observed, with some 
minor decrease in mid-2001, and some slightly higher values after the world 
economic downturn following September 2001. On the other hand, the treated 
group, i.e. the employees with less than 24 months tenure, has a decreasing 
trend in its firing rate starting after the June 1999 reform, so that at the end of 
the observation period the job loss rates for the treated group are smaller on
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average than at the beginning of the observation period, and they are also 
almost undistinguishable from the job loss rates of the control group.
This preliminary graphical analysis thus seems to indicate that the job 
loss probability of the treated group is negatively affected by the reform. In 
other terms, the reform seems to have decreased the separation probability for 
employees with less than 2 years tenure. I now investigate how the reform 
affected the hazard of firing for all tenures.
4.3 A Kaplan-Meier estimate of the hazard of firing
I plot the non-parametric Kaplan-Meier estimate of the hazard of firing 
before and after June 1999 (Figure 8). Like Farber(1994), I find a pattern 
consistent with Jovanovic’s 1979 model, and the model developed in section 
3. While the peak in terminations occurs at about 3 months as in Farber’s 
work, it is not as sharp. This difference is not due to my looking only at 
terminations and not at quits, as performing the same analysis on quits yields a 
similar pattern (see Appendix 2 Figure 12). It is instead likely to be due to the 
fact that the NSLY is a sample of young people. Indeed, I find that for people 
aged less than 40, there is a sharper peak at 3-4 months. The model developed 
in section 3 and in Marinescu (2005) suggests that the observed difference 
between younger and older workers’ firing hazard can be explained by higher 
firing and hiring costs for older workers, or by a greater per period uncertainty 
about older workers* performance.
Figure 8 shows that the shape of the hazard function in the before period 
is very similar to the theoretical hazard curve corresponding to a 24 months 
probationary period in Figure 3: in particular, one very clearly observes a 
trough in the firing hazard around 24 months. With respect to the change 
introduced by the reform, one observes that from 24 months on, the hazard 
function is essentially identical before and after the reform. This confirms that 
employees with more than 24 months of tenure form a good control group. 
The hazard of termination after the reform is significantly lower on the 
interval [0,24]. It is thus lower not only on the interval [12,23], but also on the 
interval [0,12], which indicates that it is likely that the quality of recruitment 
has increased (see model’s predictions in Table 2). Note that while there is no
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observable change in the firing hazard for the 24 to 48 months tenure group, 
this does not contradict the model’s predictions in the case of an increase in 
recruitment effort. Indeed, the decrease in the firing hazard for the 24 to 48 
months tenure group engendered by an increase in recruitment quality is likely 
to be very small (see section 3 and Figure 3).
In order to estimate how big a role increases in recruitment and/or 
monitoring efforts play in explaining the change in the shape of the hazard 
function after the reform, it is informative to perform a model calibration 
exercise: what are the parameters of the model that best correspond to the 
Kaplan-Meier empirical hazard before and after the reform? While imperfect 
due to the limitations of the model and the calibration procedure, this exercise 
is useful to build quantitative intuition about the effects of the reform on the 
firing hazard. The calibration procedure looks for the parameters of the model 
that minimize the sum of the squared differences between the theoretical and 
the empirically estimated firing hazard curves17. The fixed parameters in the 
model are the same as in section 3. The results of the calibration exercise are 
shown in Table 4. I begin with fitting the hazard in the pre-reform period. I 
find that the best fit implies a total firing and hiring cost of 6.6 during the first 
24 months, and 6.8 thereafter. To judge how big these costs are, the reader is 
reminded that a good match produces a value of 1 per month. Thus, firing and 
hiring costs are somewhat higher than 6 months of output. The proportion of 
good matches is 41%, and the standard error of the observation is 5.7. The 
calibration thus implies that the matching technology is not too efficient and 
that firing and hiring costs are high.
Now, what about the impact of the reform on those parameters? I first 
set the length of the probationary period to 12 months, and I look for the best q
17 It uses the Matlab function fminsearch to do so. Note moreover that I decide to calibrate the 
model to best fit the 36 first months of the empirical hazard function in the case of a 24 
months probationary period, and the 24 first months of the empirical hazard function in the 
case of a 12 months probationary period. The model is indeed inadequate at explaining firing 
hazards at high tenure for structural reasons, and so imposing that the model should fit the 
firing hazard at high tenure uselessly damages the quality of the fit at low tenure. Indeed, the 
theoretical firing hazard decreases very fast to 0 for high tenures, as almost all bad matches 
have been dissolved, whereas the empirical hazard remains roughly at the same level beyond 
30 months of tenure. This is very likely due to the fact that match quality is not in reality 
constant over time, as assumed by the model, but good matches may turn bad (see 
Marinescu(2006b) for a model that includes this feature).
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and cr parameters to fit the post-reform empirical firing hazard, leaving all 
other parameters as before. I find that the quality of recruitment has increased 
a lot from 42% of good matches to 63% of good matches. Moreover, 
monitoring intensity must also have slightly increased as the standard error 
decreased. In the third column, I use an alternative calibration procedure 
where I also allow the firing and hiring cost during the probationary period to 
vary. The reason for doing so is that if the recruitment efforts have increased, 
then hiring costs must have increased as well. The calibration results shown in 
the third column imply a substantially higher firing and hiring cost during the 
probationary period: indeed, the latter is now almost as high as the cost 
incurred after the probationary period (6.782 versus 6.8).
The calibration thus confirms the increase in recruitment effort in the 
post-reform period -  an inference which could already be made by observing 
the empirical hazard function and using the model's predictions -  and 
quantifies that increase. The calibration also shows a small increase in 
monitoring intensity, which could not be inferred by looking at the shape of 
the empirical hazard function but is consistent with what could have been 
expected ex ante. Thus, the reform seems to have encouraged firms to increase 
the quality of their recruitment and the intensity of monitoring. One way to 
check for the plausibility of this prediction is to rely on the fact that increasing 
monitoring or recruitment effort is likely to take some time while reducing the 
firing hazard of workers with 12 to 23 months tenure can be done more 
quickly. In this case, over time, one should observe that the hazard of firing 
first diminishes for the 12 to 23 months tenure, and then for the 0 to 11. This is 
indeed what I find when I plot the hazards using one year of data at a time 
(results not reproduced here). The way the hazard of firing changes through 
time is thus consistent with firms first directly reacting to the reform by firing 
less workers with 12 to 23 month tenure, and then increasing recruitment and 
monitoring efforts.
Another way of checking for the plausibility of the model’s predictions 
is to look for other evidence about firms’ recruitment and monitoring 
practices. One such piece of evidence is the 2004 Workplace Employment 
Relations Survey (WERS 2004). Data from this survey has not been made 
available yet, but I can draw on a summary of results by Kersley et al. (2005).
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Between 1998 and 2004, there has been no substantial change in the use of 
tests by employers when recruiting employees. Thus, if recruitment efforts are 
measured as the use of tests, there does not seem to be a substantial increase in 
recruitment efforts. However, this measure of recruitment efforts seems overly 
restrictive. Consistent with an increase in monitoring, performance appraisals 
are more widely used after the reform: while 73% of employers used them in 
1998, 78% did so in 2004. Another source of evidence on employers’ reaction 
to the qualifying period for unfair dismissal is the Blackburn and Hart (2002) 
report on small firms’ (i.e. with more than one but less than 50 employees) 
awareness and knowledge of individual employment rights. Employers report 
that unfair dismissal is the most constraining regulation after the minimum 
wage and maternity rights. In July-August 2000, 65% of these small 
employers were aware that there exists a length of service necessary to qualify 
for unfair dismissal, but their estimates varied between 1 week and 3 years, 
with a mean at 15 months, which is somewhat higher than the qualifying 
period prevailing in 2000. Lastly, employers also reported that because of the 
risk of an unfair dismissal trial, they are taking more care about who they 
recruit, which is consistent with an increase in recruitment efforts.
Having thus examined the basic patterns of change in the firing hazard, I 
move on to a more systematic approach, controlling for other variables that 
may have affected the hazard of firing.
4.4 Controlling for covariates using a Cox proportional hazard 
model
To test the robustness of my findings, I estimate a Cox proportional 
hazard model with delayed entry18, controlling for essential covariates. The 
advantage of such a model is that there is no need to specify the functional 
form of the baseline hazard (Lancaster 1990).
To test for the effect of the 1999 reform, I use two related procedures. 
First I plot the baseline hazard of firing before and after the reform in Figure 9. 
The method used here is to run a stratified Cox model and compute the
18 As explained in section 4.1, jobs are at risk of being terminated from the date of hiring but 
they are only observed from the date of the first interview on, i.e. they enter the study with a 
delay.
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baseline hazards for the strata “before” and for the strata “after”. The stratified 
Cox model assumes that the coefficients on the control variables are the same 
before and after the reform. Figure 9 is almost identical to the Kaplan-Meier 
plot in Figure 8 implying that controls for covariates do not change the main 
conclusions.
I then proceed to run a Cox regression with the following specification 
for the hazard of termination:
A(t, Z ) = A0 (t) exp { 0 Z(t) + yfTreat + /[Treat * After}
Z is a set of controls, including a full set of year dummies. Treat is a set of 
dummies for different ranges of tenure within the treatment group, i.e. 
employees with less than 25 months of tenure. After is a dummy that takes the 
value one from June 1999 on (or that takes the value 1 from June 2000 on and 
is missing from June 1998 to May 2000, depending on specifications). 
Treat*After is the interaction between Treat and After. The Treat dummies 
measure how the hazard of termination for the treatment group systematically 
differs from the hazard of termination for the control group. A test of the 
negative effect of the reform on the hazard of termination is that the 
coefficients in the y\ vector are negative and significant.
Panel A of Table 5 presents the results using basic tenure categories for 
the treated groups, that is 0 to 11 months and 12 to 23 months. Using After 
1999 as the reform dummy, I find that the reform significantly reduced the 
firing hazard by 18% for workers with 0 to 11 months tenure and by 20% for 
workers with 12 to 23 months tenure relative to those workers having more 
than 24 months tenure. I can also use as a control the workers with 24 to 48 
months tenure, as they are likely to be more similar to the 0 to 23 months 
tenure group than workers who have tenures above 48 months. Using this 
control group does not change the results: if anything, the effect of the reform 
is now stronger. A problem with using “after June 1999” as the post-reform 
period is that firms may have anticipated the reform and/or it may have taken 
some time for firms to adjust to the new regulation. Therefore, I use as an 
alternative measure the after period “after June 1999, but excluding
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observations from May 1998 to May 2000”. The results are not, however, 
affected by this change in the definition of the reform period19.
In panel B, I use detailed tenure categories to examine the effects on 
different tenure subgroups. Again, the choice of control group or post-reform 
period does not change the results. I therefore concentrate on the more 
demanding specification, i.e. taking the 24 to 48 months group as a control and 
using “after June 1999, excluding May 1998 to May 2000” as the post-reform 
period. This is also the specification I adopt in the rest of the paper, unless 
otherwise specified. Concerning the effect of the reform on different tenure 
categories, I find that the negative effect of the reform on the firing hazard is 
significant for all subgroups up to month 21, and fades away from month 22 to 
months 25. The effect is of similar magnitude as in panel A, implying a 
reduction in the firing hazard of about 30 to 40% for all subgroups from month 
5 to month 21, with a somewhat smaller effect for the 0 to 4 months tenure 
group. The fact that the effect is smaller for that very low tenure group was to 
be expected from the observation of Figure 3 (compare the “24 months prob. 
period” curve with the “12 months prob. period, q=.7” curve) and Figure 8. 
The reduction in the firing hazard is largest for the 18 to 21 months tenure, 
likely due to the fact that before the reform there used to be a spike at about 21 
months tenure (Figure 8).
In general, the reform is found to be effective in lowering the hazard of 
firing for the group newly protected by the right to claim unfair dismissal, i.e. 
the 12 to 23 months tenure group. Moreover, it also significantly lowers the 
hazard of termination for workers with 0 to 11 months tenure, which is 
consistent with the employers having increased their recruitment efforts in 
reaction to the reform.
4.5 Impact on different groups
In this section, I test whether the reform has heterogeneous effects on 
subgroups of workers. Indeed, numerous papers studying the impact of firing
19 I also used two other definitions of the reform dummy. In one case, I only allowed for an 
anticipation effect, excluding the period May 1998 to June 1999, and in the other I only 
allowed for an adaptation effect by excluding June 1999 to May 2000. The results in presented 
in Table 5 are however unaffected by these alternative definitions.
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costs found that higher firing costs tended to mostly protect prime-age males 
and more educated workers while negatively affecting youths, females and the 
less educated (see for example OECD(1999) or Blanchard and Landier(2002)). 
It is therefore interesting to ask if this tightening in workers’ protection against 
unfair dismissal affected differentially these latter groups. Moreover, 
analyzing the effects by sub-groups allows for better estimation in as much as 
fewer constraints on the parameters have to be imposed. Indeed, different 
worker types have different underlying parameters affecting the shape of their 
firing hazard, while the Cox specification only allows for proportional shift 
with covariates. If a sub-group has an altogether different pattern of firing 
hazard by tenure, then the Cox specification does not properly take that into 
account. This means that it is useful for identification purposes to separate the 
sample in more homogenous sub-groups.
Table 6 examines the effects of the reform by gender and age, while 
Table 7 looks at education. Panel A of Table 6 shows the break-down by 
gender. While females see a somewhat higher decrease in their firing hazard 
than men, this difference is not significant. Thus, reforms in the areas of 
dependent care and sex discrimination, which intervened at the same time as 
the reform of interest, are not driving the results. Panel B shows the break­
down by age. The effect on the 0 to 11 months tenure group is basically the 
same for old and young workers, whereas the effect for 12 to 23 months tenure 
group is more pronounced for younger workers.
Table 7 shows the impact of the reform on the firing hazard by level of 
education. The hazard of firing significantly decreases for workers with 0 to 
23 months tenure who are less than college educated, but not for those who are 
college educated. For workers with 12 to 23 months tenure, the hazard of 
firing decreases for all levels of education, even though the point estimate of 
the decrease in the firing hazard for university educated workers with 12 to 23 
months tenure is lower and insignificant. Why are university educated workers 
different? When looking at the Kaplan-Meier plot of their hazard of firing 
before and after the reform (figure not reproduced here), it appears that the 
positive insignificant effect of the reform (Table 7) on workers with 0 to 11 
months tenure is due to the fact that after the reform the peak in the firing
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hazard occurs at 7 months, while it occurred at 12 months before the reform. 
Moreover, while the trough in the firing hazard at 24 months was much bigger 
for university educated workers than for the whole population before the 
reform, it completely disappears after the reform. The model in section 3 
explains these results. First, the peak in the firing hazard occurs later for 
higher educated workers than for others because these workers are more costly 
to fire and hire and/or harder to monitor. Both assumptions seem realistic in 
the case of university educated workers. However, after the reform, firms can 
no longer wait so long before they fire because with the new 12-months 
probationary period they would incur too high a firing cost; thus the peak in 
the firing hazard occurs before 12 months after the reform, consistent with an 
increase in monitoring effort. Moreover, the model tells us that the hazard of 
firing will only decrease at low tenures, i.e. here for workers with 0 to a few 
months tenure, if the quality of recruitment increases. It is likely that 
university educated workers were already recruited with care, so that there was 
not much room for efficient improvement there, which provides an 
explanation for the absence of a negative effect for the 0 to 11 months tenure 
group. To get a better understanding of the impact of the reform on the 
university/college educated workers, I fit the model to the Kaplan-Meier 
estimates of the firing hazard, as done previously for the full sample. Table 8 
shows that after the reform, recruitment efforts remain roughly the same with 
about 63% of good matches. Note that this number is higher than for the 
whole sample before the reform (41%) and roughly equal to the sample mean 
after the reform. In other terms, university/college educated workers were 
indeed already recruited with much more care before the reform. After the 
reform, the recruitment effort for other employees catches up. The other 
salient finding of Table 8 is that employers have significantly increased 
monitoring efforts after the reform, with a standard error of the observation 
process going from 7.6 to 6.9. Lastly, allowing firing and hiring costs during 
the probationary period to change does not yield in this case a higher cost after 
the reform, but the cost seems to have slightly decreased. These findings 
altogether may explain why the WERS 2004 survey shows no evidence fore 
an increase in the use of tests for recruitment but does find an increase in the 
use of performance appraisals. Indeed, if tests and performance appraisals are
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mainly used for the more qualified workers, then these findings are consistent 
with the absence of change in recruitment efforts and increase in monitoring 
efforts found for the higher educated workers.
In conclusion, I do not find that males, older or more educated workers 
are most protected by the reform. Quite to the contrary, there is some evidence 
that females, younger and less educated workers are those who see the greatest 
reduction in their firing hazards. Moreover, heterogeneity in underlying 
parameters such as firing and hiring costs and the observability of 
performance does seem to be important, especially when considering different 
levels of education: thus, the reform has a different impact on the most 
educated workers when compared to other educational groups.
4.6 Impact on other separation hazards
To place firing in the context of other types of separation, I examine the 
hazard of any job separation after the reform (Figure 10). One can see that 
while all separations significantly decrease after the reform, they do not follow 
the same tenure pattern as firings, i.e. one does not see a trough in separations 
at around 24 months in the “before” period, and the hazards before and after 
become insignificantly different at tenure 30, and not tenure 24. Thus the 
shape of the firing hazard seems to be indeed determined by the existence of 
the right to claim unfair dismissal, while the overall separation hazard is not 
visibly affected by the consequences of that right. Moreover, to evaluate the 
global effect of the reform, it is interesting to note that while the firing hazard 
decreases, it is not the case that other types of separations increase at the same 
time so much as to imply no change in the overall separation hazard. In fact, 
the separation hazard is lower after the reform.
While the firing hazard has decreased after the reform, it is possible that firms 
have forced some workers to quit in order to avoid firing costs. These quits 
would then be disguised firings.
Figure 12 in Appendix 2 shows that the quit hazard did not increase after 
the reform. Because firms have increased their efforts towards higher match 
quality, one might expect to see a lower quit hazard, and so the fact that the 
latter only slightly diminishes may indicate that indeed some firms push the
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least productive workers to quit. Making the extreme assumption that all quits 
are in fact firings, I reproduce the analysis of Table 5. While I still find that the 
firing hazard has decreased, the decrease is now of lower magnitude, and it is 
only statistically significant for workers with 12 to 23 months of tenure 
(results not reproduced here). The assumption that all quits are disguised 
firings being extreme, I take the results of this analysis as showing that my 
findings are robust to shifts from firings to quits.
I next look at the impact of the reform on other key labor market 
outcomes such as training, wages or unemployment.
5 Impact on other labor market outcomes: training, 
wages, and unemployment duration
The analysis of the impact of the reform on other labor market outcomes 
is enlightening for two reasons. First, it allows for further investigation of the 
plausibility that firms have indeed increased their recruitment and monitoring 
efforts. Second, to better evaluate the overall welfare effect of the reform, one 
should look, beyond the effect on firing, at other positive or negative effects of 
the reform. In particular, it is essential to look at unemployment duration since 
theory predicts that with higher expected firing costs, one should see higher 
unemployment duration, and an increase in recruitment effort would only 
reinforce this effect.
However, the theory developed in section 3 does not directly generate 
predictions concerning the effects of the reform on labor market outcomes 
such as training, wages or unemployment duration. Indeed, that theory only 
applies to firing decisions taken by the firm. I will therefore have to use 
theoretical insights from other models of relevance in each particular case. 
However, because of the lack of appropriate theory and data, it is typically 
hard to find good control groups, and therefore estimates should be taken with 
caution.
5.1 Impact on wages and training
Theoretically, higher firing costs may increase or decrease wages. A first 
strand of theory argues that higher firing costs give a higher bargaining power
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to employed workers and so wages increase (Lindbeck and Snower, 2001). A 
second strand of theory argues that since workers value job security, they 
should accept lower wages (Summers, 1989). The relevant comparison in this 
case is workers with 12 to 23 months tenure versus workers with 24 to 48 
months tenure. Indeed, workers with 12 to 23 months tenure are more 
expensive to fire after the reform, so this would imply an increase in their 
wages relative to the 24 to 48 months tenure group under the first theory and a 
decrease in wages under the second theory.
However, before I can test this effect on wages, I have to take into
account the introduction of a National Minimum Wage, which came into force
April 1st 1999. Studies of the effect of the minimum wage in the UK show that
spillovers may have taken place on the wage distribution up to the first decile
at most (Low Pay Commission, 2003). In order to eliminate the effects of the
minimum wage, I look only at workers above the first decile of the wage
distribution. Panel A of Table 9 shows the effect of the reform on wages of
workers with different tenures: while if I use all workers, wages seem to have
increased, and even significantly so for workers with 0 to 11 months tenure,
when using only workers who were not affected by the minimum wage, this
effect disappears. I therefore conclude that the reform had no significant effect 
20on wages .
Training can be affected in two ways by a probationary period. First, 
higher firing costs after the probationary period can increase training in as 
much as it can be cheaper to train current marginal employees than to fire 
them and try to hire more productive employees. Thus, empirically firms who 
perceive higher firing costs are also more likely to train their workers (Pierre 
and Scarpetta, 2004). Another related theory is that firing costs increase 
implicit screening costs for all firms, which increases the value of the 
informational advantage of the current employer. Therefore the latter is more 
likely to provide training (Acemoglu and Pischke, 1998). These two theories
20 The reader may wander at this point what happens to the main findings on the hazard of 
firing when restricting the sample to workers above the tenth decile of the wage distribution. 
Once one corrects for the sample selection this entails (in particular for the under­
representation of high tenure workers among the observations where wage data is non­
missing), the results are unaffected.
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would imply in my setting that employees newly protected by the 1999 
reform, that is employees with 12 to 23 months tenure, should receive more 
training after the reform. The training of employees with 0 to 11 months 
tenure may also increase because while the firing cost incurred by firms i f  they 
fire workers in that tenure range does not change after the reform, the expected 
firing cost does increase as the probationary period is now shorter. A second 
way in which firing costs could affect training is through the interaction 
between training and recruitment and monitoring efforts. First, training can 
select for a more productive and stable workforce: thus, Cappelli(2002) shows 
that employers who offer tuition assistance for their employees to go to 
college manage to select better quality employees who stay longer on the job. 
This would imply that training increases across the board after the reform as a 
strategy used by employers to generate better quality matches. Second, firms 
face a trade-off when deciding on the timing of training. On the one hand, 
training can be particularly beneficial at the beginning of the employment 
relationship because the worker can be better adapted to the job from the very 
beginning. On the other hand, the firm may not be willing to invest in workers 
whose quality is uncertain and whom it would be likely to fire later on. If, 
however, recruitment quality increases, training can take place earlier in the 
employment relationship. This predicts that workers with low tenure should 
receive more training. Third, training in the very beginning of the employment 
relationship may also be used as a screening and monitoring device, i.e. by 
training workers, firms may learn more about their ability than otherwise. 
From fitting the model in section 3, we know that employers have likely 
increased their monitoring efforts. This implies that training should have 
increased after the reform for the 0 to 11 months tenure group.
The proportion of workers who get training21 has increased across the 
board after the reform (results not reproduced here), consistently with the idea 
that employers are trying to select for better matches, or that they train more
21 Training is here « any training in the last four weeks ». Such training is paid for by the 
employer in a large majority of cases (71%). However, the information on who pays for 
training is only available for about a fourth of the sample, so I do not use i t  The results are 
less significant but not different if I use only the sample where the information is available and 
I define training as “training paid for by the employer”.
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precisely because they manage to form better matches and the returns to 
training are increasing in match quality. Panel B of Table 9 documents the 
effect of the reform on firms’ propensity to train their workers at different 
tenures. Workers with 12 to 23 months tenure do not get more training, while 
workers with 0 to 11 months tenure do. The impact of the reform on training is 
thus consistent with firms having increased their recruitment and monitoring 
efforts.
5.2 Impact on unemployment duration
There are three reasons why unemployment duration may increase after 
the reform. First, if expected firing costs increase, then labor demand may 
decrease, leading to higher unemployment duration. Second, even if labor 
demand does not decrease, firms’ increased recruitment efforts could imply 
that it takes longer to pre-screen workers, and so unemployment duration 
should increase. Third, if match quality is not purely idiosyncratic but is also 
determined by general ability, and if moreover the current employer is better 
informed about the worker’s general ability than the market, then a worker 
getting fired under higher firing costs sends a worse signal to the market. This 
would imply that workers fired between 1 and 2 years tenure after the reform 
should all other things equal have higher unemployment durations than 
workers fired between 1 and 2 years tenure before the reform22.
Table 11 tries to identify the effects of the reform on unemployment 
duration. To perform this analysis, I use a sample of unemployed individuals 
in the sense of the International Labour Organization (ILO) from the same 
dataset I used for the employed. Summary statistics for this sample are 
provided in Table 10. To identify the effect of the reform on the duration of 
unemployment, I use two strategies. First, in panel A of Table 11,1 look at the 
probability of finding a permanent job with more than 16 hours a week after 
the reform. The reform actually seems to have a positive effect on the 
probability of exiting unemployment towards a treated job. This is not to say 
that the reform has actually increased this probability by 11%, but it seems 
that at least any negative impact of the reform has been overpowered by
22 Unfortunately, for lack of a long enough follow up period, it is not possible to properly test 
this specific hypothesis.
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otherwise positive trends. Moreover, increased match quality may create 
positive externalities so that the supply of treated jobs may increase despite the 
cost to individual firms of increasing match quality. Consistent with this 
finding, I observe that the proportion of permanent jobs among jobs with 16 or 
more hours a week steadily increases, just as much before as after the June 
1999 reform (Figure 11). Therefore, it does not seem that the reform incited 
employers to substitute away from full-time permanent jobs.
A second strategy I use in panel B of Table 11 is to look at the exit 
towards any job and use the difference between those looking for full-time 
jobs and the others. Because the unfair dismissal provisions only apply to full­
time jobs, we expect that workers looking for full-time jobs take longer to find 
a job relative to other unemployed workers. Note that part-time workers are 
actually a good control group because since the Part-time Workers (Prevention 
of Less Favourable Treatment) Regulations 2000, which came into force on 
July 1st 2000, they have the same rights as full-time workers in most areas, 
except precisely for this right to claim unfair dismissal.
The table shows no negative effect of the reform on the duration of 
unemployment for workers looking for full-time jobs relative to the others . 
Quite to the contrary, the reform seems to have a positive effect implying that 
workers looking for a full-time job are 9% more likely to exit unemployment 
after the reform. Once again, this is not to say that the reform had a causal 
effect, but that any negative effects have been overrun by stronger positive 
effects. In conclusion, the reform has no discemable negative effect on the 
duration of unemployment or on the relative supply of permanent jobs with 
more than 16 hours a week, implying that any negative effects have been 
overpowered by positive ones.
23 Note that being part-time or full-time is left by the LFS to the subjective appreciation of the 
worker. In practice, 37.55% of workers who say they work part-time and are in permanent 
jobs work 15 hours or less, and 45.45% work 16 or less hours. Therefore, some of the “part- 
timers” are de facto also affected by the unfair dismissal provision. This means that any 
negative effect of the reform will be underestimated if one compares workers looking for full­
time jobs versus the others.
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6 Conclusion and possible extensions
Using a learning model, I have shown that the existence of a 
probationary period influences firms’ firing pattern so that, all else equal, there 
is a peak in the firing hazard just before the end of the probationary period and 
a trough right after the end of the probationary period. This effect is smaller 
the smaller the difference between firing costs before and after the end of the 
probationary period. The empirical analysis showed that shortening the 
qualifying period for the right to claim unfair dismissal reduced the hazard of 
firing for newly covered workers, but also for workers with lower tenure, 
reflecting firms’ increase in recruitment efforts. Firms have also increased 
their monitoring efforts and their investment in training after the reform.
These results are only partially consistent with the predictions of the 
British labor government about the impact of the reform (section 2). First, they 
predicted that it would encourage workers to change jobs, leading to a more 
flexible labor market. This is not the case however as quits and overall 
separations have actually decreased. Second, they predicted that employers 
would adopt better employment practices, thus increasing productivity: this 
seems to have happened since employers are more careful about whom they 
hire, they monitor their workers better, and they train them more. Lastly, the 
government thought that one year is enough time for the initial screening of 
workers: this does not seem to be confirmed by the data, since the reform 
prompted firms to change their human resource management policies, 
precisely to limit the need for firing past one year of tenure.
These results on the British reform are of particular interest for the 
evaluation of the new CNE contract in France and the longer probationary 
period proposed in Germany by the Merkel government: thus, lengthening the 
probationary period should increase firing, decrease match quality, and have a 
limited impact on employment. However, these predictions are based on direct 
extrapolation of the British results, and do not take into account the 
specificities of the French or German economies. I therefore plan to evaluate 
these reforms directly as data becomes available.
In the debate about the effects of firing costs, this work has shown that 
the British reduction in the probationary period, and the associated increase in
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expected firing costs, did not have any discemable effect on employment or 
the duration of unemployment, while it likely increased productivity via better 
matches and more training.
This paper could be extended along several lines. First, to better 
understand the mechanisms at play, it would be helpful to examine countries 
with different lengths of the probationary period and different firing costs. The 
United Kingdom is indeed a special case: while its employment law is very 
similar in structure to that of the countries from continental Europe, firing 
costs are much lower on average. Examining more typical European countries 
such as France or Germany should thus shed more light on how a probationary 
period affects firms’ behavior and labor market outcomes in the European 
institutional context. Second, the model used here could be applied to other 
questions. For example, I have shown how the distributions of firms’ beliefs 
about workers’ productivity evolve with tenure: this may have important 
implications for the wage distribution by tenure.
In general, it would be useful to further investigate how the widely 
spread institution of a probationary period can solve the trade-offs policy 
makers face when deciding on firing costs. While I have shown some ways in 
which a probationary period can affect economic efficiency, i.e. for example 
by influencing firms’ investments in match quality and human capital, this 
paper sheds little light on how this institution affects labor demand or interacts 
with the business cycle. The analysis of general equilibrium and business 
cycle effects of tenure-dependant job protection is thus a promising avenue for 
future research.
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Table 1 : parameters used to compute results in the benchmark case
Parameters Values
Discount factor 8 .995
Initial proportion of good matches q .5
Standard error of signal cr 4
Firing costs c 7
Maximal tenure 2 0 0
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Figure 1 : the effect of a probationary period on the firing hazard
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Figure 2: belief distributions in the reference case
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Figure 3: the effect of an increase in recruitment effort or monitoring intensity
after the reform
0.1
24 months prob. period 
12 months prob. period, q=.7 
12 months prob. period, o2=4
0.09
0.08
0.07
0.06
-*= 0.05O)
: i  0.04
r*
0.03
0.02
0.01
45
Tenure in months
58
Figure 4: belief distributions in the case of an increase in recruitment effort
after the reform
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Figure 5: distributions o f belief in the case o f an increase in monitoring
intensity after the reform
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Table 2: Effects predicted by the model for a reduction in the probation period 
from 24 to 12 months
No change in 
recruitment 
effort or 
monitoring
Increase in 
recruitment 
effort
Increase in 
monitoring
0 to  a few m onths tenure NONE — + + +
12 to  24 m onths tenure — — —
24 m onths tenure  and  m ore -NONE — —
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Figure 6: The evolution of the employment to population ratio
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Source: UK National Statistics, MGSR series, computed from the Labour Force 
Survey.
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Table 3: Summary statistics for the sample of permanent full-time employees
Obs. Mean Std. Min Max
Macro situation
Unemployment rate (claimant count) 436867 3.954 1.706 1.5 11.7
Reason for leavlna last lob
dismissed 39954 0.030 0.172 0 1
made redundant,voluntary redundancy 39954 0.183 0.389 0 1
temporary job ended 39954 0.034 0.180 0 1
resigned 39954 0.358 0.479 0 1
gave up work for health reasons 39954 0.046 0.209 0 1
took early retirement 39954 0.024 0.153 0 1
retired 39954 0.026 0.160 0 1
family, personal reason 39954 0.074 0.261 0 1
left for some other reason 39954 0.225 0.417 0 1
Job characteristics
Tenure 436097 98.456 101.866 0 652
Usual hours worked per week 433442 36.596 8.948 16 97
Gross weekly wage In pounds 167695 333.354 282.744 1 44000
Log real hourly wage 166926 -2.633 0.571 -8.792 2.342
Job training 435358 0.287 0.452 0 1
Person characteristics
Female 436867 0.460 0.498 0 1
Married and cohabiting 436867 0.580 0.494 0 1
Age 436867 38.850 11.566 16 64
Less than high school educated 436771 0.247 0.432 0 1
University educated 436771 0.278 0.448 0 1
Occupation cateaorles
Manager 436690 0.161 0.368 0 1
Professional 436690 0.111 0.314 0 1
Associate professional and technical 436690 0.121 0.326 0 1
Administrative and secretarial 436690 0.159 0.366 0 1
Skilled trades occupations 436690 0.107 0.309 0 1
Personal service occupations 436690 0.090 0.285 0 1
Sales and customer service occupations 436690 0.073 0.260 0 1
Process, plant and machine operatives 436690 0.098 0.297 0 1
Elementary occupations 436690 0.081 0.273 0 1
Emolover characteristics
Private sector employer 435832 0.643 0.479 0 1
Manufacturing or construction sector 436699 0.238 0.426 0 1
Administration sector 436699 0.044 0.205 0 1
Notes: The sample is restricted to persons who are employed in the first quarter, in a 
permanent job, and usually working 16 or more hours a week. Only the first 
observation for each job (as defined by the hiring date) is kept.
Source: Labour Force Survey Two-Quarter Longitudinal Dataset (www.data- 
archive.ac.uk). For the unemployment rate, UK National Statistics, Time Series data 
[NS TSD], Regional claimant count rate, non seasonally adjusted, series code EGU4.
63
Figure 7: Job loss rate
Job loss rate
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Notes: the job loss rate is calculated as  the number of workers who were dismissed 
or made redundant between the first and the second interview nuarter over the total
Figure 8: Kaplan-Meier estimates o f the firing hazard before and after the
reform
o
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Notes: The figure plots smoothed non-parametric Kaplan-Meier firing hazard 
estimates. Firing is defined as dismissing or making redundant a worker. The sample 
is restricted to persons who are employed in the first quarter, in a permanent job, and 
usually working 16 or more hours a week. Only the first observation for each person 
is kept.
Source: Labour Force Survey Two-Quarter Longitudinal Dataset (www.data- 
archive.ac.ukl.
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Table 4: parameters of the calibrated model
Before June 1999 After June 1999 After June 1999
Length of probationary period 24 months 12 months 12 months
q 0.414 0.630 0.624
a 5.706 5.554 5.567
cO 6.602 6.602 6.782
c1 6.800 6.800 6.800
Discount factor 0.995 0.995 0.995
Maximal tenure 200 months 200 months 200 months
Notes: The bold numbers are those that were calibrated, while the other numbers 
were taken as parameters. cO is the firing cost during the probationary period and c1 
is the firing cost after the probationary period. The model is calibrated to best fit the 
36 first months of the empirical hazard function in the case of a 24 months 
probationary period, and the 24 first months of the empirical hazard function in the 
case of a 12 months probationary period.
66
Figure 9: Adjusted estimates of the firing hazard before and after the reform
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■ Adjusted smoothed firing hazard function: after June 1999
Notes: The plots are the smoothed baseline firing hazards after a stratified Cox 
regression model where “before" and “after” are the two strata. Firing is defined as 
dismissing or making redundant a worker. The control variables included in the Cox 
regression are: the regional unemployment rate in the month under consideration, 
age, gender, education, occupation, sector (public or private), industry. The graph is
then plotted at the median values of these variables (when the latter are categorical
and cover more than one category, the most frequent category is used). The sample 
is restricted to persons who are employed in the first quarter, in a permanent job, and 
usually working 16 or more hours a week. Only the first observation for each person 
is kept.
Source: Labour Force Survey Two-Quarter Longitudinal Dataset (www.data- 
archive.ac.ukl. For the unemployment rate: UK National Statistics, Time Series data 
[NS TSD], Regional claimant count rate, non seasonally adjusted, series code EGU4.
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Figure 10: Kaplan-Meier estimates of the separation hazard before and after
the reform
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Smoothed separation hazard function: before June 1999
 ..........................  Smoothed separation hazard function: after June 1999
...............................  90% Confidence interval
Notes: sam e as  Figure 8, except that the failure event here is any job separation, 
instead of dismissals or redundancies only.
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Table 5: Impact of the reform on the hazard of firing by tenure
Post reform period: 
After June 1999
Control Control
group: group:
24 months 24-48
and more months
tenure tenure
Post reform period: 
After June 1999, excluding 
May 1998 to May 2000
Control Control
group: group:
24 months 24-48
and more months
tenure tenure
A. Basic tenure categories
0 to 11 months tenure -0.182 -0.267 -0.158 -0.282
(0.050)*** (0.072)*** (0.060)*** (0.087)***
12 to 23 months tenure -0.205 -0.290 -0.202 -0.326
(0.065)*** (0.083)*** (0.078)** (0.100)***
B. Detailed tenure categories
Control Control Control Control
group: group: group: group:
26 months 26-48 26 months 26-48
and more months and more months
tenure tenure tenure tenure
0 to 4 months tenure -0.135 -0.223 -0.071 -0.195
(0.069)* (0.088)** (0.085) (0.108)*
5 to 11 months tenure -0.203 -0.292 -0.190 -0.313
(0.060)*** (0.082)*** (0.073)*** (0.099)***
12 to 17 months tenure -0.203 -0.292 -0.188 -0.311
(0.081)** 
n nr\A
(0.098)***
n onn
(0.099)*
r\ onn
(0.120)*** 
r \  a *
Number of observations 430604_______430604
between tenure categories and Notes: The coefficients reported are the interactions
“after”. Cox proportional hazard models are used.
Table 6: Impact of the reform on the firing hazard by gender and age
A. Gender
Males Females
0 to  11 m on ths tenure  -0.223
(0 .106)** 
12 to  23 m onths tenure  -0.307
(0 .122)**
-0.392
(0.153)**
-0.348
(0.177)**
N um ber of observations 180899 154883
B. Age
Age<40 Age>=40
0 to  11 m on ths tenu re  -0.299
(0 .110)*** 
12 to  23 m onths tenure  -0.421
(0.127)***
-0.263
(0.146)*
-0.150
(0.167)
N um ber of o b serva tions 174762 204265
Notes: The coefficients reported are the interactions between tenure categories and 
the “after June 1999, excluding May 1998 to May 2000” dummy. Cox proportional 
hazard models are used.
Robust standard errors clustered by person in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
The control group is 24 to 48 months tenure.
All regressions include the following controls: tenure categories dummies (same as 
listed in the table), unemployment rate, married and cohabiting dummy, age, 2 
education dummies, 8 occupational dummies, private sector dummy, manufacturing 
and construction dummy, administration dummy, 3 guarters dummies, year dummies 
(years are June to May). Regressions in panel B also include a female dummy.
The sample is restricted to persons who are employed in the first guarter, in a 
permanent job, and usually working 16 or more hours a week. Only the first 
observation for each job (as defined by the hiring date) is kept.
Source: Labour Force Survey Two-Quarter Longitudinal Dataset (www.data- 
archive.ac.ukl. For the unemployment rate: UK National Statistics, Time Series data 
[NS TSD], Regional claimant count rate, non seasonally adjusted, series code EGU4.
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Table 7: Impact of the reform on the firing hazard by education level
Less than High school but University/College
high school less than college educated
0 to 11 months tenure -0.358 -0.319 0.145
(0.153)** (0.125)** (0.215)
12 to 23 months tenure -0.297 -0.429 -0.166
(0.177)* (0.148)*** (0.220)
Number of observations 81712 159224 94846
Notes: The coefficients reported are the interactions between tenure categories and 
the “after June 1999, excluding May 1998 to May 2000” dummy. Cox proportional 
hazard models are used.
Robust standard errors clustered by person in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1 %.
The control group is 24 to 48 months tenure.
All regressions include the following controls: tenure categories dummies (sam e a s  
listed in the table), unemployment rate, female dummy, married and cohabiting 
dummy, age, 8 occupational dummies, private sector dummy, manufacturing and 
construction dummy, administration dummy, 3 quarters dummies, year dummies 
(years are June to May).
The sample is restricted to persons who are employed in the first quarter, in a
p erm a n en t fnh anH ncnallv  u/nrkinn nr m nra hnnre a  u /eak  O nlu th a  first
jrce: Labour Force Survey Two-Quarter Longitudinal Dataset (www.data- 
iive.ac.uk). For the unemployment rate: UK National Statistics, Time Series data 
! TSD], Regional claimant count rate, non seasonally adjusted, series code EGU4.
Table 8 : Parameters of the calibrated model for college/university educated 
workers
Before June 1999 After June 1999 After June 1999
Length of probationary period 24 months 12 months 12 months
q 0.631 0.633 0.633
o 7.616 6.901 6.902
cO 7.778 7.778 7.761
c1 7.801 7.801 7.801
Discount factor 0.995 0.995 0.995
Maximal tenure 200 months 200 months 200 months
Notes: The bold numbers are those that were calibrated, while the other numbers 
were taken as parameters. cO is the firing cost during the probationary period and c1 
is the firing cost after the probationary period. The model is calibrated to best fit the 
36 first months of the empirical hazard function in the case of a 24 months 
probationary period, and the 24 first months of the empirical hazard function in the 
case of a 12 months probationary period.
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Table 9: Impact of the reform on wages and training
A.Log real hourly wage
All workers
Workers above 
the 1st decile
B. Training
0 to 11 m onths tenure 0.016 -0.002 0.017
(0.009)* (0.008) (0.007)**
12 to 23 m onths tenure 0.012 0.009 -0.008
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007)
R-squared 0.45 0.44
Number of observations 126855 106934 338238
Notes: The coefficients reported are the interactions between tenure categories and 
the “after June 1999, excluding May 1998 to May 2000” dummy. Panels A reports 
results from OLS regressions. Panel B reports the marginal effects from a probit 
model; while the marginal interactions effects are not properly calculated by the 
dprobit Stata command, the coefficients from a linear probability model are quasi 
identical.
Robust standard errors clustered by person in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
The control group is 24 to 48 months tenure.
All regressions include the following controls: tenure categories dummies (sam e as
Table 10: Summary statistics for the sample of ILO unemployed
Obs. Mean Std. Min Max
Macro situation
Unemployment rate (claimant count) 38004 4.437 1.827 1.5 11.7
Unemployment spell characteristics
Unemployment duration 38004 31.775 52.734 0 482
Seeking full-time employee job 38004 0.513 0.500 0 1
Person characteristics
Female dummy 38004 0.408 0.491 0 1
Married and cohabiting dummy 38004 0.372 0.483 0 1
Age 38004 36.076 12.667 15 64
Less than high school educated dummy 37997 0.395 0.489 0 1
University educated dummy 37997 0.156 0.363 0 1
Notes: The sample is restricted to persons who are ILO unemployed in the first 
quarter and whose date of leaving their previous job is known. Only the first 
observation for each unemployment spell (as defined by the date when the last job 
was left) is kept.
Source: Labour Force Survey Two-Quarter Longitudinal Dataset (www.data- 
archive.ac.uk). For the unemployment rate: UK National Statistics, Time Series data 
[NS TSD], Regional claimant count rate, non seasonally adjusted, series code EGU4.
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Table 11: Impact of the reform on the duration o f unemployment
A. Exit unemployment
towards a permanent job B. Exit unemployment
with more than 16 hours 
a week
towards any job
After 0.107
(0.031)***
Looking preferably for full-time 0.005
employee job (0.025)
Looking preferably for full-time 0.086
employee job*After (0.030)***
Number of observations 27966 27956
Notes: Cox proportional hazard models are used. After is defined as  “after June 1999, 
excluding May 1998 to May 2000”.
Robust standard errors clustered by person in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
All regressions include the following controls: unemployment rate, female dummy, 
married and cohabiting dummy, age, 2 education dummies, 3 quarters dummies. 
Regressions in panel B also include dummies for types of job looked for, dummies for 
types of job looked for interacted with “after”, and year dummies (years are June to 
May).
The sample is restricted to persons who are ILO unemployed in the first quarter and
Figure 11: Evolution of the proportion of permanent jobs among full-time jobs
CO _
CD
CO _ 
CD
CM _ 
CD
1996m6 1998m6 2000m6 2002m6 2004m6
1997m6 1999m6 2001 m6 2003m6
Notes: The sample is restricted to persons who are employed in the first quarter and 
usually working 16 or more hours a week. Only the first observation for each job (as 
defined by the hiring date) is kept.
Source: Labour Force Survey Two-Quarter Longitudinal Dataset (www.data- 
archive.ac.uk).
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APPENDIX 1 : Equations for the firm’s belief about match quality, and the
firing hazard
Belief
The sum of observations out of / periods is described, under my hypotheses, 
by a normal distribution. Let g g (s,t) be the probability of getting a sum s of 
observations at tenure t when the true match quality is good: the distribution is 
normal with mean t and variance t.cr2. Symmetrically gb(s,t) is normal with
mean -t and variance t.cr2. Using Bayes' rule we can then compute all 
possible beliefs. We have:
<l-gg CM)b(s,t) =
q-ggM+d-q)-gbM
It turns out that t drops out and the formula simplifies to:
<7. exp
b(s,t) = \cr
<7. exp
Vcr2 j
+ (l-?).exp
\  a  J 
Firing  hazard
Let f t(s) be the density of matches with sum of observations s at time /.
The initial values are:
/ o ( 0 )  = l
Vs * 0, f 0(s) = 0
Let p(s | s,) be the probability density of getting a total sum of observations s 
when at the previous period the total sum of observations was s , .
/>(■*!■*,) = — 7=  exp
rv2 K
' - ( s - s ,  - 6 (s,))2> 1 -b (S])
I  2 <r2 J 1 nr-  CXP oV2  n 2 <r2 J
The evolution of the density of matches is given by the following recursion 
equation, where s(r(0 ) is the sum °f observations corresponding to the belief 
threshold at tenure V.
+ao
f,(s) = //mC*! )•/>(* K )^ ,
s ( r ( 0 )
The firing hazard at tenure t is then:
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*(r(/))
J / ,  ( ■ « ) < *  
M — S---------
//,(*)<*
-00
APPENDIX 2: robustness checks
Figure 12: Kaplan-Meier estimates of the quit hazard before and after the 
reform
oo
to
3 -
...........•
Tenure in months
Smoothed quitting hazard function: before June 1999 
Smoothed quitting hazard function: after June 1999 
90% Confidence interval
Notes: sam e as Figure 8, except that here the failure is quit.
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CHAPTER 2
THE DETERMINANTS OF THE SEPARATION HAZARD 
IN A MODEL WITH LEARNING AND TIME-VARYING 
MATCH QUALITY
IOANA MARINESCU
A b s t r a c t .  People and organizations enter relationships, learn about 
them, adapt to them, and sometimes decide to leave them. This paper 
analyzes the impact of uncertainty, random shocks, time-varying sep­
aration costs and discount rates on the decisions of agents to separate 
from ongoing relationships. It also examines how such parameters affect 
the separation hazard, thus paving the ground for empirical analysis.
If relationship quality is constant over time, the hazard converges to 
0 as relationship length increases, whereas it converges to a positive 
value if relationship quality is subject to random shocks. In all models 
examined, higher separation costs and higher discount rates lower the 
separation threshold, i.e. they make agents more willing to continue 
with lower quality relationships; this in turn decreases the hazard of 
separation. A change in uncertainty or in the prevalence of random 
shocks has a negligible impact on the separation threshold, but a big 
impact on the separation hazard; moreover, the impact on the separa­
tion hazard depends on whether relationship quality changes over time. 
Overall, the model is very general and can allow us to understand and 
statistically analyze employment relationships, marriages, firm-supplier 
relationships, etc.
1. I n t r o d u c t io n
When people enter a relationship, be it professional or personal, they 
usually do not know with certainty how good this relationship is for them. 
Moreover, a relationship that is good today may become undesirable to­
morrow. Given this uncertainty, how do people and organizations decide 
whether to continue or separate from a relationship? In non-experimental 
empirical settings, we never observe the full information available to agents, 
but we are typically able to observe their separation decisions and deter­
mine how long the relationship was at the time of separation. These ob­
servations allow us to empirically estimate the separation hazard, i.e. the 
probability that a relationship is terminated given that it has survived so
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far. This paper develops a model which can ultimately allow the researcher 
to infer the tenor of the hidden information agents base their separation 
decision on. The model assumes that agents have an unbiased prior be­
lief about the distribution of match qualities among potential partners, i.e. 
they know how likely they are to find a given match quality when sampling 
from the population of potential partners. Then, agents observe signals of 
relationship quality over time, and decide whether to separate or not based 
on their updated belief about quality, the costs of separation, and their dis­
count factor. Three versions of the model are considered. In all versions, 
signals are normally distributed conditional on true match quality. In the 
first version, match quality only takes two values and is constant over time. 
In the second version, match quality is normally distributed and constant 
over time. Lastly, in the third and most general version, match quality is 
normally distributed and evolves over time according to an AR(1) process. 
I analyze the effect of belief-shaping parameters, the cost of separation and 
the discount factor on the threshold for separation (i.e. the match qual­
ity such that the agent is indifferent between continuing and separating) 
and on the hazard of separation. In all three models, separation costs and 
a lower discount factor (or higher discount rate) decrease the separation 
threshold, and thus the separation hazard in all cases: this is intuitive 
since both parameters diminish the returns of separating in order to look 
for a better option. The effects of parameters entering the belief are more 
complex. One striking feature of the results involving a change in the pa­
rameters governing belief formation is that, as long as the prior expected 
value of a relationship does not change, other parameters entering the belief 
formation have a very limited impact on the threshold of separation. The 
parameters entering the belief are however very important in shaping the 
separation hazard, and the way they affect the ha-zard depends on whether
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actual relationship quality is allowed to vary over time; the details of these 
effects axe however too complex to discuss in this introduction.
The contribution of this paper to the literature is three-fold. First, 
while some general results about the separation hazard have been derived 
by Jovanovic(1979) in a model where match quality was assumed to be 
normal and constant over time, this paper directly computes the quan­
titative effect of various parameters on the hazard of separation. Sec­
ond, we introduce time-varying separation costs and analyze the impact 
of such variation on the separation hazard. Third, we generalize the Jo- 
vanovic(1979) model by allowing match quality to evolve over time accord­
ing to an AR(1) process. This extension to time-varying match quality 
is highly relevant empirically. Indeed, it seems unrealistic to assume that 
relationship quality cannot change, and estimated job separation hazards 
(Farber(1994),Marinescu(2006a)) or divorce hazards (Weiss-Willis(1997), 
Svarer(2004)) are inconsistent with a constant match quality since they do 
not decline to 0 with relationship length.
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2 ,1 describe a very general 
model of the optimal separation decision and analyze the impact of param­
eters on the separation threshold and hazard in this context. However, it 
is not possible to derive quantitative estimates of the impact of parameters 
in the general case, and I therefore move on to more specific assumptions 
about the distribution of match quality in sections 3 to 5. Specifically, in 
section 3, I compute the impact of parameters assuming that match qual­
ity can only take two values and does not vary over time. In section 4, 
I assume that match quality is normally distributed and cannot change 
over time, while section 5 relaxes this latter assumption by allowing match 
quality to follow and AR(1) process. Section 6 discusses the limitations 
and implications of the results. Finally, section 7 concludes.
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2. T h e  o p t im a l  s e p a r a t io n  d e c is io n  a s  a  P a r t ia l l y  O b s e r v a b l e  
M a r k o v  D e c is io n  P r o c e s s  (POM DP)
The goal of this paper is to model the decision of an agent1 to continue 
or separate from a relationship. The relationship links the agent with a 
partner. It is assumed that the agent entering a new relationship does not 
know the exact value of such a relationship. The quality of the relationship, 
or match quality, is what makes the relationship valuable to the agent, the 
benefits (monetary and others) of the relationship to the agent. The agent 
holds a prior belief about the distribution of quality in the population of 
partners that it encounters. Then, at each period, the agent observes a 
signal of the quality of the relationship. Based on these signals, the agent 
updates its belief using Bayes’ rule, and decides whether to continue with 
the current relationship, or end it and start a new one2. If the agent decides 
to end the relationship, it has to pay a cost f (k)  which is a function of the 
length of the relationship k.
Formally, such a decision process is well modeled in the framework of 
Partially Observable Markov Decision Processes (see Hauskrecht(2002) for 
a full description of such models). This model allows solving for the optimal 
policy of the agent. The model is fully specified by states, actions, obser­
vation and transition functions, reward function, discount and planning 
horizon.
2.1. Definitions.
2.1.1. States, actions. The state of the world is defined by a vector of two
variables: the length of the current relationship k, and the quality of the
agent-partner match, q. The length of the relationship is perfectly observed
xThe agent may be a person or an organization. I will use the pronoun ’it’ to refer to 
the agent in this abstract general context.
2This means that there is no explicit account for search in this model, and agents cannot 
choose to stay unmatched. For a discussion of the implications of such assumptions, see 
the discussion in section 6.
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by the agent. Moreover, to be realistic and simplify calculations, we assume 
that the length of the relationship is limited to some length kmax. As to 
match quality, it is assumed to take a finite number of values3 . All these 
hypotheses imply together that the state space is finite.
Using information coming from previous experience or some other source, 
the agent forms an idea of how likely it is that, when forming a relationship, 
that relationship will be turn out to be of a given quality. The agent 
thus has a prior belief about match quality, which is defined by a prior 
distribution of qualities P(qo). I will denote by q the expected value of this 
prior distribution. In sections 3 to 5, I will examine specific hypotheses 
about the quality state space and the prior distribution over that space. I 
will denote by q^  the value of match quality at length k , thus allowing it 
to be time-varying.
At every time step, the agent has two possible actions a. it can continue 
the current relationship (a =  C) or separate from the current partner and 
begin a new relationship with another partner (a =  S).
2.1.2. Observation and transition functions. The observation function gives, 
for each action and actual match quality, the probability of observing a 
given signal z , i.e. P(z\a,q). Note that the observation function is as­
sumed to be independent of the length of the relationship. I will denote by 
Zk the value of the observation at length k. In this paper, the observation 
function will always be a Gaussian:
(2 .1 ) P(z\C, q) =  P(z\S, q) =  N(z,
where z  is the expected value of the observation. Note that z  has to depend 
on match quality, otherwise it would not be an informative observation. In
3In some of the models used in this paper, match quality is assumed to take an infinite 
number of values. However, when computing the solution to the agent’s problem, we will 
discretize that infinite space, and so the number of match qualities used in computations 
will remain finite.
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what follows, I will explore several specifications of the relationship between 
z  and actual match quality.
The transition function attributes a probability to each new possible 
state as a function of the current state and the agent’s action. Before I 
define this function, a few remarks are in order about the notation. There 
is a perfect correspondence between the length of the relationship and the 
action taken, and so, to simplify notation, I will dispense with the spec­
ification of the action when the latter is evident given the length of the 
relationship. More precisely, a relationship length of 1 indicates a separa­
tion during the previous time period, and any k > 1 indicates a decision to 
continue the relationship at the previous period. Indeed, at the beginning 
of a given relationship, the length of the relationship gets reset to 04. The 
decision about a new relationship (length 0 ) is by definition “continue”, be­
cause in this case beginning a relationship and continuing it are one and the 
same thing. Thus, the length x of the relationship evolves deterministically, 
so that if x =  k then at the next time step:
x — <
k +  1 if a =  C  
0 if a =  S
We are now ready to specify the match quality transition function, i.e. 
the probability of a given match quality next period given current match 
quality. This entails specifying the initial distribution of match qualities, 
which in this case is the prior distribution P(q0), and then how match 
quality evolves over time starting from there. The evolution of match
4In the rest of the paper, I will often use length and period interchangeably, because as 
long as there is no separation, they are, up to a constant, the same.
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quality is thus governed by the following equations:
(2 .2 ) P(qi\qk) =  P(qo)
(2.3) P(Qk+i\qk) =  N ^ iq k ) ,  Vq)
where P(qo) is the prior distribution of match qualities. Note that I restrict 
P(qk+i\Qk) to normal distributions, ^(qk) denotes a deterministic function 
of qk. This allows the modeling of deterministic drifts: relationships can 
indeed get better or worse over time. If ^(qk) =  qk and &q =  0, then match 
quality is constant over time. The transition function is such that the state 
of the world at time t  +  1 only depends on the action of the agent and the 
state of the world at time t , and not on the whole history of actions and 
states, i.e. the state process is Markovian.
2.1.3. Belief and belief transition function. A belief state is a distribution 
of probability over the states of the world. While the length of the rela­
tionship is known with certainty, the belief about match quality needs to 
be specified as a probability distribution. Given the prior distribution of 
match qualities, the transition function and the observation function, it is 
possible to us Bayes’ rule and compute the belief as a function of the history 
of observations from length 0  to the current length k of the relationship. 
Let qk be the expected value of the belief distribution at length k. The 
belief distribution can be calculated recursively:
(2.4) P(qk\z\-.k) =  <
P (z lift) P(liho)P(qo) if k =  1
P{zk\qk)P{qkWk-i) if fc > 1 
P(Zk\Zl:k-l)
(2.5) qk =  E(qk\zi:k)
where P{qo) is the prior distribution of match quality. Z\± is a shorthand for 
the set of observations from length 1 to length k , i.e. { z i , ..., Zk}. P(zk\qk)
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is the observation function. The belief transition function5, P(qk\z\.k-\), 
attributes a probability to each possible belief as a function of the previous 
belief and the agent’s action. It is defined as:
(2 .6 ) P(<?i|zi:fc-i) =  P(qi) =  £P(<7i|<7o)P(<7o)
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(2.7) P{qk\Zl:k-l) =  ^ 2  P (<lk\<lk-l)P(qk-l\Zl:k-l)
Qk- 1
P(qk-i\zi.k-i) is the previous period belief distribution. Equation 2 .6  cor­
responds to the case where the agent separates, and equation 2.7 to the 
case where the agent continues with the current relationship. Note that 
if the agent separates from the current relationship, the next belief state 
does not depend on the current belief state, but on the prior belief.
As match qualities are not directly observed, the agent has to rely on 
beliefs to make its decisions. As we have just seen, beliefs depend on the 
prior distribution, the set of observations, the observation function and 
the transition function. Beliefs thus fully summarize what the agent knows 
about the system. Therefore, it is convenient to express the agent’s decision 
problem in the belief space. It is important to note here that the decision 
process expressed in terms of beliefs (rather than actual states of the world) 
is Markovian. That is, it can be shown that in a POMDP, the belief about 
the state of the world at time t  + 1  only depends on the action of the agent 
and the belief of the agent about the state of the world at time t, and 
not on the whole history of actions and beliefs (see for example Cassandra 
1998).
2.1.4. Reward, discount, horizon. The reward function R  associates a re­
ward to each possible combination of belief and action continue (C) or
5From now on, whenever I refer to “the transition function”, I will mean the belief 
transition function, not the state transition function.
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separate (S):
(2.8) Rc(P{<lkW.k)) =  Qk
(2.9) Rs(P(qk\zi:k)) =  Q ~  f ( k )
where f(k)  is a separation cost which depends on the length of the rela­
tionship fc, and it is assumed that The agent discounts the future at rate 
<5 6 [0,1].
The reward function can be derived from two possible hypotheses about 
the observability of the per period benefit of the relationship to the agent. 
Either the benefit is not directly observed but is known to be equal to the 
relationship quality, and to be realized after the observation: in this case, 
the benefit is trivially equal to the agent’s belief. Or the benefit is equal 
to the observation next period: in this case, if we define the observation to 
have the same expected value as the actual quality, then qk is indeed the 
agent’s best estimate of the expected value of the observation, and hence 
the reward, at the next period.
The separation cost / ( k) covers the direct cost of ending the current 
relationship, such as a firing cost in the case of the employment relationship. 
It also covers the costs of beginning a new relationship, such as hiring 
costs. If the two partners have diverging interests over separation, i.e. if 
for example it is harder for the worker to find a new job than for the firm 
to find a new worker, then the model is not complete because it does not 
explicitly account for both partners’ rewards. However, if these diverging 
interests are known ex ante and do not depend on match quality, then the 
party that is relatively more advantaged by the separation can agree ex 
ante to make a fixed payment to the other party. This case is covered by 
the model since the cost f(k)  can also include any such payments.
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The definition of the reward function is compatible with a Nash bargain­
ing solution where the two partners split the surplus, so that, while the 
relationship continues, each partner gets a fixed share. Suppose that a  is 
the share received by the modeled agent. The reward of the agent would 
then be aqk if continuing and aq if separating; but this change is not 
substantial since it simply amounts to rescaling the distribution of match 
quality.
The planning horizon of the agent is assumed to be infinite. This means 
that the agent is infinitely lived; or alternatively, the agent’s retirement 
from the relationships market is at some date so far away in the future 
that given the discount factor, it does not play any role in the agent’s 
current decisions6.
2.1.5. Value function. We now need to define what it means for the agent 
to follow an optimal strategy. To do so, I will first define the notion of a 
strategy or policy, and the value function for a policy. In the context of this 
model, at each time step, the agent has the choice between two actions: 
continue or separate. The agent chooses one of these actions depending on 
its current belief and the length of the relationship k. Define a policy 7r, 
which gives for each belief and relationship length the action to be taken. 
Define the Q function Qn(P(qk\zi:k)iO>) 3 5  the expected return of taking 
action a today and then following the policy 7r in the future. The value 
function V*(P(qk\z\ : Zk)) gives the current and future rewards of the agent 
as a function of current belief, assuming that the agent follows policy 7r from 
now on. The optimal policy maximizes Vir{P{qk\z\ : Zk)), and gives rise 
to the optimal value function V*{P{qk\z\ : Zk)). The optimal action value
6The model is thus not quite adequate for explaining the behavior of “old” agents. That 
is typically not a problem if the agent considered is an organization, but may be relevant 
if the agent is a person.
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function Q* is defined as a function of the optimal value V*(P(qk\z\  : Zk)):
(2.10) Q*(P((fc|*i:*). C ) = q k +  S j 2  P(<lk+i\zi:k)V'(P(qk+l\zl:k+l))
Q k+1
(2 .1 1 ) Q*(P(qk\z1.k),S) =  q - f ( k )  +  S Y / P(<ll)V'(P(q1\z1))
The optimal value is given by the Bellman equation:
(2.12) V*{P(qk\z1:k)) =  max Q*{P(qk\z1:k),a)
ae[C,S]
Given the assumptions that I will be using about the distribution of 
match qualities and observations, the belief distribution at length k, 
P{qic\zi:k), can be summarized by (qk, k), i.e. the expected value of the 
belief distribution and the length of the relationship. To represent all pos­
sible values of the belief distribution, we can thus use a nq x kmax matrix, 
where nq is the number of possible values for the expected value of match 
quality and kmax is the maximum possible length for a relationship. To 
simplify notation in what follows, I will use qk to summarize the belief 
distribution, since this expression already contains k.
Thus, the Q functions for the actions “continue” and “separate” can be 
rewritten as:
(2.13) Q*(qk, C ) = q k +  6 ] T  P(qk+ilqk) V ( q M )
Q k+1
(2.14) Q*(qk,S) =  q - f ( k )  +  S ' £ / P(q1\q)V*(q1)
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=  Vnew -  f(k), where Vnew =  q +  S ^ P (q i\q )V * (q i)
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In this framework, the optimal policy followed by the agent is uniquely 
defined by r(k), the belief such that the agent is indifferent between con­
tinuing or separating from its partner at relationship length k. In other
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terms, the threshold for separation r(k) is defined by the equalization7 of 
Q functions for the actions “continue” (equation (2.13)) and “separate” 
(equation (2.14)), i.e.:
(2.15)
t(A) + S  £  P(qk+i\r (k ))V (q h+l) = q -  f ( k )  + P($,|5)V($,)
9fc+l 9l
(2.16)
r(k) - q  +  f(k) +  i [ £  P(qk+M k ) ) V ( q k+i) -  £  P(gi|«)V*(<h)] =  0
Q k+1 Ql
2 .2 . C o m p u tin g  th e  value function  an d  th e  o p tim a l policy. To com­
pute the optimal policy, one starts at the highest possible relationship 
length, i.e. kmax. At that point, because relationships come to a final 
ending, the value of a relationship is exactly equal to the value of a new 
relationship, minus final separation costs, i.e. Vnew — f ( k m a x ) -
The algorithm starts with giving Vnew some arbitrary value. Then, at 
length kmax — 1 , Q(qk> S) and Q(qk, C ) are computed using equations 2.14 
and 2.13. The optimal policy at k m a x  — 1 is then given by equation 2.12. 
These calculations are repeated for k m a x  — 2, k m a x  — 3,....
It is thus possible to recursively compute the value up to length 0. Vnew is 
then defined as the value of a relationship with length 0  and quality q (the 
expected value of the prior distribution). We start the loop over again until 
Vnew is numerically identical to its value in the previous iteration8. One
7When performing computations, we only consider a finite number of match qualities. 
Therefore there will typically be no belief that makes the agent indifferent between con­
tinuing and separating: rather, the optimal action will be “separate” for some belief and 
“continue” for the next higher belief. In practice, I defined as the threshold the minimum 
expected belief such that it is optimal for the agent to continue the relationship.
8This is a special case of the ‘Value iteration” algorithm, which has been shown to 
converge to the solution of the Partially Observed Markov Decision Problem (see 
Hauskrecht(2002)). Note however that this algorithm is not the fastest possible to estab­
lish the optimal policy, because we compute the values for all possible beliefs, whereas 
it is clear that if for some belief it is optimal to separate, then for all beliefs with lower 
expected value, it is also optimal to separate. If computation time were a concern, one 
could therefore use a faster algorithm.
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can thus determine the value function and optimal actions for all beliefs 
and relationship lengths.
2.3. The im pact o f param eters on the optim al policy. In order to 
assess the impact of parameters on the optimal policy, one needs to show 
how the condition defining the threshold in equation (2.16) is affected when 
parameters change. Define J  as the left-hand side of equation (2.16), i.e.:
J  =  r(k) -  q +  f (k ) +  S[J2 P(qk+M k ) ) V ( q k+1) -  £  P (A © V (& )]
Q k+1 Ql
Consider some parameter x: we are interested in the sign of Given
that the threshold is defined by J  =  0, we can use properties of implicit 
functions to determine the sign of It is a known result that, if
J(r(k),x) =  0, then . It is easy to show that J  increases
with r(k ), which implies that dJ/dr(k) >  0. Hence, we have:
(2.17) sign(dT(k)/dx) =  —sign(dJ/dx)
In the general case, it is not possible to determine sign(dJ/dx). It becomes 
feasable, however, if one uses a few approximations9. First, I show that, if 
k is small, then qk =  qk+i implies that V*(qk) ~  V*{qk)- This allows me to 
drop k from qk- I then proceed to calculate the sign of dJ/dx,  which will 
involve some more approximations.
Early in the relationship, if qk =  &+i, there is only a negligible difference 
between V*(qk) and V*(<jk+1). This is because, given the existence of a 
discount factor, the maximum possible length kmax is too far away in the 
future to influence the current value. Thus, at short relationship lengths, 
the value of a given belief does not change with relationship length k.
9For each of these approximations, I will explain why it may be correct. Moreover, 
all the approximations used are indeed good approximations in the models for which I 
explicitly compute the threshold in sections 3 to 5.
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Using the approximation V*(qk) =  V*(qk+i) for qk =  qk+i allows us to 
drop the subscript of q, and the condition defining the threshold can then 
be rewritten as:
(2.18) r(k) - q  +  m  +  « E [ P (9lT(fc)) -  =  0
4
The function J  is consequently redefined as:
(2.19) J =  r(k) - q  +  m  +  <5^[P(g|r(fc)) -  P(«|«)]V («)
4
I now show that typically ^2^[P{q\r(k)) — P(q\q)]V*(q) <  0, which will 
be important in determining the sign of the derivative of J  with respect 
to some parameter x. Let P\(q) be a shorthand for P(q\r(k)) and P2 (q) 
a shorthand for P(q\q). The reasoning will rely on the fact that Pi and 
P2 axe normal, E(Pi) < E(P2) and V*(q) increases in q. The latter fact 
is trivial. Now I show that E{P\) < E(P2). If r(k)  =  q, then equation
(2.18) implies that f ( k )  =  0. If f (k )  > 0, then r(k) < q, i.e. in the 
presence of positive separation costs, the threshold for separation is lower 
than the expected quality of a new match. If '&(qk) =  qk in equation (2.3), 
E(Pi) = r(k)  and E(P2) =  q, and therefore, E(Pi) < E(P2). If Pi and 
P2 have the same variance, then, as E(Pi) < E(P2) and V*(q) increases 
in q, we have that indeed ^L,$[P(q\T(k)) — P(q\q)]V*(q) < 0. Indeed, the 
expression ^2$[P(q\T(k)) — P(q\q)]V*(q) is the difference of two weighted 
means of the increasing series V(q): in this case, the mean around r(k)  is 
smaller than the mean around q.
More generally, the variances of Pi and P2 may differ and so the means 
5 ^  P(q\T(k))V*(q) and ^2^P(q\q)V*(q) use different weights. Denote by 
g  1 the standard deviation of Pi{q) and g 2 the standard deviation of P2(q) . 
As long as Gi is not much greater than g 2 , we still have ]P-[P(<7|t(A;)) —
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< 0. In almost all cases that we will examine, cri <  O2 10 , and 
so we typically have ^2$[P(q\T(k)) — P(q\q)]V*(q) <  0.
2.3.1. Impact of the separation cost on the optimal policy. Taking the de­
rivative of J  with respect to f(k),  we get:
( 2 2 0 >
dV*(q)/df(k) decreases with q because higher quality matches have a lower 
probability of being eventually dissolved and thus the agent is less likely 
to bear the firing cost for higher quality matches. Since dV*(q)/df(k)  
decreases with q, the second term of equation (2.20) is positive11. Thus, 
d J /d f (k ) > 0, which implies that dr(k )/d f(k )  < 0. As is intuitive, this 
means that higher separation costs make the agent more willing to pursue 
relationships of lower value. Hence, we have:
Proposition 1 . Higher separation costs f(k) lower the threshold for sep­
aration r(k)12
This implies in particular that if the separation cost increases over time, 
then the threshold decreases over time. For example, if there is some sort 
of probation period, with a low constant separation cost followed by a 
higher constant separation cost, then at the period when the separation 
cost increases, the threshold will decrease. Moreover, in such a case, the 
threshold will slightly increase at the end of the probation period (i.e. the 
initial period with low separation cost). This is explained by the following
10This is because it is typically the case that the agent’s belief gets more precise over 
time, and so since P(q\q) is taken at length 0, its variance is greater than the variance 
of P(q\r(k)), which is taken at some length at least equal to 1.
11This is for the same reasons why the fact that V*(q) increases in q implies that 
E ^ [ P m k ) ) - P m \ V * ( q ) < 0 .
12Most propositions in this paper (including this one) are dependent on the approxima­
tions used. However, they are still useful to understand the logic of the model, and they 
relate to each other in such a way that it is useful to number them. When a proposition 
depends on approximations, I will signal it in a footnote.
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consideration. As the end of the probation period approaches, the value of 
separating from the relationship stays the same but the value of continu­
ing the relationship decreases because of the increased probability that a 
bad quality relationship will have to be terminated under the higher post­
probation separation cost. Because the value of continuation decreases 
relative to the value of separation as the agent approaches the end of the 
probation period, the threshold increases.
2.3.2. The impact of the discount factor on the threshold of separation. 
Taking the derivative of J  with respect to 5, we get:
(2 .2 1 ) | f  =  E  +  V ' m
9
It seems plausible that dV*(q)/d6 is roughly constant over <7, as a lower 
discount factor roughly proportionally reduces the value of all levels of 
match quality13. If this assumption is valid, then [Pi (ff) ~  ^ 2  (g) ] =  
0: this is because both P\(q) and P2 M) add up to 1 over q. Then, equation
(2 .2 1 ) simplifies to:
(2 .2 2 ) S  =  E  -  f t t t ) ]V (« )
9
We have already established that the above expression is negative. Thus, 
from equation (2.17), we infer that:
P ro p o s itio n  2. The threshold of separation r(k) increases with a higher 
discount rate Su .
2.3.3. The impact a change in the transition function on the threshold of 
separation. We are now interested in the effect of some parameter x  that 
enters both Pi and P2 . The derivative of J  with respect to such a parameter
13This is verified in all specific cases I will analyze in sections 3 to 5.
14This proposition depends on the approximations used.
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is:
(2-23) w = E (^Sr ■- +(Pl® - P2« » tQ
As previously, if dv^  is constant, then the second term drops out. 
Assume that indeed the second term drops out.
If separation costs axe very small, then r(k) q, i.e. Pi(q) «  P2 W); 
thus, 9Pq^  — - Pq1P is very close to 0 , implying that «  0 , i.e. a change 
in the transition function has no effect on the threshold.
If separation costs axe bigger, then one can rely on other approximations. 
Pi and P2 axe probability distributions, so we must always have ^i{Q) — 
1 , i =  1 , 2 , therefore, J2q =  0 , i =  1 , 2 , and so £ 4 & -  ^£41) =  0 .
Moreover, P\ and P2 axe normal, so they axe close to 0 for values of q fax 
away from their respective means. Any change in the variance of these dis­
tributions will mainly have an impact in the neighborhood of their means. 
Therefore, 9Pq ^  — 9PqIP is only significantly different from 0 in the neigh­
borhood of r(k) and q, i.e. in the neighborhood of the separation threshold. 
But in the neighborhood of the separation threshold, V*(q) is almost con­
stant since it is equal to the constant Q*(q,S) below the threshold, and 
increases slowly above the threshold. If V*(q) can be assumed to be con­
stant in the neighborhood of r(k) and q, then the first term of equation
(2.23) is 0. In that case, we again obtain that «  0, so that a change in 
the variance of the transition function does not affect the threshold for sep­
aration. While the conclusion above relies on quite a few approximations, it 
does indicate that, in most cases, a change in the variance of the transition 
function will have a very limited impact on the threshold of separation.
2.4. Hazard o f separation. Deriving the impact of parameters on the 
hazard of separation is an important task because the separation hazard 
can be computed from empirical data, while the threshold for separation is
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typically not observed. The theoretical hazard of separation is the result 
of infinitely many agents confronted with the same separation problem; 
it summarizes the average separation behavior of agents over relationship 
lengths.
One can compute the theoretical separation hazard once the threshold 
for separation is known. Note that at length 0, when no observation has 
been made yet, qo =  q for all matches, i.e. for all agents the belief is the 
same as the prior. Let Pk(qk) be the density of agents who hold a belief with 
mean at length &, given that they follow the optimal policy embodied 
in r ( k ) .  The initial values for the distribution of agents’ expected beliefs 
about match quality are:
QO
The hazard of separation at length k, hk, can then be computed recursively, 
starting at k  =  1 :
Equation (2.28) insures that the mass of agents is always normalized to 
1 . P(qk+i\qk) can be computed using the belief transition function defined 
in equation (2.7). Note that if match quality does not change over time, 
then the hazard declines to 0  as relationship length k  increases: indeed,
(2.24) Po(Qo) =  <
1 if qo =  q
0  otherwise\
(2.25)
(2.26)
Qk—Qmin
(2.27) PkiQk) =  o if qk <  T(k)
(2.28)
(2.29) Pk+i(qk+i) = 2^pk(qk)P(qk+i\%)
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over time, the knowledge of the agent becomes more and more precise, and 
eventually there are no more matches to terminate as only those that are 
above the threshold with certainty remain.
2.5. The im pact o f param eters on the hazard o f separation. Param­
eters affect the hazard of separation through their effect on the threshold 
and the transition function. Therefore, we will first discuss the impact of 
changes in the threshold and the transition function on the hazard, and 
then proceed to the full analysis of the impact of parameters.
2.5.1. Impact of the threshold and the transition function on the hazard of 
separation. For a given distribution Pk(qk), the effects of a change in the 
threshold of separation r(k) or the transition function P(qk\qk-i) on the 
hazard of separation hk are straightforwardly described. The impact of 
the transition function on the hazard of separation for a given threshold is 
defined by equations (2.25) and (2.29).
Proposition  3. For a given threshold r(k) and a given distribution of con­
tinuing relationships Pk(qk), a> higher variance for the transition probability 
P(qk\qk-i) implies a higher separation hazard hk.
Indeed, a higher variance for the transition probability P(qk\qk-i) im­
plies that more matches will cross the threshold from one period k to the 
next (see equation 2.29). Thus, any change in parameters that increases 
the standard error of the transition function P(qk\qk-i), will, for a given 
policy and distribution of continuing relationships, increase the hazard of 
separation at length k.
For a given transition function, the threshold for separation affects the 
hazard of separation as described by equation (2.26).
Proposition 4. The higher the threshold r(k), the higher the hazard of 
separation hk.
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Indeed, a higher threshold implies that a higher expected value of the 
belief distribution is needed for the agent to continue the relationship. 
Describing the effects of a change in the threshold of separation or the 
transition function on the hazard of separation all other things equal is a 
useful first step.
However, if one wants to assess the impact of a change in parameters on 
the hazard of separation derived from an optimal policy, it is necessary to 
examine the effect of each parameter on both the the transition function 
and the threshold.
2.5.2. Impact of parameters entering the transition function on the separa­
tion hazard. If a parameter affects the variance of the transition function 
but has little impact on the threshold, then proposition 3 determines the 
impact of such a parameter. If, however, the parameter has a significant 
impact on both the threshold and the transition function, the effect on the 
hazard function cannot be predicted but has to be calculated numerically. 
Let us now examine the impact of the first type of parameters: can we say 
anything about it since proposition 3 is conditional on the distribution of 
continuing relationships Pk(qk)?
First, note that no change in the variance of the transition function can 
affect the starting point for the calculation hazard: indeed, from equation
(2.24), po(qo) only depends on q. Second, one should realize that the hazard 
of separation at length k is determined by the successive application of the 
transition function to the initial distribution po(£o)> with a truncation of 
the distribution below the threshold at each step. Thus, if a parameter 
increases the variance of the transition function at all lengths and does not 
affect the threshold, then, from Proposition 3, it increases the hazard of 
separation at length 1 for sure. However, this effect may be reversed with
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increasing length, depending on exactly how the variance of the transition 
function evolves with length15. Thus, we have that:
Proposition  5. A parameter that increases the variance of the transition 
function at short lengths, and does not affect the threshold, increases the 
hazard of separation at short lengths.
2.5.3. Impact of separation costs on the separation hazard. Higher separa­
tion costs decrease the threshold and do not influence the transition func­
tion, therefore, from proposition 4:
Proposition  6 . Higher separation costs f(k) decrease the separation haz­
ard hk for all lengths k16.
If separation costs do not depend on k , then higher separation costs 
decrease the hazard of separation at all lengths. If there is a probation 
period, then the hazard of separation will be higher during the proba­
tion period relative to the post-probation period. Moreover, because the 
threshold increases when approaching the separation threshold, the hazard 
of separation also increases, creating a spike at the end of the probation 
period.
2.5.4. Impact of the discount factor on the separation hazard. A higher 
discount rate increases the separation threshold and does not affect the 
transition function, therefore, from proposition 4:
Proposition  7. A higher discount factor 8 increases the separation hazard 
hk for all lengths k17.
15This point will become clearer in section 5, where such a reversal is observed under 
some parameter values.
16This proposition depends on the approximations used in assessing the effect of sepa­
ration costs on the threshold of separation.
17This proposition depends on the approximations used in assessing the effect of the 
discount rate on the threshold of separation.
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We have now completed the exploration of what can be said about the 
effects of parameters on the threshold of separation and the separation 
hazard under the assumption that the transition function is normal. In 
the coming sections, I will compute and analyze these effects under more 
specific assumptions about the distribution of match quality and the ob­
servation function.
3. Two QUALITY LEVELS
3.1. M odel specification. In this section, I assume that match quality 
can be either good or bad. More specifically a good match has a per-period 
value of 1 and a bad match a value of 0. I assume that a proportion g of the 
matches is good whereas a proportion 1-g is bad. Therefore, the expected 
value of the prior distribution is:
(3.1) q =  l g  +  Q ( l  -  g )  =  g
At each period, the agent observes a normally distributed signal about 
the quality of the match. The signal for a good match is normally dis­
tributed with mean 1 and variance cr^ s, whereas for a bad match it is 
normally distributed with mean -1 and variance cr^ a. The belief of the 
agent that the match is good can be written b(sk) where Sk is the sum of 
all signals observed up to length k18. Because there are only two values of 
match quality, the belief that the match is bad is 1 — b(sk). The expected 
value of Sk given the quality of the match is described by a normal distri­
bution. Let <pg(sk) be the probability of getting a sum Sk of observations 
by length k when the true match quality is good; ipb(sk) denotes the same 
probability when the match is bad. y>g(sk) is normally distributed with
18Given that match quality is fixed over time for a given match, and that the obser­
vation function does not depend on relationship length (no observation is more precise 
than another), the sum of observations is a sufficient statistic for the full history of 
observations.
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mean k and variance k a ^ .  Symmetrically, ipb(sk) is normal with mean —k 
and variance k a ^ .  Using Bayes’ rule we can then compute all possible 
beliefs. We have:
^ 9Vg(*k) +  (1 -  9)<Pb{sk)
S e x p (-f-)
(3 3 ) = ---------- i -----------* -------- ~
g exp(—5—) +  ( l - g )  exp (~r -)
obs obs
Note that after simplifying the length k drops out of the belief, so that the
agent’s belief only depends on the sum of observations. Finally, one needs
to specify the belief state transition function.
(3.4) P(b(sk)\sk- i ) t C) =  b(sk)N(sk - s k-i,l ,aobs)
+  (1  b(^Sk ) )N (^ S k  1 , dobs)
(3.5) P(b{sk)\sk- i ) t S) =  g
where N(a, b, c) stands for the normal distribution with mean b and stan­
dard deviation c, evaluated at a. Since sk- 1 is the sum of observations 
at length A; — 1 , ^  — Sk-i is the value of the observation made at length 
k. Equation (3.4) says that if the agent continues with the current rela­
tionship, then with a probability b(sk) the relationship is good, and so the 
mean of the observation at the next period is 1 , and with a probability 
1 — b(sk) the match is bad and so the mean of the observation at the next 
period is -1 .
3.2. B elief space discretization. As we have just seen, for the purpose 
of value calculation, belief is fully summarized by the value b(sk) € [0 , 1]. 
For computational purposes, the interval [0 ,1] is divided in discrete steps. 
It would seem natural to divide it in some n equal steps. However, such
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a division would lead to computational problems. Indeed, as the agent’s 
knowledge of match quality gets more precise with more observations, be­
liefs will tend to get very close to 0  if the match is bad, and to 1 if the 
match is good. This means that, to adequately represent the evolution 
of beliefs over time, the disrectization needs to be much more precise, i.e. 
to have smaller steps, in the neighborhood of 0 and 1. To achieve this, I 
choose to divide the interval [0 , 1] in n values, but with varying intervals 
in between values: specifically, the values of match qualities are defined 
by normcdf(X, 0.5,0.1), where X  is a vector of n equally spaced values 
between 0 and 1, and normcdf(X, 0.5,0.1) is the cumulative distribution 
function, evaluated at point X ,  of a normal probability distribution with 
mean 0.5 and standard deviation 0.1. The mean of 0.5 is chosen so that 
the step size is symmetric over the [0 , 1] interval, and the standard error 
was chosen inductively to be very small (so that there are indeed many 
more values in the neighborhood of 0  and 1 ), but still provide a reasonable 
coverage for the middle of the [0 , 1] interval. Given this discretization issue, 
it is important remember that quantities computed are only approximate, 
and especially so at long relationship durations19.
3.3. R esults. The parameters given in Figure 1 were used for the refer­
ence case. In all cases, the parameters in the reference case were chosen 
such that the resulting hazard function is similar to the empirical haz­
ard of a worker getting fired in the United Kingdom in the late 1990’s20. 
The crucial point is that parameters were chosen de facto to be such that 
the hazard of separation first increases and then decreases with relationship
19It is possible to make the computation more precise in this case by choosing to describe 
the problem in the space of sum of observations Sk rather than beliefs. This is what 
I have done in my paper Marinescu(2006a). In the context of this paper, however, to 
keep computations more comparable across different hypothesis, I decided to keep the 
computations in the belief space.
20This empirical hazard was estimated in Marinescu(2006).
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length, a pattern that is typically found in studies of the firing hazard (Far- 
ber(1994),Marinescu(2006a)) or the divorce hazard (Weiss-Willis(1997), 
Svarer(2004)).
For each parameter, I choose a few values below and above the reference 
value, and I compute the variance of the transition function, the separation 
threshold, and the resulting hazard of separation.
[Figure 1 about here.]
Because the transition function, threshold for separation and separation 
hazard for the reference case are plotted in the figures that follow, I will 
not plot them again here.
3.3.1. The impact of separation costs. As already pointed out, separation 
costs have no impact on the transition function. Figure 2  illustrates how 
higher separation costs do indeed lower the separation threshold. Note, 
moreover, that the threshold is constant with length in the beginning of 
the relationship, and thereafter it increases very slightly as the relationship 
approaches the maximal length; this pattern is preserved for almost all 
parameter values, and I shall signal when this is not the case. Since a 
higher separation cost decreases the threshold, it lowers the separation 
hazard (Figure 321). Note that, as predicted, since match quality does not 
change over time, the hazard declines to 0  as relationship length increases.
[Figure 2 about here.]
[Figure 3 about here.]
One can also examine the impact of a probation period, i.e. instead of 
having constant separation costs over the length of the relationship, sep­
aration costs are constant in the beginning of the relationship, and then 
they increase to a higher and constant level after some given length. In
21From the figure, the hazard seems to be higher at higher tenures for higher firing costs; 
hazards for different separation costs in fact converge as relationship length increases, 
and the observed effect is due to a discretization artifact.
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this case, I use a separation cost of 1.5 in the beginning, and 2.3 after the 
end of the probation period. I also show results for two different lengths 
of the probation period, that is 12 and 24 periods. The separation thresh­
olds axe plotted in Figure 4. As predicted, one observes an increase in the 
threshold before the end of the probation period, and lower thresholds af­
terwards. The hazards are plotted in Figure 5. As a result of the variations 
in the thresholds, the hazards increase right before the end of the proba­
tion period, producing spikes in separations. The spike is higher with a 
shorter probation period because at lower length there axe more relatively 
low quality matches that axe close to the threshold and have not yet been 
terminated.
[Figure 4 about here.]
[Figure 5 about here.]
3.3.2. The impact of the discount factor. As predicted, the threshold for 
separation increases with a higher discount factor (Figure 6 ). This implies 
that the hazard of separation increases, as shown by Figure 722.
[Figure 6  about here.]
[Figure 7 about here.]
Thus, the discount factor has virtually the same effect on the thresh­
old and the firing hazaxd as the separation cost: both a higher separation 
cost and a lower discount factor shift the threshold for separation down­
wards in a quasi parallel fashion, inducing a decrease in the firing hazaxd 
which is more pronounced for shorter relationships. This means that, in 
empirical applications, if neither the separation cost nor the discount fac­
tor are observed, one cannot distinguish the effect of those two parameters 
by observing either the separation threshold or separation hazaxd. Only 
the observation of the value function itself would allow to distinguish the
22As for firing costs, the fact that the hazard seems to be higher at higher tenures for 
lower discount factors is due to a discretization artifact.
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two: indeed, the discount factor affects all match qualities equally while the 
separation cost mostly affects relationships that are close to the threshold. 
Since the value function will typically not be observed, in most applications 
one would have to have some other source of knowledge about the discount 
factor or the separation cost. For example, it should often be reasonable 
to assume that the discount factor is stable over time, while it may vary 
across agents.
3.3.3. The impact of the observation variance. The observation variance 
affecting both the transition function and the threshold, both of these ef­
fects need to be taken into account in order to understand the impact on 
the separation hazard. Figure 8  plots the transition function for different 
observation standard deviations, and for belief 0.5. The transition function 
has the same standard deviation for all beliefs; only the mean changes. We 
can see that a higher observation standard deviation translates into a lower 
standard deviation for the transition function, which can be derived from 
equation (3.4). Intuitively, this is because a higher standard deviation of 
the observation makes it optimal for the agent to rely relatively more on 
the prior belief and less on the observation. If, as predicted, the threshold 
of separation does not change much with the change in the transition func­
tion, then the hazard of separation at low lengths decreases with a higher 
observation variance.
[Figure 8  about here.]
The effect of a higher observation standard deviation on the threshold 
is depicted in Figure 9: the threshold increases with a higher standard 
deviation of the observation. This increase is limited, but has an effect 
on the hazard of separation which is opposite to the direct effect of the 
transition function, and thus the total effect is undetermined.
[Figure 9 about here.]
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As shown in Figure 10, the effect on the transition function dominates in 
the sense that the hazard at short lengths is lower with a higher standard 
deviation of the observation.
[Figure 10 about here.]
We have thus confirmed our predictions about the impact of separation 
costs and the discount factor on the separation hazard, and shown how the 
observation variance affects the hazard. We know turn to a more general 
specification of the problem, assuming that match qualities, instead of only 
taking two values, are normally distributed.
4. C o n s t a n t  q u a l it y , n o r m a l l y  d is t r ib u t e d
4.1. M odel specification. In this section, it is assumed that match qual­
ity is normally distributed. Let every relationship be characterized by a 
true quality q that is drawn from N(q , aq).
In order to compute the belief transition function, one needs to specify 
how observations arise and how beliefs evolve over time as a result.
Let each observation zk about a given relationship be a noisy observation 
of the relationship’s true quality q drawn from N (q,a0ba).
(4.1) Zk =  q +  4
As the likelihood function is a Gaussian and the prior is Gaussian as well, 
we obtain a Gaussian posterior function:
(4.2) P{q\z\-.k) =  N(qkj ak)
where z \:k stands for the set of observations from length 1 to length k. 
We observe that ak does not depend on any of the observations but only 
depends on the number of observations that are available. The definition
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of the variance of the belief in this case is well known:
rr2 <r2/ A o \  2 obs q
( 3) =  + o*zaq ^g
To calculate the expected value for the quality q after an additional obser­
vation z\b+i, we use the fact that we can analytically treat the multiplication 
of two gaussians:
(4.4) qk + 1 =  a kqk +  (1 -  a k)zk+1
where a k =  4 - <r|). With this recursion rule, it is possible to
calculate the belief after a number of observations. We can also express 
this as a function of the mean q of the prior distribution and the sum of 
observations up to time t:
to 2 +  a 21(7q +  a obs
Given these assumptions, a belief is fully specified by qk and ak. The belief 
transition function will thus specify the probability of transition from a 
belief defined by qk, a k to a belief defined by qk+\ and ak+i 23.
We now proceed to calculate the belief transition function. We have 
already given above the equation for a k (equation 4.3). The expected 
quality qk, depends on the observations made (equation 4.4). On top of 
these equations, it will also be necessary to calculate how likely any given 
observation will be at the next step fc+ 1  given our current knowledge qk: in 
other terms, we need to specify the transition function. The variance of the 
estimate of the quality at length k is al. The variance of the observation 
is (7^. As these two effects axe additive and we know that variances add
23I will omit conditioning on ak to simplify the notation. Indeed, qk already contains k 
and if A; is known, then ak is immediately given by equation (4.3).
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linearly we obtain the following equation:
(4.6) P (zk+l\qk,a k) =  N (zk+1,qk, y fa [+ a ^ a)
where N (a , b, c) stands for the normal distribution with mean b and stan­
dard deviation c, evaluated at a. This probability can be equivalently 
expressed in the following way:
/+oo P (zk+i\q)P(q\zi:k)dq
•oo
/ + 0 0 N (zk+i,q, v ^ N ^ q ,  qk, ak)dq
■00
As I chose to perform computations in the belief space, I need to express 
everything in terms of the mean of belief qki and to eliminate the observa­
tions zk from the equations. This can be achieved by expressing zk+i as a 
function of the other variables using (4.4).
(4.8) zk + 1 =  ^ f(® t+i -  qk) +  qk+\
ak
Thus, because computations are performed in the belief space and not the 
observation space, the expression erf +  is not exactly the variance of 
the transition function. The variance of the transition function at length 
k, VT*., can instead be calculated using the definition of the variance for a 
probability distribution with a known mean:
/+oo (&+i -  ik fP [ z k+x(qk+i)\qk]dqM
■oo
4.2. B elief space discretization. Note that the specific value of q is not 
substantial for the calculations since the normal distribution is symmetric 
and defined over R. q only matters relative to the separation cost. The 
discretization uses equally spaced values between some minimal and some 
maximal value of qk. To make the interpretation of qk more intuitive, I 
chose the minimal value of qk to be 0 and its maximal value to be 2q. Thus
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a positive separation cost is commensurate with the per period value of the 
relationship.
4.3. R esults. The parameters used as a reference for calculations can be 
found in Figure 1 . Note that, contrary to the 2-qualities case, the transition 
function here depends on the length of the relationship. Namely, as the 
relationship gets longer, the variance of the transition function decreases, as 
implied by equations (4.3) and (4.6). Therefore, when looking at the effect 
of parameters that affect the transition function, we need to document how 
the variance of the transition function is affected. Another slight difference 
with the 2 -qualities case is that the threshold for separation increases a bit 
more with length k , even though this increase remains very limited (see for 
example Figure 1 1 ).
4.3.1. The impact of separation costs. An increase in separation costs has 
qualitatively the same effect as in the 2 -qualities case, both on the threshold 
for separation (Figure 11) and on the separation hazard (Figure 12). Note 
that the separation hazard at lengths greater than 15 would look the same 
in the 2 -qualities case if it were not for the discretization artifact already 
mentioned. Again, since match quality does not change over time, hazards 
converge towards 0  at high lengths.
[Figure 11 about here.]
[Figure 12 about here.]
The impact of the introduction of a probation period on the threshold 
(Figure 13) and hazard (Figure 14) are again qualitatively the same as in 
the 2 -qualities case.
[Figure 13 about here.]
[Figure 14 about here.]
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4.3.2. The impact of the discount factor. Because the discount factor has 
essentially the same effects as the separation cost, it should not come as a 
surprise that the effects of a change in the discount factor on the thresh­
old (Figure 15) and separation hazard (Figure 16) are again qualitatively 
similar to the ones found in the 2 -qualities case.
[Figure 15 about here.]
[Figure 16 about here.]
4.3.3. The impact of the observation variance. As shown in Figure 17, an 
increase in the observation variance reduces the variance of the transition 
function at low lengths and increases it thereafter. This is because at small 
lengths, a higher observation variance makes the agent rely more on their 
length 0  prior belief (which has, by assumption, the same standard devia­
tion of 5, regardless of the observation variance): the higher the observation 
variance, the more unlikely that any information acquired at the next time 
step will make the agent deviate much from their prior belief. Because 
a higher observation variance implies that the agent acquires information 
at a slower pace (each observation is less informative), the agent’s belief 
at higher tenures is less precise; therefore, it is more likely that the agent 
should hold a belief with a different mean at the next period, and so the 
transition function has a larger variance.
If, as predicted, the threshold of separation is barely affected, then we 
expect that an increase in the observation variance decreases the hazard of 
separation at short lengths, and, possibly24, increases it at higher lengths.
[Figure 17 about here.]
When examining the impact of an increase in the variance of the obser­
vation on the separation threshold (Figure 18), one observes quasi no effect 
at very low lengths, and a slight negative effect thereafter.
24As already pointed out in section 2.5.2, the effect of a change in the transition function 
at long lengths cannot be predicted precisely.
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Thus, at low lengths, when the observation variance increases, there is 
no change in the threshold, and the variance of the transition function de­
creases; therefore the hazard of separation decreases. At higher lengths, 
the effects on the threshold and the transition function go in opposite di­
rections, making the effect on the separation hazard even more uncertain.
[Figure 18 about here.]
Plotting the separation hazard in Figure 19, we see that the hazard in­
deed decreases with the observation variance at low lengths, showing that 
the effect on the transition function dominates the effect on the thresh­
old. At higher lengths the hazard increases with the observation variance. 
Overall, the qualitative impact on the firing hazard is the same as in the 
2-qualities case, despite somewhat different effects on the separation thresh­
old.
[Figure 19 about here.]
4.3.4. The impact of the prior variance. An increase in the prior vari­
ance increases the variance of the transition function at both high and 
low lengths (Figure 20), with a vanishing effect at higher lengths. This 
is very intuitive: since there is a higher match quality variance, all other 
things equal, agents expect their next period beliefs to vary more. And, 
since in this model the variance of the transition function converges to 0, 
variances converge together to 0. We thus expect, all other things equal, a 
sizable increase in the hazard of separation at low length and, possibly, a 
smaller positive effect a higher lengths.
[Figure 20 about here.]
The separation threshold decreases with a higher variance of the prior 
at low lengths, and increases at higher lengths (Figure 21). The effect is 
however small.
[Figure 21 about here.]
I l l
Figure 22 shows that the hazaxd increases with the variance of the prior 
at low lengths and that hazards converge to 0 at higher lengths. Thus, 
again the effect of the transition function dominates the threshold effect at 
low lengths.
[Figure 22 about here.]
While the model examined in this section is more general than the two 
match qualities model, the effect of parameters on the hazaxd of separation 
is qualitatively very similar in both models. Thus, if one is interested 
in the effect of parameters such as the separation cost on the hazard of 
separation, the simpler 2-qualities model can be used with little loss of 
predictive power.
5. T im e - v a r y in g  q u a l it y , n o r m a l l y  d is t r ib u t e d
So far, I have assumed that match quality is constant over time. This 
is however not very realistic in most settings, for at least two reasons. 
First, some random shocks could affect the quality of a relationship: for 
example, tastes and needs (or demand conditions and technology for firms) 
can change over time in an unpredictable way, and affect match quality. 
Second, partners typically adapt to each other while in a relationship: they 
learn how to be more productive in this relationship, and so match quality 
may systematically improve, at least in the beginning of a relationship.
5.1. M odel specification. Specifically, match quality is assumed to evolve 
over time according to the following AR(1) process:
(5.1) qk =  PQk-i + c  +  4 _ !
where eqk ~  N (0 ,crp). c is a deterministic drift. Note that, with crp =  0, 
p =  1 and c =  0, we obtain the model from the previous section; so 
this model is indeed a generalization. The observation is defined as in
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(4.1), except that match quality is now allowed to vary over time. The 
observation is therefore defined as:
(5.2) zk =  qk +  4
The best estimate fa of given (5.1) and (5.2) is given by the Kalman 
filter solutions (see Arulampalam et al. (2001)).
(5.3) P (q k \z i± )  =  N(qk, qk, <rk)
(5.4) P(<lk+ lk l:* ) =  ^(flfc+li & +l|t) &k+l\k)
where
(5.5) fa+l\k =  Pfa +  C
(5.6) 2 2 , 2 2  < n |*  =  ° v +  P ° k
(5.7) fa+l =  fa+l\k +  K k + lfa + i ~  fa+l\k)
(5.8) a k+1 =  (1 — Kk+l)&k+l\k
In equations (5.7) and (5.8), Kk+i is the Kalman gain and is defined as:
(5.9) K m  =  ‘7fc+1|t
al+i\k +  aL  
+ P2vk
+  a ob,
As previously, because we work in the belief space, we need to express Zk+i 
as a function of other variables. Using equations (5.7) and (5.5):
/e Qk+l Qk+l\k a.
(5.10) %k+\ — t? 1“ Qk+i\k
Qk+i-(m + c) , _
= -------- p ---------------1-P<lk +  c
J^k+1
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The probability of transition from qk to g/t+i, i.e. the belief transition 
function, is:
(5.11) P (zk+l\qk) = N(pqk +  c, ^/p2^  + a %  +  <rJJ
Because the computations are performed in the belief space and not the 
observation space, the expression p2a l+ a 2+ a 2b3 is not exactly the variance 
of the transition function. As previously, the variance of the transition 
function at length k , VTkl can instead be calculated using the definition of 
the variance of a probability distribution with a known mean:
/+oo p(*fc+i(&+i)|&)(4b+i -  (PQk +  c))2dqk + 1
-oo
Note that, due to the assumptions made about the evolution of match 
quality, o \ no longer necessarily decreases with fc, as it did in the con­
stant match quality case, i.e. beliefs do not necessarily get more precise as 
length increases. This is because while the agent accumulates observations, 
match quality changes, and therefore whether the belief gets more precise 
as relationship length increases depends on whether observations are suf­
ficiently informative given the parameters of the match quality process. 
More precisely, we have:
(5.13) crl+1 < ( % ■ &  (<7p + f ? a D i p * ,  -  a l )  -  <  0
This implies that we can extract conditions over parameters under which 
the variance of the belief decreases from length k to length k + 1. Note that 
the variance of the transition function in equation (5.11) is a function of 
crfc, so that the inequality above has some influence on the variance of the 
transition function, and therefore on the hazard of separation. Condition
(5.13) is however not sufficient to predict how the variance of the transition
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function evolves with length, because the variance of the transition function 
also depends directly on p2, cr2 and and is given by equation (5.12).
5.2. R esults. The belief state discretization used here is the same as in 
section 4 (constant match quality, normally distributed).
The parameters used in the reference case are to be found in Figure 1.
Before examining the results, it is useful to comment on the general 
properties of the transition function variance when match quality follows 
an AR(1) process. As mentioned before, the variance of the transition 
function could either increase or decrease with relationship length. Given 
the parameters used in the reference case, the variance of the transition 
function decreases with length but ultimately converges to a stable value, 
as shown by Figure 29 (in the case where the observation standard de­
viation is 10). If the variance of the transition function increases with 
length, and I will show some cases where this happens, the variance of 
the transition function also converges to a stable value. The relationship 
between the variance of the transition function and length is explained by 
the fact that, in the beginning of a relationship, agents learn about match 
quality, combining their prior with their observations; but the stochastic 
aspect of the quality process implies that agents eventually hit a wall such 
that they cannot further improve the precision of their knowledge. Even if 
the agent’s knowledge of today’s match quality was perfect, match quality 
would change tomorrow according to equation (5.1)and so the transition 
function must always have a non-zero variance. For the hazard of separa­
tion, if the threshold does not vary much over time, as is the case here, this 
implies that the hazard of separation eventually reaches a plateau and no 
longer decreases. This is an important difference with the constant quality 
case, where the hazard of separation converges to 0 as length increases.
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One more remark is in order concerning the transition function. In the 
constant quality case, the mean was q. In this case the mean is pq+c, which 
in the reference case is .99<J < q. This implies that, in the reference case, 
match quality slightly decreases over time. Together with the fact that the 
variance of the transition function does not converge to 0, this also accounts 
for higher hazards of separation at longer lengths in the time-varying match 
quality model relative to the constant quality models.
5.2.1. The impact of separation costs. As in all cases examined so far, 
higher separation costs decrease the separation threshold (Figure 23) and, 
thus decrease the separation hazard as well (Figure 24).
[Figure 23 about here.]
[Figure 24 about here.]
The effects of a probation period on both threshold (Figure 25) and 
hazard (Figure 26) are also qualitatively similar to the effects found in the 
cases examined before.
[Figure 25 about here.]
[Figure 26 about here.]
5.2.2. The impact of the discount factor. Not surprisingly, given that the 
effects of separation costs are the same as before, the effects of the discount 
factor are also the same as usual (Figures 27 and 28).
[Figure 27 about here.]
[Figure 28 about here.]
5.2.3. The impact of the observation variance. The observation variance 
has an impact on the transition function (Figure 29) that is similar to 
the one found in the section 4 constant quality case25 for short lengths:
the variance of the transition function decreases with the variance of the
25From now on, when referring to “the constant quality case”, I will mean the case 
examined in section 4.
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observation, and this for the same reason as in the constant quality case. As 
length increases, variances converge to different values, but in such a way 
that the variance of the transition function remains slightly higher for lower 
observation variances. This result is thus different from the constant quality 
case where at high lengths a higher observation variance was associated 
with a higher variance of the transition function. This different effect comes 
from the role played by the stochastic aspect of the match quality process. 
Intuitively, after a while, it does not matter anymore what the belief was at 
period 0 since match quality has evolved dramatically. Therefore, at high 
length, the agent’s current belief plays the same role the prior played in 
the constant quality case. This explains why a larger observation variance 
leads to a lower transition function variance: with a higher observation 
variance, the observation that the agent will get next period is less likely 
to change their current belief. Given its impact on the variance of the 
transition function, a higher observation variance should all other things 
equal decrease the hazard of separation at low length.
[Figure 29 about here.]
The separation threshold (Figure 30) decreases with observation stan­
dard deviation. The overall effect is qualitatively very similar to the effect 
shown in the constant quality case.
[Figure 30 about here.]
The overall effect of an increase in observation standard deviation on the 
separation hazard is limited, as shown in Figure 31. Basically, a higher 
observation standard deviation shifts the whole separation hazard slightly 
to the right. The fact that the hazard is lower at short lengths for a 
higher observation variance is not surprising since the transition function 
variance and the threshold both decrease with observation variance. It is 
however less obvious why the hazard at higher lengths increases with the
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observation variance, since both the threshold and the observation variance 
decrease with observation variance at all lengths. The explanation is given 
by the consideration of the evolution of the distribution of continuing re­
lationships with length. Intuitively, a noisier observation does not allow 
the agent to detect the “lemons” as fast and efficiently, which means that 
the hazard of separation at low lengths is smaller. On the other hand, 
since with a noisier observation the agent has not been able to sort out the 
lemons so well in the beginning of relationships, it knows that, once the 
precision of its knowledge no longer improves, there are more lemons left 
among the continuing relationships. This is what drives the higher hazard 
of separation at longer relationship lengths. To understand this in the spe­
cific context of the model, let’s look at Figure 32. At length 2, we observe 
that the distribution of continuing relationships with an observation stan­
dard deviation of 12 is narrower than the distribution with an observation 
standard deviation of 826. This implies a lower separation hazard for “12” 
than for “8”, and can be seen by the fact that the part cut to the left of 
the distribution (which is exactly equal to the hazaxd) is fatter with an ob­
servation standard deviation of 8. This also implies that fewer low quality 
relationships axe terminated at length 2 with “12” versus “8”. At length 10, 
the “12” distribution of continuing relationships has a higher density in the 
neighborhood of the threshold, implying that the “12” hazaxd is now bigger 
than the “8” hazard. The higher proportion of low quality relationships at 
length 10 in the “12” case is explained by the fact that overall fewer low 
quality relationships have been terminated before length 10, and so there 
axe more low quality relationships to terminate at length 10 and later27.
26This is because, as shown in Figure 29, the variance of the transition function decreases 
with the observation variance.
27Notice that, since the prior distribution is held constant, the distribution of relation­
ships at short lengths is not affected by the change in the observation variance. In other 
terms, in cases “8” and “12”, the agent starts with an identical density of actual matches 
below the threshold, so it makes sense to say that fewer of the low quality matches have 
been terminated in the “12” case.
118
Besides, because the agent’s belief does not get more precise after length 
10, this difference in the proportion of low quality relationships between 
the “8” and the “12” cases at length 10 will tend to persist over time.
[Figure 31 about here.]
[Figure 32 about here.]
5.2.4. The impact of the prior variance. As shown in Figure 33, a higher 
prior variance increases the variance of the transition function at all lengths, 
as in the constant quality case. However, the variance here converges to 
the same value, for all the prior variance considered. The convergence is 
explained by the fact that, as already mentioned, if match quality is time- 
varying, the prior ceases to matter after a while. Note that with a prior 
standard deviation smaller than 5, the variance of the transition function 
increases with length.
[Figure 33 about here.]
Moreover, as in the constant quality case, a higher standard deviation 
for the prior decreases the threshold for separation at very short lengths 
and increases it thereafter (Figure 34).
[Figure 34 about here.]
With a higher standard deviation of the prior, the hazard of separation is 
higher at low length, and the maximum of the hazaxd occurs earlier (Figure 
35). The effect on the hazard is slightly different from the effect observed 
in the constant quality case, in as much as, at higher lengths, the hazard 
is higher and not lower for a lower standard deviation of the prior. This is 
explained by the fact — mentioned earlier when discussing the impact of 
the observation variance — that a lower variance of the transition function 
at short lengths leads to a permanently higher separation hazard all other 
things equal.
[Figure 35 about here.]
119
5.2.5. The impact of the drift. The drift in the match quality process does 
not affect the variance of the transition function. It does however change 
its mean in a straightforward additive way, as seen in equation (5.11).
A larger drift has a positive effect on the separation threshold, effect 
which is roughly similar for all lengths (Figure 36).
[Figure 36 about here.]
A larger drift has a negative impact on the hazard of separation (Figure 
37). This is because, for a given threshold, a lower mean for the transition 
function means that at each length more relationships cross the threshold. 
Even though the threshold decreases with a smaller drift, this is not enough 
to countervail the effect on the transition function. Intuitively, the more 
matches worsen over time, the higher the separation hazard.
[Figure 37 about here.]
5.2.6. The impact o f the process variance. As shown in Figure 38, an in­
crease in the standard error of the process leads to a higher variance of 
the transition function at all lengths. Moreover, when the process variance 
is below 3, the variance of the transition function decreases with length, 
whereas it increases with length if the process variance is greater than 
3. Variances converge to a constant value, and this value is higher with 
a higher process variance. All other things equal, this should lead to a 
smaller hazard of separation at short lengths when the process variance is 
smaller.
[Figure 38 about here.]
A higher standard deviation of the process decreases the threshold (Fig­
ure 39), and this effect is less strong at very short lengths.
[Figure 39 about here.]
Overall, the impact of the process variance on the separation hazard is 
positive at short lengths and negative thereafter (Figure 40). The impact
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of an increase in process variance on the hazard is mainly explained by the 
fact that a higher process variance increases the variance of the transition 
function. The mechanism at play is identical to the one examined for 
a decrease in the observation variance, which also leads to an increase 
in the variance of the transition function (see section 5.2.3): namely, a 
higher variance of the transition function implies that more low quality 
relationships are dissolved at low lengths, and, precisely because of this, 
fewer relationships are left to be dissolved at higher length. Finally, one 
may wonder why the hazard of separation even increases for a process 
variance of 1: this is because, as p =  .99, match quality deterministically 
decreases over time, so if the process variance is close to 0 , then this decrease 
in quality drives the increase in the separation hazard.
[Figure 40 about here.]
5.2.7. The impact of the AR(1) parameter of the process. The AR(1) par 
rameter p of the process has a positive impact on the variance of the tran­
sition function, as illustrated by Figure 41. This positive impact is however 
small at low lengths and increases thereafter. Moreover, a bigger AR(1) 
parameter increases the mean of match quality given previous match qual­
ity.
[Figure 41 about here.]
A higher p increases the separation threshold, as seen in Figure 42. This 
effect is roughly equal for all relationship lengths.
[Figure 42 about here.]
Finally, a higher p has little effect on the hazard at very low lengths, but 
decreases it for longer lengths (Figure 43). This is because the effect of 
p on mean match quality given previous match quality (see equation 5.1) 
dominates: a smaller p implies that relationship quality deteriorates faster, 
and thus increases the separation hazard.
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[Figure 43 about here.]
While the effects of changes in separation costs or the discount factor on 
the hazard of separation are qualitatively similar in this model compared 
to the others, the effect of parameters entering the transition function are 
different. Essentially, this is because of the interactions between the extra 
parameters in this model (i.e. p, ap and c) and the other parameters 
entering the transition function.
Therefore, one must ask if this model really yields any practical bene­
fits. One important way in which this model is superior to the ones used 
in previous sections is that it allows for the hazard of separation not to 
decline to 0 as relationship length increases. Indeed, such decline to 0 is 
typically not observed empirically. The substantial reason behind this is 
that, realistically, match quality is not constant over time, and therefore it 
is important for a model to account for such time variation.
6. D is c u s s io n
6.1. E ffort an d  lab o r supply. The models presented have not explicitly 
integrated agents’ efforts. This is a very important issue as match quality 
could be in part determined by agents’ efforts. For example, in the em­
ployment relationship, the employee can affect output by supplying more 
or less unobserved effort, as in Holmstrom(1999). In a formal framework 
very similar to the one I use here, the latter article shows that labor sup­
ply will decline to 0  if an employment relationship continues indefinitely 
and the worker’s ability is fixed. On the other hand, if ability evolves 
stochastically, labor supply will be positive and stable over time (after an 
initial period of adjustment). Homlstrom’s results imply that the models 
developed in sections 3 (two constant match qualities) and 4 (normally 
distributed, constant match quality) are inconsistent in the presence of a 
serious moral hazard problem; these models assume indeed that the agent
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(wrongly) believes that the benefits from the relationship do not depend 
on the partner’s effort. If match quality evolves over time as in section 
5, then the model is not necessarily inconsistent, even in the presence of 
moral hazard. Further exploration of this issue is left, however, to future 
work.
6.2. G en era l equ ilib rium . The analysis developed in this paper is in 
partial equilibrium; it does not attem pt to model the influence of the be­
havior of each agents on the others. If relationship quality is entirely match 
specific, then this is not a problem as the prior distribution of match qual­
ities faced by the agent is not influenced by the behavior of other agents. 
If, however, match quality is at least in part due to some general char­
acteristics that make a partner desirable to all agents, then a change in 
behavior by other agents is likely to change the distribution of prior match 
qualities. For example, if firms face higher firing costs and, as a result, de­
crease their threshold for separation, then the distribution of prior match 
qualities should have a slightly lower mean since now workers who were 
terminated and are looking for a new job are a bit worse on average28. The 
feedback mechanism from agents’ optimal behavior to the distribution of 
prior match qualities could in principle be modeled within the framework 
used here, and it would be useful to do so in future work29.
Another related issue is that this model does not allow agents not to be 
in a relationship at all. By assumption, the agent can only continue the 
current relationship or separate and start a new one immediately. This is an 
important limitation in contexts such as the labor market where vacancies
28This effect is smaller the more workers with no prior experience enter the labor market, 
and the more match-specific productivity is.
290ne important challenge is that the feedback from behavior to the distribution of prior 
match qualities would likely make the latter distribution non normal. Computations are 
greatly eased if one assumes normality of the distribution of prior match qualities, and 
to preserve these desirable properties, one would have to devise a meaningful way to 
approximate the non normal distribution of prior match qualities by a normal one.
123
and permanent layoffs do exist and are essential for understanding the 
dynamics of the labor market. The model, however, already contains the 
tools to analyze these issues, at least in a limited sense. Indeed, one can 
assume that at length 1 the separation cost is extremely low, and call 
period 1 the screening period: thus, in period 1 the agent meets a partner, 
gets a signal about match quality and decides to pursue the relationship 
or not. This application will be developed in future work and can allow to 
determine, for example, if firing costs reduce hiring (where hiring means 
not firing at length 1 ) more than firing (at lengths 2  and above) and under 
which conditions this is the case.
6.3. L earn in g  a b o u t m a tch  quality , lea rn in g  on  th e  jo b , a n d  ra n ­
d o m  shocks. The model presented in section 5, with time-varying match 
quality, can simultaneously account for learning about match quality, learn­
ing on the job, and random shocks to match quality. These three elements 
are typically included in separate models in the literature about match qual­
ity in the employment relationship. Learning about match quality is thus 
the main component in Jovanovic(1979). Teulings and van der Ende(2001) 
develop a model where match quality is subject to random shocks. Us­
ing a model that integrates all these empirically relevant effects at the 
same time30 is more efficient for empirical analysis because parameters can 
be determined jointly from a single statistical model. From an empirical 
perspective, it will typically be difficult to disentangle the effects of these 
different elements, because of insufficient information about parameters. 
However, having an integrated model is a useful first step towards finding 
empirical settings where the effect of a parameter or a set of parameters 
can be identified.
3°Nagypal(2004) offers a somewhat different way of integrating these effects in her model.
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7. C o n c l u s io n
This paper has developed a model of optimal matching and separation, 
allowing for partially observed and time-varying match quality. Despite the 
limitations discussed in section 6  — some of which could be overcome in 
future work — the model is already very general and sheds useful light on 
the mechanisms at play in relationship evolution and dissolution. Specifi­
cally, I have shown that, in all models considered, higher separation costs 
and a lower discount factor decrease the separation threshold and thus the 
separation hazard. The effect of parameters entering the belief on the sep­
aration hazard only depends on the effect of these parameters on the belief 
transition function31, i.e. the probability of the agent’s holding a certain 
belief next period given the agent’s current belief. In all cases, an increase 
in the variance of the belief transition function leads to a higher hazard of 
separation at short lengths. A lower observation variance, a higher vari­
ance of the prior, and a higher variance of the error in the AR(1 ) process all 
increase the variance of the transition function at short lengths, and thus 
increase the hazard at short lengths. The effect of parameters entering the 
transition function at longer lengths is not so clear cut. If match quality 
is assumed to be constant over time, then the separation hazard converges 
to 0, and so there will be little effect at higher lengths. If however match 
quality follows and AR(1) process, then an increase in the variance of the 
transition function at all lengths typically lowers the separation hazard at 
higher lengths.
The class of models developed here lends itself to applications in various 
contexts. As already mentioned, domains of choice would be the employ­
ment relationship, marriage, and firm-suppliers relationships. Empirically, 
hazards of separation from an employment relationship and hazards of di­
vorce both increase and decrease over the length of the relationship, but
31This is only true if we assume that the expected value of the prior does not change.
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do not decline to 0. This implies that, very likely, the underlying match 
quality is time-varying and separation costs are positive. In general, it is 
possible to determine which parameters best fit32 an empirically observed 
separation hazard and thus gain useful information about the matching 
process. The model is also useful in predicting the impact of a parameter 
change on the hazard of separation. For example, in Marinescu(2006), I 
examined the impact of a change in the probationary period on the hazard 
of an employment relationship being terminated by the employer.
This paper developed a formal framework with empirical applications 
in view. It is useful both as a conceptual tool to understand the issues 
involved in this class of problems in a real world environment, and as a 
statistical tool for structural estimation. The model will thus hopefully be 
a starting point for fruitful future empirical work.
32We have to keep in mind, however, that the greater the number of unobserved pa­
rameters, the less precise the estimates. For example, I already pointed out that one 
cannot typically distinguish separation costs from the discount factor just by looking at 
the separation hazard.
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F igure 1. Parameters in the reference case
2 match qualities
Normally 
distributed match 
qualities
Normally 
distributed match 
qualities, with 
AR(1) process for 
match quality
Parameters of interest
Mean of prior 0.5 30 30
Standard deviation of prior N/A 5 5
Standard deviation of process N/A N/A 2
Dirft of process N/A N/A 0
Auto-correlation of process N/A N/A 0.99
Standard deviation of observation 4 10 10
Separation cost 1.5 30 30
Discount factor 0.85 0.85 0.85
Technical parameters
Range of match qualities [0,1] [0,60] [0,60]
Number of match quality values 1001 801 801
Maximal length 50 50 50
Notes: In the 2 match qualities case, the values of match qualities are 
defined by norm cdf(X , 0.5,0.1), where X  is a vector of 1001 equally 
spaced values between 0 and 1, and norm cdf(X 10.5,0.1) is the 
cumulative distribution function, evaluated at point X ,  of a normal 
probability distribution with mean 0.5 and standard deviation 0.1. In the 
other cases, values of match quality are equally spaced over the range.
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F igure 2. Separation threshold for different separation
costs, 2 match qualities
1
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L e n g t h  o f  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p
Notes: The figure shows the threshold for different separation costs, 
holding all other parameters fixed to their reference case values. 
Parameter values used in the reference case are to be found in Figure 1.
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F igure 3. Separation hazard for different separation costs,
2 match qualities
5  1 0  1 5  2 0  2 5  3 0  3 5  4 0  4 5
L e n g t h  o f  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p
Notes: The figure shows the hazard for different separation costs, holding 
all other parameters fixed to their reference case values. Parameter values 
used in the reference case are to be found in Figure 1.
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F i g u r e  4. Separation threshold with a probation period, 2
match qualities
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Notes: The figure shows the threshold for different lengths of the 
probation period, with separation costs being 1.5 during the probation 
period and 2.3 thereafter. All other parameters are fixed to their 
reference values. Parameter values used in the reference case are to be 
found in Figure 1.
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F i g u r e  5. Separation hazard with a probation period, 2
match qualities
P r o b a t i o n = 1 2
P r o b a t i o n = 2 4
 * l
L e n g t h  o f  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p
Notes: The figure shows the hazard for different lengths of the probation 
period, with separation costs being 1.5 during the probation period and 
2.3 thereafter. All other parameters are fixed to their reference values. 
Parameter values used in the reference case are to be found in Figure 1.
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F i g u r e  6. Separation threshold for different discount fac­
tors, 2 match qualities
- 0 . 7 5  
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L e n g t h  o f  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p
Notes: The figure shows the threshold for different discount factors, 
holding all other parameters fixed to their reference case values. 
Parameter values used in the reference case are to be found in Figure 1.
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F i g u r e  7. Separation hazard for different discount factors,
2 match qualities
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Notes: The figure shows the hazard for different discount factors, holding 
all other parameters fixed to their reference case values. Parameter values 
used in the reference case are to be found in Figure 1.
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F i g u r e  8. Transition function for different observation 
standard deviations, 2 match qualities
0 . 0 0 6  0 . 1 5 9 0 . 5 0 . 8 4 1  0 . 9 9 4
M e a n  o f  b e l i e f
Notes: The figure shows the transition function for different observation 
standard deviations, holding all other parameters fixed to their reference 
case values. Parameter values used in the reference case are to be found 
in Figure 1.
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F i g u r e  9. Separation threshold for different observation
standard deviations, 2 match qualities
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Notes: The figure shows the separation threshold for different observation 
standard deviations, holding all other parameters fixed to their reference 
case values. Parameter values used in the reference case are to be found 
in Figure 1.
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F i g u r e  10. Separation hazard for different observation
standard deviations, 2 match qualities
L e n g t h  o f  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p
Notes: The figure shows the separation hazard for different observation 
standard deviations, holding all other parameters fixed to their reference 
case values. Parameter values used in the reference case are to be found 
in Figure 1.
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F i g u r e  1 1 .  Separation threshold for different separation
costs, normally distributed match qualities
“O
L e n g t h  o f  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p
Notes: The figure shows the threshold for different separation costs, 
holding all other parameters fixed to their reference case values. 
Parameter values used in the reference case are to be found in Figure 1.
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F i g u r e  12. Separation hazard for different separation costs,
normally distributed match qualities
L e n g t h  o f  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p
Notes: The figure shows the hazard for different separation costs, holding 
all other parameters fixed to their reference case values. Parameter values 
used in the reference case are to be found in Figure 1.
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F i g u r e  13. Separation threshold with a probation period,
normally distributed match qualities
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Notes: The figure shows the threshold for different lengths of the 
probation period, with separation costs being 1.5 during the probation 
period and 2.3 thereafter. All other parameters are fixed to their 
reference values. Parameter values used in the reference case are to be 
found in Figure 1.
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F i g u r e  14. Separation hazard with a probation period, nor­
mally distributed match qualities
N o  p r o b a t i o n  
P r o b a t i o n = 1 2  
P r o b a t i o n = 2 4
L e n g t h  o f  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p
Notes: The figure shows the hazard for different lengths of the probation 
period, with separation costs being 1.5 during the probation period and
2.3 thereafter. All other parameters are fixed to their reference values. 
Parameter values used in the reference case are to be found in Figure 1.
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F i g u r e  15. Separation threshold for different discount fac­
tors, normally distributed match qualities
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L e n g t h  o f  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p
Notes: The figure shows the threshold for different discount factors, 
holding all other parameters fixed to their reference case values. 
Parameter values used in the reference case are to be found in Figure 1.
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F i g u r e  16. Separation hazard for different discount factors,
normally distributed match qualities
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L e n g t h  o f  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p
Notes: The figure shows the hazard for different discount factors, holding 
all other parameters fixed to their reference case values. Parameter values 
used in the reference case are to be found in Figure 1.
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F i g u r e  17. Variance of the transition function for different
observation standard deviations, normally distributed match
qualities
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Notes: The figure shows the variance transition  function for different 
observation standard  deviations, holding all other param eters fixed to  
their reference case values. Param eter values used in the reference case 
are to  be found in Figure 1.
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F igure 18. Separation threshold for different observation
standard deviations, normally distributed match qualities
/ — /
L e n g t h  o f  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p
Notes: The figure shows the threshold for different observation standard  
deviations, holding all other param eters fixed to  their reference case 
values. Param eter values used in the reference case are to  be found in 
Figure 1.
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F i g u r e  19. Separation hazard for different observation
standard deviations, normally distributed match qualities
L e n g t h  o f  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p
Notes: The figure shows the hazard for different observation standard 
deviations, holding all other parameters fixed to their reference case 
values. Parameter values used in the reference case are to be found in 
Figure 1.
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F igure 20. Variance of the transition function for different
prior standard deviations, normally distributed match qual­
ities
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Notes: The figure shows the variance of the transition function for 
different prior standard deviations, holding all other parameters fixed to 
their reference case values. Parameter values used in the reference case 
are to be found in Figure 1.
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F i g u r e  21. Separation threshold for different prior stan­
dard deviations, normally distributed match qualities
W 24.7
CO 2 1
L e n g t h  o f  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p
Notes: The figure shows the threshold for different prior standard  
deviations, holding all o ther param eters fixed to  their reference case 
values. Param eter values used in the reference case are to  be found in 
Figure 1.
148
Se
pa
ra
ti
on
 
h
az
ar
d
F i g u r e  22. Separation hazard for different prior standard
deviations, normally distributed match qualities
L e n g t h  o f  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p
Notes: The figure shows the hazard for different prior standard deviations, 
holding all other parameters fixed to their reference case values. 
Parameter values used in the reference case are to be found in Figure 1.
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F igure 23. Separation threshold for different separation
costs, normally distributed match qualities and AR(1) pro­
cess for match quality
CL
CD
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L e n g t h  o f  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p
Notes: T he figure shows the threshold for different separation costs, 
holding all other param eters fixed to  their reference case values. 
P aram eter values used in the reference case are to  be found in Figure 1.
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F i g u r e  24. Separation hazard for different separation costs,
normally distributed match qualities and AR(1) process for
match quality
L e n g t h  o f  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p
Notes: The figure shows the hazard for different separation costs, holding 
all other parameters fixed to their reference case values. Parameter values 
used in the reference case are to be found in Figure 1.
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F i g u r e  25 .  Separation threshold with a probation period, 
normally distributed match qualities and AR(1) process for 
match quality
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L e n g t h  o f  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p
Notes: The figure shows the threshold for different lengths of the 
probation period, with separation costs being 1.5 during the probation 
period and 2.3 thereafter. All other parameters are fixed to their 
reference values. Parameter values used in the reference case are to be 
found in Figure 1.
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F ig u r e  26. Separation hazard with a probation period, 
normally distributed match qualities and AR(1) process for 
match quality
N o  p r o b a t i o n  
P r o b a t i o n = 1 2  
P r o b a t i o n = 2 4
L e n g t h  o f  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p
Notes: The figure shows the hazard for different lengths of the probation 
period, with separation costs being 1.5 during the probation period and
2.3 thereafter. All other parameters are fixed to their reference values. 
Parameter values used in the reference case are to be found in Figure 1.
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F i g u r e  2 7 .  Separation threshold for different discount fac­
tors, normally distributed match qualities and AR(1) process
for match quality
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L e n g t h  o f  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p
Notes: The figure shows the threshold for different discount factors, 
holding all other parameters fixed to their reference case values. 
Parameter values used in the reference case are to be found in Figure 1.
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F igure 28. Separation hazard for different discount factors,
normally distributed match qualities and AR(1) process for
match quality
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Notes: The figure shows the hazard for different discount factors, holding 
all o ther param eters fixed to their reference case values. Param eter values 
used in the  reference case are to  be found in Figure 1.
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F igure 29. Variance of the transition function for different
observation standard deviations, normally distributed match
qualities and AR(1) process for match quality
L e n g t h  o f  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p
Notes: The figure shows the variance of the transition  function for 
different observation standard  deviations, holding all other param eters 
fixed to  their reference case values. Param eter values used in the  reference 
case are to  be found in Figure 1.
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F i g u r e  30. Separation threshold for different observation
standard deviations, normally distributed match qualities
and AR(1) process for match quality
8-21
L e n g t h  o f  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p
Notes: The figure shows the threshold for different observation standard 
deviations, holding all other parameters fixed to their reference case 
values. Parameter values used in the reference case are to be found in 
Figure 1.
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F igure 31. Separation hazard for different observation
standard deviations, normally distributed match qualities
and AR(1) process for match quality
—  9
L e n g t h  o f  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p
Notes: T he figure shows the hazard for different observation standard  
deviations, holding all other param eters fixed to  their reference case 
values. Param eter values used in the reference case are to be found in 
Figure 1.
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F i g u r e  32. D istribution of continuing relationships for dif­
ferent observation standard  deviations, normally d istributed 
m atch qualities and AR(1) process for m atch quality
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Notes: T he figure shows the distribution of continuing relationships (i.e. 
the  d istribu tion  Pk(qk) in equation 2.28) for different observation standard  
deviations, holding all other param eters fixed to their reference case 
values. Param eter values used in the reference case are to  be found in 
Figure 1.
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F i g u r e  33. Variance of the transition function for different
prior standard deviations, normally distributed match qual­
ities and AR(1) process for match quality
••
L e n g t h  o f  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p
Notes: The figure shows the variance of the transition  function for 
different prior standard  deviations, holding all other param eters fixed to 
their reference case values. Param eter values used in the reference case 
are to  be found in Figure 1.
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F i g u r e  34. Separation threshold for different prior stan­
dard deviations, normally distributed match qualities and
AR(1) process for match quality
L e n g t h  o f  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p
Notes: The figure shows the threshold for different prior standard 
deviations, holding all other parameters fixed to their reference case 
values. Parameter values used in the reference case are to be found in 
Figure 1.
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F i g u r e  35. Separation hazard for different prior standard
deviations, normally distributed match qualities and AR(1)
process for match quality
'v
L e n g t h  o f  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p
Notes: The figure shows the hazard for different prior standard  deviations, 
holding all other param eters fixed to  their reference case values. 
Param eter values used in the reference case are to  be found in Figure 1.
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F i g u r e  36. Separation threshold for different process drifts,
normally distributed match qualities and AR(1) process for
match quality
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L e n g t h  o f  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p
Notes: T he figure shows the threshold for different process drifts, holding 
all o ther param eters fixed to their reference case values. Param eter values 
used in the  reference case are to  be found in Figure 1.
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F i g u r e  37. Separation hazard for different process drifts,
normally distributed match qualities and AR(1) process for
match quality
L e n g t h  o f  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p
Notes: The figure shows the hazard for different process drifts, holding all 
o ther param eters fixed to  their reference case values. Param eter values 
used in the reference case are to  be found in Figure 1.
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F igure 38. Variance of the transition function for differ­
ent process standard deviations, normally distributed match
qualities and AR(1) process for match quality
20
—  2
40
L e n g t h  o f  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p
Notes: The figure shows the variance of the  transition  function for 
different process standard  deviations, holding all other param eters fixed 
to  their reference case values. Param eter values used in the reference case 
are to  be found in Figure 1.
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F i g u r e  39. Separation threshold for different process stan­
dard deviations, normally distributed match qualities and
AR(1) process for match quality
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Notes: T he figure shows the threshold for different process standard  
deviations, holding all other param eters fixed to  their reference case 
values. Param eter values used in the reference case are to  be found in 
Figure 1.
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F igure 40. Separation hazard for different process standard
deviations, normally distributed match qualities and AR(1)
process for match quality
VV
L e n g t h  o f  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p
Notes: The figure shows the hazard for different process standard 
deviations, holding all other parameters fixed to their reference case 
values. Parameter values used in the reference case are to be found in 
Figure 1.
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F igure 41. Variance of the transition function for differ­
ent process AR(1) parameters, normally distributed match
qualities and AR(1) process for match quality
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Notes: The figure shows the variance the transition function for different 
process AR(1) parameters, holding all other parameters fixed to their 
reference case values. Parameter values used in the reference case are to 
be found in Figure 1.
F igure 42. Separation threshold for different process
AR(1) parameters, normally distributed match qualities and
AR(1) process for match quality
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L e n g t h  o f  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p
Notes: The figure shows the threshold for different process AR(1) 
parameters, holding all other parameters fixed to their reference case 
values. Parameter values used in the reference case are to be found in 
Figure 1.
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F i g u r e  43. Separation hazard for different process AR(1)
parameters, normally distributed match qualities and AR(1)
process for match quality
L e n g t h  o f  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p
Notes: The figure shows the hazard for different process AR(1) 
parameters, holding all other parameters fixed to their reference case 
values. Parameter values used in the reference case are to be found in 
Figure 1.
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Chapter 3
Are Judges Sensitive to Economic Conditions? Evidence from UK
Employment Tribunals1
loana Marinescu
A bstrac t
In the view of classical legal theory, judges’ decisions are fully determined by legal 
texts, whereas for legal realism and in particular law and economics, these decisions 
can be determined by other factors such as economic conditions. This paper 
specifically investigates whether judges deciding on the legitimacy of unfair dismissal 
claims are sensitive to economic conditions faced by firms and the workers they 
dismissed. Judges may face the following trade-off: in bad times, getting fired is more 
costly for workers, while at the same time firms find firing costs harder to bear. How 
do judges decide? I use British data on individual unfair dismissal and redundancy 
payment cases brought to Employment Tribunals in 1990-1992. Controlling for case 
selection, I find that when the unemployment or bankruptcy rate are high, and the 
dismissed worker has found a new job, judges tend to decide in favour of firms. All 
other things equal, when the dismissed worker is still unemployed, his probability of 
prevailing at trial is lower. However, the higher the unemployment rate, the more 
likely the unemployed dismissed worker is to win the case. On the whole population 
of cases brought to trial, a one point increase in the unemployment rate leads to a 7 
points decrease in the probability of judges deciding in favour of dismissed 
employees. An increase in the bankruptcy rate has a similar effect. These findings are 
consistent with the idea that judges maximize the joint welfare of the dismissed 
worker and the firm, tailoring firing costs to local and individual economic 
circumstances.
1 This paper was already included, in a very similar version, in my PhD defended in June 2005 at the 
EHESS, Paris.
171
“If a covenant be made, wherein neither of the parties perform presently, but trust one 
another; in the condition of mere nature (which is a condition of war of every man 
against every man), upon every reasonable suspicion, it is void: but if there be a 
common power set over them both, with right and force sufficient to compel 
performance, it is not void. For he that performeth first, has no assurance the other 
will perform after; because the bonds of words are too weak to bridle men’s ambition, 
avarice, anger and other passions, without the fear of some coercive power
HOBBES, Leviathan, Part I, chapter XTV, §18.
1 Introduction
As Hobbes put it, contracts would be void without an enforcing power. From this 
basic requirement, legal theory usually goes a step further to posit that a contract is 
valid only if the parties freely agree to its terms. However, this basic requirement of 
contract law raises a double problem in the case of the contract of employment. First, 
the bargaining power of firms is usually higher than the bargaining power of 
individual workers, which casts doubt on the fairness of the contractual terms (A. 
Smith2). Second, the employment contract is generally incomplete, which gives rise to 
hold-up opportunities for both workers and firms (Malcomson, 1999). Although 
workers’ shirking has often been stressed (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984), the 
subordination of workers to firms inherent in the employment contract opens large 
hold-up opportunities for firms as well (K. Marx3).
Labour law has developed to address these specific problems. One of the main areas 
of regulation concerns the conditions in which the employment contract can be 
terminated. Such regulation will be the focus of this paper. In the absence of specific 
regulation, employers and employees can terminate the employment contract at will, 
under some minimal conditions such as the requirement to act in good faith. Under 
regulation, the employer is typically required to have a good reason or just cause to 
terminate the contract. Thus, in most European countries, and sometimes in the 
United States4, workers have the right not to be unfairly dismissed.
2 An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes o f the Wealth o f Nations, Book I, chapter VIII, §11-13. Note 
that Smith believes that the imbalance in bargaining power should be corrected through the growth in 
the wealth of the nation, which increases the demand for labour, and not through a law fixing a fair 
wage (chapter VIII).
3 The Capital, Book I, Section II, chapter VI, last paragraph.
4 In the United States, this right is only granted in general if it is implicitly given by the employer. This 
is called the “implied-contract” exception to the doctrine of employment-at-will. For a study of the 
effects of this exception on employment, see Autor et al. (2002). In unionized firms, this right is
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In as much as the legislator aims at protecting the workers against arbitrary job loss, 
unfair dismissal law can be viewed as having an ingrained “pro-worker” bent. 
However, this overlooks the autonomy of judicial bodies in charge of implementing 
the law. Judges have the possibility, more or less limited by each country’s 
institutions, of tailoring the law to individual cases, according to their own views of 
fairness. Specifically, in countries such as the United Kingdom or France, judges in 
charge of implementing unfair dismissal legislation are themselves employees and 
employers meant to represent their respective constituencies5, which makes them 
particularly sensitive to the specific context of the case. For example, economic 
circumstances affect the costs incurred by firms and workers when a dismissal takes 
place. It is more difficult for dismissed workers to find a job in a high unemployment 
context. For a firm, being over-manned is more hazardous when bankruptcy risk is 
higher. Testing whether and how economic circumstances may tilt the sense of 
legitimacy of judges in the marginal unfair dismissal case is the main goal of this 
paper.
However, the exact effect of economic conditions on judges’ decisions depends on the 
definition of their objective function. Assuming for example that judges* objective is 
to maximize social welfare, it is not clear how their decisions should be related to 
economic conditions. Indeed, the right to claim unfair dismissal gives rise to a firing 
cost incurred by firms whenever a dismissed employee goes to court. If such a cost 
discourages firing, it also discourages hiring so that the effect on employment is 
unclear. Non surprisingly then, economic models show no clear-cut relationship 
between the level of firing costs and the level of employment (Bertola(1992) in partial 
equilibrium, Ljungqvist(2002) in general equilibrium). The empirical literature using 
cross-country variation does not reach a clearer conclusion. Djankov et al. (2003) find 
that a general employment law index has a positive correlation with the 
unemployment rate, i.e. a more protective employment law is correlated with higher 
unemployment. Within the OECD however, Employment Protection Legislation 
(EPL) is found to have no significant relationship with the unemployment rate 
(OECD, 1999). It is then interesting to study what judges’ revealed preferences tell us 
on their views on fairness as a function of economic conditions. Judges may try to
granted by the contract between the union and the firm, which specifies some rules to guarantee the 
fairness of the discharge or lay-off process.
5 In the UK, the body of judges also includes a professional judge.
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restore efficiency where the blind enforcement of the law is inefficient and private 
contracting is not an option. Indeed, some dispositions of dismissal law severely limit 
the ability of agents to defeat it using private arrangements, which largely invalidates 
the view advanced by Lazear(1990) according to which the requirement of a 
severance payment could be undone by properly designed contracts.
The literature on the effect of macroeconomic conditions on EPL enforcement by 
labour courts is scarce. Using regional aggregated data, Macis (2001) finds a negative 
effect of the unemployment rate on the share of employees winning their unfair 
dismissal cases. Ichino et al. (2003) use micro data from a large Italian bank ( 8 6  trials 
in 15 years) combined with Macis' macro data and find a positive effect of the 
unemployment rate on the probability of an employee winning the unfair dismissal 
case.
This study uses a survey of British Employment Tribunal cases to estimate the effect 
of economic conditions on workers' probability of winning unfair dismissal cases at 
trial, and hence determine whether judges' decisions are influenced by economic 
conditions. The determination of the relevant empirical strategy faces however an 
important caveat. Indeed, an abundant literature (Cooter and Rubinfeld,1989) has 
pointed out that the distribution of case quality at trial can be expected to be different 
from the distribution of case quality in the population of applicants. In my paper, case 
quality is conventionally defined as being the quality of the worker's case, i.e. a 
higher case quality means that the worker would, all other things equal, have a higher 
probability of winning at trial. The focus of this paper is then to estimate the impact of 
economic conditions on judges’ decisions. However, given the above mentioned 
problem, estimating this effect using only the sample of cases having reached the trial 
stage may be misleading. Indeed, it could be that economic conditions are correlated 
with case quality. In particular, one concern may be that unemployed workers are 
more likely to go to trial, thereby reducing the average quality of cases being put 
forward by workers. This would generate a negative correlation between 
unemployment and the quality of the cases going to trial. Note that the employment 
status of the dismissed worker determines the existence of a bias: if the worker finds a 
new job right after being dismissed, the unemployment rate is unlikely to influence 
his decision to go to trial. The data used in this paper contains information on the 
employment status of the worker and thus allows one to estimate the effect of
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economic conditions on judges’ decisions on a category of cases for which 
contamination by selection bias is unlikely.
In general, if case quality can be measured sufficiently well, any effect of economic 
conditions on case quality is captured by the case quality measure, and therefore the 
estimated effect of economic conditions corresponds to the effect on judges’ 
decisions. Like Ichino et al, I have information on the reason for the dismissal, as well 
as other individual variables that may be correlated with case quality, such as, 
crucially, the amount of settlement offers made by firms to workers prior to trial. 
Thus, the measures of case quality in the data are exceptionally good by the standards 
of the literature. If these measures were still not precise enough, one would need to 
account for potential selection on unobservables. I carefully analyse the selection of 
the sample of applicants itself, as well as the selection of applicants for trial; the latter 
analysis is performed using sample selection models by Heckman(1979), Van de Ven 
and Van Praag (1981), and Sartori(2003). In all the models considered, I find a 
negative effect of both the unemployment rate and the bankruptcy rate on workers' 
probability of winning their cases, rejecting the possibility that the main results of this 
paper are driven by selection bias. When also controlling for the worker’s 
employment status, I find that workers who have found a new job see a decrease in 
their probability of winning when unemployment or bankruptcy rates are higher, 
whereas workers who are still unemployed see a positive effect of the unemployment 
rate on their probability of winning.
Economic conditions thus affect judges’ decisions differently for employed and 
unemployed workers, while on average, worse economic conditions make judges 
marginally more pro-firm. This result should be taken into account by legislators 
when framing unfair dismissal legislation: indeed, the effect of the law is a 
combination of the formal content of the law and the way judges actually enforce it. 
For social scientists, the finding of this paper indicates that one should take into 
account enforcement when assessing the efficiency of unfair dismissal legislation, and 
EPL in general. Indeed, what really matters for economic performance, and therefore 
economic policy, is not EPL per se but the effective firing costs induced by its 
application.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives some background on British 
Employment Tribunals and describes the data used. Section 3 discusses theories of 
judges' decisions and defines the estimation problem arising due to sample selection.
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Section 4 deals with the selection of the sample of applicants, establishing that there 
are no observable effects of economic conditions on applicants' case quality. Section 
5 presents a general model of settlement behaviour and derives the relevant 
econometric specifications. Section 6  gives the results of the empirical analysis. And 
section 7 concludes.
2 British Employment Tribunals and data used
2.1 British Employment Tribunals and the employment law
Most European countries have specialized labour tribunals to deal with unfair 
dismissal cases, and other specific labour law cases that may arise. It is commonly 
assumed that dealing with these matters requires some knowledge of common 
practices among firms and workers. Some countries, such as France and the United 
Kingdom, have decided it is in the best interest of equity to have representatives of 
employees and employers act as judges and provide the expertise required. In the 
United Kingdom, the employment tribunal is composed of one chairperson, a 
professional judge, and two appointed lay judges, one representing employers and the 
other representing employees. The lay judges are chosen by the administration from 
lists of persons proposed mainly by trade unions (for lay judges representing 
employees) and employer groups (for lay judges representing employers).
The United States have no such specific labour courts, but the Employment Tribunals’ 
setting in the United Kingdom is similar to the arbitration scheme used in unionized 
firms in the United States to decide on issues where employer and union disagree 
(Ashenfelter and Bloom 1984, Farber and Bazerman 1986). In both cases, the 
institutional setting is meant to achieve some equitable compromise between firms' 
and workers' interests. In an experimental study, Farber and Bazerman (1986) find 
that when deciding on a wage increase, the arbitrator reacts in an asymmetric way to 
firms' financial situation. Compared to a medium situation, worse financial conditions 
lead to a discount in the award made by the arbitrator and better financial conditions 
lead to a premium. Interestingly enough, the premium is significantly lower than the 
discount. This shows that arbitrators are particularly sensitive to firms' interests in 
bad times, and suggests that judges in labour courts may react in a similar fashion.
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In Europe, the majority of cases labour courts have to deal with concerns dismissals. 
In the US, although the economics literature has focused on arbitration on wages 
issues, these are only a very small part of the issues arbitrators have to decide on. 
Instead, issues of discharge and disciplinary action are most common (see for 
example the statistics given by the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, 
www.fincs.gov). In other terms, in the arbitration system, dismissal is at the centre of 
debate, just as in British Employment Tribunals. In what follows, I am going to 
concentrate on cases concerning dismissal, although I also have data on other types of 
cases such as unfair deduction from wages, and race and sex discrimination6.
Once he/she has been dismissed, the employee can bring a case to court, either to ask 
for some severance/redundancy payments if those are absent or insufficient, or to ask 
for compensation for unfair dismissal. It is important to notice that the first category 
of cases (redundancy and severance payments) is closer to the second one (unfair 
dismissal) than it may seem at first glance. Indeed, if the employer claims very serious 
misconduct on the part of the employee, then the employer need not pay any 
severance payment to the employee. In those cases, the employee, without claiming 
there was no reasonable ground for his/her dismissal, can still claim that the 
misconduct was not as severe as to deprive him/her of a severance payment; this is 
then very close to saying that the dismissal was in some way unfair. A surprising but 
fruitful parallel can be drawn here with unemployment insurance. Indeed, in many 
countries, and in particular in the United States, workers do not receive any 
unemployment benefits if they have lost their job by their own fault. This restriction 
has particularly interesting consequences in the United States where experience rating 
is in place. If a firm wants to avoid paying higher unemployment insurance 
contributions when laying off more often (this is the principle of the so-called 
“experience rating”), it can instead discharge its employees for misconduct or 
underperformance, which has no effect on its experience rating. Of course, such 
opportunistic behaviour should be limited: this is why fired workers can appeal 
against their disqualification for unemployment benefits by showing that they did not 
misbehave or shirk in such a way that the firm could have legitimately discharged 
them. If the unemployment insurance commission decides in the worker’s favour, the 
worker receives unemployment benefits and the firm does get penalized in its
6 I tested for an the influence of economic conditions on those other cases and found similar but less 
significant effects. The sample however is too small to provide reliable results.
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experience rating. Thus, appealing against disqualification to the unemployment 
insurance commission in the United States is similar to filing a case for unfair 
dismissal in Europe.
Returning to the British Employment Tribunals, the British law governing unfair 
dismissal cases is formulated in such a way that it explicitly allows judges to take into 
account circumstances other than the mere facts pertaining to the case (the 
“substantial merits of the case”):
“the determination of whether the dismissal was fair or unfair, having 
regard to the reason shown by the employer, shall depend on whether 
in the circumstances (including the size and the administrative 
resources of the employer’s undertaking), the employer acted 
reasonably or unreasonably in treating it as sufficient reason for 
dismissing the employee; and that question shall be determined in 
accordance with equity and the substantial merits of the case.” 
(Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978 s. 57(3), as 
amended by Employment Act 1980, s. 6 ).
Thus, three elements can legally determine judges' decisions. First, as is obvious, 
decisions shall depend on the substantial merits of the case. But decisions may also 
depend on relevant “circumstances”, which explicitly include the firms' ability to deal 
with such cases in a proper, and hence costly, way. The implication is that smaller 
firms, and firms with less administrative resources, may expect more forgiveness on 
the part of the judges. Moreover, the list of circumstances is not explicitly limited and 
therefore economic conditions could also in principle be included, as firing costs are 
more difficult to bear for firms when economic conditions are worse. Decisions shall 
also depend on “equity”, which means that judges should compromise between firms' 
and workers' interests.
To see how these considerations apply to a specific case, we can take an example 
from a 2003 Employment Tribunal decision concerning the allegedly unfair dismissal 
of a truck driver. During an early delivery up a particularly tricky lane, the truck 
ended up on its side, resulting in damage to vehicle and interruption of deliveries that 
day. The employer observed the scene and, without further inquiry, dismissed the 
driver without notice for gross misconduct (“reckless driving”). The employer argued 
that this was gross misconduct as it was a financial disaster for his business: he could 
not afford to increase insurance premiums by claiming on the insurance policy for the 
damage to this vehicle. The driver, who had by then found a new job, argued this was
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only an unfortunate accident, and that such things happened in the past without the 
driver being dismissed. The court decided for the driver, mainly on account of the fact 
that the employer had not followed the rules set out in the company’s own handbook, 
according to which no dismissal should take place without a reasonable investigation 
and an opportunity for the employee to offer an explanation.
This example calls for two comments. First, deciding whether the employee was 
guilty of a gross misconduct partially depended on judges’ view about the fact that the 
employee’s misconduct was endangering the financial position of the firm; hence, if 
economic conditions were bad, the argument of the employer would sound more 
credible. Second, the decision depends on procedural fairness: the employer not 
respecting a certain rule of conduct was seen as a fault. This is very similar to the 
American implied contract exception, whereby it is insisted that if the employer 
stated, even implicitly, that the employee has a right not to be unfairly dismissed, then 
the employer may be found guilty of unfair dismissal at court. In the British context, 
one must remember that one of the reasons why the unfair dismissal legislation was 
introduced in the first place was to give an incentive to employers to organize a 
systematic internal disciplinary procedure to deal with conflicts arising at the 
workplace (Davies and Freedland, 1993).
At this point, one might wonder whether judges are allowed to give their own 
interpretation of the fairness of the dismissal based on considerations such as 
economic conditions. More precisely, even though the law in its formulation may 
allow such considerations to have an influence on decisions, it may be that the appeal 
courts do not allow it. However, the Court of appeal decision in the Gilham and others 
v. Kent County Council case in 1985 leaves tribunals full discretion to decide on 
matters of facts. In the British legal system, the control of the court of appeal only 
concerns breaches in the principle of the law itself, and no appeal on matters of fact 
can be made. The way the Gilham case arose deserves some further comments. In the 
early eighties, the conservative government of Mrs. Thatcher cut local authorities’ 
budgets. The Kent County decided to reduce dinner ladies’ (the persons working at 
school restaurants) wages to face the new financial constraint. Some dinner ladies 
refused this modification to their conditions of employment, were fired and claimed 
unfair dismissal. The court balanced employers’ financial constraints and the fact that 
there had been a breach in a nationally negotiated agreement concerning wages, and 
decided in favour of the dinner ladies. An appeal was made by the employer. The
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employer’s lawyer argued that a pro-employer decision was reached in two quasi­
identical cases in Devon and Somerset counties. The court of appeal confirmed the 
tribunars decision, stating that different courts are permitted to come to different 
conclusions in similar cases: “Now whether or not an employer has behaved 
reasonably in dismissing an employee is a question of fact, and it is a question upon 
which different people, looking at the same set of circumstances, may reasonably 
come to different conclusions. It is therefore endemic in a system where there is no 
appeal on fact [because of the high costs it would involve] that from time to time 
different industrial tribunals will give different answers to broadly similar situations 
[...]”. In this specific case, one should note that the two pro-employers decisions cited 
by the Kent County’s lawyer were taken in a high-unemployment (7.2%) region, 
whereas the pro-employees decision in the Kent county was taken in a lower 
unemployment (6 %) region. Of course, as these decisions concern public sector firms, 
one cannot argue that judges give more weight to firms’ arguments in bad times 
because these particular firms may go bankrupt. However, it can still be that judges 
are more sensitive to pro-firms arguments in general when economic conditions are 
worse. This can be either because of mere association of ideas or because the sense of 
fairness of treatment for workers is related to economics conditions. In the first case, 
by association of ideas, firms in the public sector end up being given a similar 
treatment to firms in the private sector although they do not to have the same financial 
constraints. In the second case, judges may consider it less legitimate for the dinner 
ladies to complain about a change in their wages and getting dismissed on that 
account when the local economy is undergoing some episode of relatively bad 
economic conditions. One can picture the judges using reasoning such as: “these 
dinner ladies should be content to have a job, and they should be happy to make some 
sacrifices to keep it, as so many other workers are unemployed and so many firms are 
under heightened financial pressure”.
To conclude, the functioning of the British dismissal law allows Employment 
Tribunals judges to take into account economic conditions when deciding on whether 
or not a firm has acted reasonably in dismissing an employee. I will now describe the 
data used to investigate whether this is indeed the case.
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2.2 Data used
I have data on individual cases, coming from the 1992 survey of Employment 
Tribunal Applications in Great Britain. This survey was conducted in the following 
way. First, a random sample of applications completed between January 1990 and 
October 1991 was drawn; then, employers and employees involved in those cases 
were interviewed. Note however, that, to save on resources, the survey managers 
decided to interview all employers and only half of the dismissed employees involved 
in the cases of the sample. The sample is constructed to be representative of all cases, 
withdrawn, settled or heard. Many variables are available, including the precise 
reason for dismissal, and information on all the stages of the case from application to 
tribunal hearing, including details of settlements, such as the amounts firms offered to 
workers for a settlement.
Among the available variables, I pick a set X  that will constitute the control 
variables: they are variables concerning case characteristics, worker characteristics 
and firm characteristics listed in table 1 . 1 report summary statistics for these variables 
for the population of surveyed applicants, and for the sub-sample of applicants whose 
cases end by a full tribunal hearing. Note that I include in particular two dummy 
variables allowing me to distinguish economic dismissals or redundancy payment 
claims from other cases, which is crucial as one may fear that the effect of economic 
conditions, if any, only concerns this type of cases. In table 2, I report the same 
summary statistics for the sub-sample of cases for which we know whether the worker 
was still unemployed at the time of the survey. Indeed, while all the survey variables I 
use come from the employers’ responses, the employment status question is only 
asked to the dismissed employee. Given that there are moreover some missing 
responses to the employment status question, the sample for which the employment 
status is available is much smaller. However, for reasons that will become clearer in 
the next section, exploiting the information on workers’ employment status is a 
crucial aspect of this work
All variables in X  are potentially correlated with case quality, but two among these 
variables are most likely to be a good measure of case quality. First, I define a dummy 
variable for bad misconduct: this dummy is equal to 1 if the reason for the workers’ 
dismissal was misconduct in relation with health and safety (hygiene, smoking, 
drunkenness), violence or theft. This definition was chosen both on a priori grounds 
and because these “bad misconduct” cases have a significantly higher probability of
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being deemed fair dismissals by judges. Second, I use the settlement offer made by 
the firm to the worker: indeed, as the settlement offer is made by the firm to the 
worker in order to convince the latter to give up going to full tribunal hearing, it must 
be that the higher this offer given other characteristics, the more the worker is likely 
to prevail at trial, i.e. the higher the worker’s case quality7 (this argument is further 
developed in section 4.2). Note that the reason why settlement offers are lower for 
cases that go to full trial is because 80% of dismissed employees who do get an offer 
accept it, and therefore there is a high proportion (8 8 %) of employees with no offers 
among those who go to full trial.
We use two variables to reflect economic conditions: the unemployment rate, which 
pertains to labour market conditions and therefore should affect workers relatively 
more than firms, and the bankruptcy rate, which should affect firms relatively more 
than workers. The unemployment rate we used is the claimant count rate in the region 
and month of application. Therefore, we have both cross-sectional (12 regions) and 
temporal variation. The bankruptcy rate is the yearly bankruptcy rate (VAT 
deregistration statistics, statistics available on the Small Business Service website, 
www.sbs.gov.uk) by industry and region; the identification comes from 3 years, 12 
regions and 9 industries. As can be seen in table 1, the variation in economic 
conditions in the sample is quite substantial, so that prospects for meaningful 
estimation are good. Moreover, it is important to notice that the average 
unemployment rate and bankruptcy rate in the sample of applicants who go to full 
trial does not significantly differ from the average of these variables in the sample of 
all applicants (Tables 1 and 2). Therefore, it does not seem that the propensity of 
workers to go to full trial is correlated with economic conditions. Selection bias is 
thus unlikely to drive results on judges’ decision as a function of economic 
conditions.
In the following section, I discuss how economic conditions can influence judges' 
decisions and how to estimate this effect empirically.
7 In as much as firms anticipate that judges’ decisions depend on economic conditions, controlling by 
settlement offers may dampen the direct effect of economic conditions on judges’ decisions. Therefore, 
finding no effect of economic conditions on judges’ decisions when controlling for this variable would 
not show that there is no effect, whereas finding some effect would consolidate the robustness of the 
results while indicating that firms may not have perfect information about judges’ decision rule.
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3 Models of judges' decision and the selection 
problem
Economic conditions can affect judges’ decisions in two ways:
1 .Directly, as an element taken into consideration in judges' decisions (channel 1 on 
figure 1).
2 .1ndirectly, by the influence they may have on the worker’s and the firm’s behaviour 
before the trial, affecting case quality (channel 2  on figure 1).
Figure 1: the effect of economic conditions on judges* decisions
Parties’ behavior Judges’ decisionCase quality
Economic
conditions
3.1 The determinants of judges' decision making
The reader is reminded that case quality refers to the quality of the worker’s case, i.e. 
case quality is higher when the worker is more likely to prevail at trial. Judges' 
decision given case quality and economic conditions are independent of parties' 
behaviour. So, if case quality is perfectly observable, channel 2 can be ignored and 
one can directly analyze judges' decision as a function of case quality and economic 
conditions. Let q be the case quality as perceived by the judges, and u an indicator of
economic conditions, such as the unemployment rate. Let q* be the judges’ standard 
independently of economic conditions. Higher q indicates better case quality and 
higher u worse economic conditions. We can assume that the condition for the 
worker winning the case is:
q> q*+ ua  (1)
The right-hand side expression is the cut-off for the worker winning the trial: when 
this cut-off goes up, relatively higher quality cases end with a loss for the worker.
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Hence, a higher right-hand side indicates that judges are more severe on workers. If 
a  = 0 , then judges do not take into account economic conditions and their standard is 
q . If a  > 0 , the cut-off goes up with worse economic conditions, i.e. judges are 
more severe on workers when economic conditions are worse. The opposite holds if 
a  < 0 .
In the case where a * 0, it is not obvious whether a should be positive or negative, 
i.e. whether, for a given q , judges should be more or less severe on workers when 
economic conditions are worse. Indeed, bad economic conditions have a negative 
impact on both firms and workers. They typically affect firms through lower profits 
and an increased bankruptcy risk, and workers through lower real wage growth and 
higher unemployment.
Judges can be assumed either to maximize welfare or to act strategically to please 
their constituencies, i.e. the workers and firms they represent. If judges try to 
maximize welfare, they can either try to maximize social welfare, or the welfare of the 
parties involved in each particular case. If judges try to maximize social welfare, they 
are confronted with the following trade-off. On the one hand, in bad times, financial 
pressure on firms increases, and so does the bankruptcy risk. Thus, any extra cost 
imposed on firms could have important consequences in terms of lost profits and lost 
jobs. On the other hand, as firing tends to be already high in bad times, being more 
severe on workers could encourage firms to fire even more, which would have 
adverse consequences for unemployment and aggregate demand. If the first effect 
dominates, then a  > 0 , i.e. judges are more severe on workers in bad times compared 
to good times. If the second effect dominates, then a  < 0. If now judges try to 
maximize the welfare o f the parties, they have to consider, in each particular case, 
whether the dismissed worker or the firm suffers more from degraded economic 
conditions. Relevant to this evaluation is the employment status of the plaintiff. 
Indeed, if the dismissed worker has already found a new job, worse or better 
economic conditions have little or no effect on his employment prospects. Therefore, 
for all cases where the worker is not unemployed, we expect, if anything, a>  0 , i.e. 
judges would favour firms when economic conditions are worse. If however the 
dismissed worker is unemployed, then, as in the case where judges try to maximize 
social welfare, the sign of a  is undetermined; indeed if the worker is unemployed, 
clearly both the firm and the worker are likely to suffer from worse economic
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conditions. Thus, we can conclude that, if judges maximize the welfare of the parties, 
a  is strictly higher if the worker is employed rather than unemployed at the time 
when his case reaches judgement. Another reason why we may expect the latter to be 
true is signalling: in the absence of perfect information, judges may take the 
employment status of the dismissed worker to be correlated with case quality, in the 
sense that if the employee is “good”, and has indeed been “unfairly” dismissed, it is 
all other things equal easier for him to find a new job. When the unemployment rate is 
higher, it is however more likely that a worker is unemployed, which means that the 
bad signalling effect of being unemployed is attenuated. This signalling mechanism 
makes us expect that unemployed workers are less likely to win their cases in general, 
but relatively more likely to win their cases when economic conditions are worse.
Instead of trying to maximize welfare, lay judges may behave strategically and try to 
minimize their constituencies' dissatisfaction, and thus maximize their own 
popularity. Remember that a tribunal is composed of a chairperson, an employees' 
representative and an employers' representative. Clearly, firms as a group complain 
more about firing costs in bad times, hence firms' representatives are keener to please 
firms in bad times. On the other hand, as firings are more common in bad times, they 
can be perceived as a fact of life by workers as a group. Hence, higher firing in bad 
times would not be blamed so much on workers' representatives as on bad economic 
conditions. This can lead to firms' representatives exerting relatively more effort than 
workers' representatives to convince the chairperson in bad times. If this were not 
enough, firms' representatives could engage in intertemporal bargaining with workers' 
representatives and trade workers' victories in good times for firms' victories in bad 
times. This bargaining process is possible as lay judges typically work together on a
o
series of cases . Would the workers' representatives agree to this bargain? As long as 
firms' representatives’ preference for more firms' victories in bad times relative to 
good times is stronger than workers' representatives’ preference for more workers' 
victories in bad times relative to good times, the bargain is mutually beneficial. If so, 
lay judges would agree to be more severe on workers in bad times. This means that 
though the best cases would always win and the worst cases always lose, a case close
8 In France, anecdotal evidence shows that such type of a bargaining is common in labour courts 
("conseils de prud'hommes") : firms' representatives are usually small or medium businesses owners, so 
they trade-off big firms' victories for small firms' victories.
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enough to the neutral judges' standard q* could lose in bad times and win in good 
times. The mechanism exposed above leads to a  > 0.
We can now summarize the expected effect of economic conditions on judges’ 
decisions in table 3. The reader is reminded that a  > 0 means that judges tend to be 
more favourable to firms (and less to workers) when economic conditions are worse, 
and the opposite for a  < 0 .
Table 1: Theoretical predictions
Judges’ objective
Sign of a
Social welfare Parties’ welfare Judges’ welfare
a  ?SW •
Worker
employed
Worker
unemployed
“ jw > 0a r*« > ° ® p w u  ^  ^ p w e
Do we expect to see any differences in a  depending on whether the bankruptcy rate 
or the unemployment rate is used to represent economic conditions? As argued above 
(2 .2 ), the unemployment rate should affect relatively more the well-being of workers 
and the bankruptcy rate the well-being of firms. If judges aim at maximizing social 
welfare or their own welfare, this difference between the two variables does not have 
any obvious implications for a . If judges aim at maximizing the parties’ welfare 
however, this difference becomes relevant. If the worker is employed, any indicator of 
economic conditions is more likely to proxy for the conditions faced by the firm. On 
the other hand, the unemployed worker suffers more from a higher unemployment 
rate than from a higher bankruptcy rate, and hence we expect judges to be relatively 
more likely to decide in favour of the unemployed worker when the unemployment 
rate is higher rather than when the bankruptcy rate is higher. Given that we do not 
have a clear prior on whether the unemployment rate or the bankruptcy rate is a better 
indicator of firms’ conditions as perceived by judges, we cannot draw a conclusion 
about which one should have a stronger effect in cases involving employed workers. 
But we can expect that using the unemployment rate as a measure of economic 
conditions should lead to judges being relatively more favourable to unemployed 
workers than using the bankruptcy rate. I.e. using the superscript br for the 
bankruptcy rate and ur for the unemployment rate, we expect that:
a ur < a brpwu pwu
186
3.2 The selection problem: parties' behaviour
The former discussion assumes that case quality is perfectly observable. However, if 
we try to estimate a  in (1) using data on cases that have reached the trial stage, we 
have to come to terms with the fact that case quality is imperfectly measured. Indeed, 
it can hardly be expected that a dataset collected by interviewing employers and 
employees, as detailed as it can be, should capture perfectly judges’ view of case 
quality.
Assume then that for each case i in the population o f applicants to Employment 
Tribunals, the quality qt is given by:
Qi = X iP\ £ \i (2)
where X, is a vector of observed characteristics for case i and su is a random error, 
normally distributed with zero mean. X, includes the constant and the control
variables whose summary statistics are provided in table 1, section 2 .2 .
Moreover, assume that the judges’ threshold is given by:
q* — X tP2 + ua  + e2i (3)
where e2i is a random error, normally distributed with zero mean. The decision
threshold is thus modelled in the same way as the case quality itself, i.e. assuming that 
the observer has noisy but unbiased information about its determination.
Then the empirical counterpart of equation 1 is a probit model. Thus, if win is a 
dummy variable taking the value 1 if the worker wins the trial and 0  otherwise, we 
have:
P(win, = 1) = P(q, > q + ua)
= p (£n ~ eu < X, (A -  p 2) -  ua)
Crucially, one should note that the variable win has missing values for all cases that 
do not reach the trial stage, i.e. the value of win is observed conditional on the case
A
reaching trial. Let a  be the estimate of a  obtained by a probit estimation of equation 
(4) on the cases for which win is observed.
Now, let I be an indicator variable taking the value 1 if a case reaches the trial stage 
and 0 otherwise. Suppose that applicants choose to go to trial if their case quality qf
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exceeds a certain threshold q1 which depends on X, and possibly on u , so that
q1 = X j x -u S  + s3i, where s3l is a random error normally distributed with zero
mean. Then the model for sample selection is given by:
P (/f = 1) = P{qt > * ')  = P{e3i -  eu < X iY + u8) (5)
where Y = J3x~ Yx-
Finally, the relevant model for the selected sample is:
P{wini = 1 1/ ,  = 1) = P{XtP - q * -u a  + eu - e 2i > 0 1X iY + u8 + eX( - e3i > 0 )  (6)
Under those assumptions, two situations may arise:
• £u ~ €2i is uncorrelated with eu - e 3i: then
A
P{wini = 11 /, = 1) = P(wini = 1) = P(e2i ~ £u < X t{Px - f l 2) -u a )  • Thus a ,
the estimate of a  obtained by using the probit model in (4) on the selected 
sample of cases reaching trial, does not suffer from any bias due to sample 
selection. Under this assumption, the fact that we do not perfectly observe case 
quality does not imply that we need to explicitly model the behaviour of 
parties before trial (channel 2  in figure 1) in order to get a consistent estimate 
of the effect of economic conditions on judges' decisions.
A
• £Xi —S2i is correlated with eu - e 3i: a  is then potentially biased. The two 
errors are likely to be correlated among themselves because they both include 
an omitted variable, the unobserved case quality eu: for example, we may 
expect that all other things equal, cases with higher unobserved quality have a 
higher probability of reaching trial. Even so, if 8  = 0 , i.e. economic conditions
A
do not influence the selection process, a  will likely not be biased due to
sample selection because the conditional mean of £u —€2i depends only on
X ( and not on u. If 8 = 0, ignoring the selection process and running the
probit model (4) is equivalent to omitting a function of X , . Given that X t is
already included, this omission will bias the X, parameters but is unlikely to
have much impact on the u coefficient. However, looking at channel 2 on 
figure 1, one may think of a series of reasons why economic conditions can
9 This assumption will be further justified by a model of parties’ behaviour developed in section 5.1.
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affect parties’ behaviour before trial, leading to 8 * 0. For example, if the 
prospects on the labour market are bleak, the opportunity cost for a worker to 
go to trial may be lower, and therefore worse cases may proceed to trial. 
Under these circumstances, a higher u leads to more cases with low
A
unobserved quality being selected for trial, which then leads to a lower a .
Thus, in general, if £u —£2i is correlated with su - £ 3i and 8 * 0 ,  a  captures
the net effect of economic conditions on both parties’ behaviour (channel 2 ) 
and judges’ decisions (channel 1).
Therefore, determining the correct empirical strategy for estimating a  in (1) requires 
examining the behaviour of parties before trial. However, before we can have a closer
look at the determination of the selection process and hence / , ,  we have to deal with
a potential caveat. The whole discussion so far only takes into account the behaviour 
of parties from application to trial, whereas the behaviour of parties before application 
may also defeat the identification strategy. Indeed, the strategy strongly relies on the 
assumption, embodied in equation 2 , that the case quality of applicants does not 
depend on economic conditions, i.e. eu is uncorrelated with u. Hence, we first have to
ascertain whether such an assumption is reasonable, given that we do not observe X t 
for any case in which the employee does not apply to Employment Tribunal. This will 
be the purpose of the next section. We will then proceed to consider selection of cases 
within our sample in section 5.
4 The selection of the sample of applicants to 
Employment Tribunals
To deal with the selection of the sample of applicants, we investigate the typical 
process a case goes through before the application stage (Figure 2) in the United 
Kingdom. Each circle determines a decision point for an agent, F being the firm and 
W the worker. First, the firm decides whether to keep or fire the worker (node 1). 
Then, if the worker is fired, he decides to apply to the Employment Tribunal or not 
(node 2 ).
Given that I do not have information on X ( for non-applicants, I cannot distinguish 
observed from unobserved case quality. I assume that if economic conditions affect
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case quality in some direction, then they will affect unobserved case quality in the 
same direction10. Thus, I examine if economic conditions affect the distribution of 
case quality among applicants in order to assess whether eu , the unobserved
component of case quality, is correlated with u due to the selection of the sample of 
applicants.
Figure 2: the selection process for applicants
FireKeep
END
Accept Apply
Firm’s
financial
condition
Worker’s 
behaviour 
at work
END Applicant
4.1 The effect of u on selection of applicants: theory
Let q( be the case quality of an employed worker and f u{q) be the density of case 
quality among employed workers. This density may depend on u, because when 
unemployment is higher, employed workers are likely to shirk less in order to avoid 
getting unemployed when the value of unemployment is low.
Obviously, the lower the quality of the worker’s potential case, the more likely the 
firm is to fire him. Then the worker is fired if:
q i <qFiu) (7)
10 This is not warranted under any possible set of hypotheses about the correlation matrix between 
unobserved case quality, observed case quality and economic conditions, but seems generally 
reasonable.
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where qF(u) is the case quality threshold below which a worker is fired; this 
threshold may depend on w. Indeed, one may think that firms are likely to fire 
relatively higher quality workers when economic conditions are bad.
Then, among fired workers, all other things equal, workers with better case quality are 
more likely to apply. The worker applies to Employment Tribunal if:
q( >qA(u) (8)
where qA(u) is the case quality threshold above which a fired worker decides to 
apply to tribunal; again this threshold may depend on u, as discussed in section 3.2. 
Then the expected case quality of applicants is:
E(q | apply) = ^ V / *  (q)dq (9)
With this notation in mind, let’s discuss decisions at nodes 1 and 2.
At node 7, the population at risk is the entire population of employed workers. At this 
node, the firm decides to fire or keep the worker. As workers tend to shirk less in bad 
times, f u (q) the distribution of case quality in the population of employed workers
presumably has a less thick lower tail: if qF(u) and qA(u) do not change, this effect 
is likely to increase E(q \ apply), the expected case quality of applicants. However, 
the decision rule of the firm itself is likely to change with economic conditions: 
indeed, in bad times, firms are less willing to keep relatively low productivity 
workers, so the firm will tend to fire workers with relatively higher case quality, i.e. 
qF(u) increases with u. Assuming no change in qA(u) , E(q \ apply) is thus likely to 
increase when economic conditions are worse.
If the firm decides to fire the worker, at node 2 the worker can accept the decision or 
apply to the Employment Tribunal. However, as we will discuss in more detail later 
on (section 5.1), it is not clear whether qA(u) increases or decreases with u.
Assuming that f u(q) and qF(u) change with u as described above, we can conclude 
that if qA(u) is unaffected by u or increases with w, then E(q \ apply) goes up when u 
goes up. If, on the other hand, qA(u) decreases with u, the total effect of u on 
E(q | apply) depends on the relative magnitudes of the effects on f u{q) and qF(u) ,
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which tend to increase E(q \ apply), and on qA(u), which tends to decrease 
E{q | apply) .
Given these possible correlations between case quality of applicants and economic 
conditions, in any subsequent regression analysis on the sample of applicants, the 
error, which possibly includes unobserved case quality, may be correlated with u. If 
unobserved case quality is indeed correlated with u due to the selection of the sample 
of applicants, estimates of the effect of economic conditions on judges’ decisions will 
be biased, even when controlling for selection within the sample of applicants. We 
therefore need to design an empirical strategy to estimate the effect of u on 
E(q | apply). If we can show that overall u does not affect E(q \ apply), we may 
concentrate on selection within the sample of applicants.
4.2 Empirical strategy
The purpose of this section is to derive an empirical strategy to determine the 
correlation between the expected case quality of applicants, E(q \ apply), and 
economic conditions in the sample of applicants.
Observations on the total number of applications to Employment Tribunals can shed 
light on this issue. Indeed, looking at equation (9), we can derive a relationship 
between the number of applicants and the mean quality of applicants. Indeed, the 
number of applicants is proportional to:
P(qA(u) <q< qF (u)) = £4™fu (q)dq (10)
First, suppose employed workers do not react to economic conditions by exerting 
more or less effort to improve their potential case quality, so that f u (q) is unaffected
by economic conditions. If so, it is obvious that if qF (u) increases with u and qA(u) 
weakly decreases with u, then P{qA (u) < q < qF (u)), and hence the number of 
applicants, will increase. Then, if f u (q) does not change with economic
conditions, P(qA (u) < q < qF (u)) can only weakly decrease with u if qA(u) 
sufficiently increases with u. Therefore, if we find that the number of applicants does 
not increase with u, we can conclude that it is likely that qA(u) increases with w, i.e. 
workers are less willing to apply to Employment Tribunal when u is higher. This in
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turn implies that if the number of applicants does not increase with u, then the mean 
case quality of applicants should be, if anything, higher.
If now employees react to worse economic conditions by shirking less, then f u (q) is 
affected by economic conditions and all other things equal the number of people 
below qF(u) decreases and so will possibly decrease the number of applicants. This 
effect in itself increases the case quality of applicants. However, if we take this effect 
into account, the conclusion that if the number of applicants does not increase with w, 
then the mean case quality of applicants increases is not as solid anymore. Indeed, 
now it could be that the number of applicants does not increase with u although 
qA(u) decreases with u. If qA(u) decreases with «, then workers, once fired, are more 
prone to apply, which in itself increases the number of applications and decreases the 
quality of applicants. But on the other hand, because workers shirk less, they are less 
likely to be picked upon in the first place, which diminishes the number of applicants 
and can compensate the positive effect of a decrease in qA(u) on the number of 
applicants. However, it remains true that if the number of applicants does not increase 
with u, then the mean case quality of applicants is more likely to increase than to 
decrease with u: indeed, any move in qA(u) would have to be big enough to 
compensate for the fact that less shirking means that f u (qA(u)) is smaller.
In general, we conclude that if the number of applicants does not increase with w, then 
the mean case quality of applicants is likely to weakly increase.
A second insight into the correlation between case quality of applicants and economic 
conditions is available using the micro dataset. Once the dismissed worker applies to 
the Employment Tribunal, the firm can offer an amount of money to the worker in 
order to settle the case instead of going to trial. It is reasonable to assume that the 
amount of the offer is, roughly speaking, proportional to the expected gains of the 
worker at trial, i.e. the probability of the worker winning multiplied by the monetary 
award he would get11. Thus, the ratio of the settlement offer B to the award A is a 
very good proxy for the probability of the worker winning according to the firm. 
Given A and B, we can therefore investigate the distribution of case quality among
11 We will discuss more thoroughly a model of settlement behaviour in section 5.
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1 *)applicants . The micro dataset fortunately contains the amounts firms proposed to 
workers for a settlement and B is therefore known13. The awards workers would get if 
they won at trial are determined by the law and are a function of tenure, wage and 
age14; I can compute these amounts using the dataset and get A.
I can thus estimate the distribution of case quality in the whole sample using a kernel 
representation: I plot and compare the distribution of B/A in high unemployment 
versus low unemployment conditions, and high bankruptcy versus low bankruptcy 
conditions. If there is no difference in the distribution of B/A in low versus high 
unemployment conditions, we can conclude that the distribution of case quality of 
applicants is unlikely to be affected by economic conditions.
4.3 Results for the selection of the sample of applicants
The first test for selection bias is to examine the relationship between the number of 
applications to Employment tribunals and the unemployment rate. Burgess, Propper 
and Wilson (2001) find that there is none. Therefore, using the reasoning outlined in 
section 4.2 above, we conclude that the case quality of applicants is likely to weakly 
increase with worse economic conditions.
The second test for selection bias uses the distribution of firm’s settlement offers as a 
proxy for the distribution of case quality. In the figure 3 below, we plot separately the 
distributions of case quality for high and low unemployment. As we can easily see, 
they are almost identical. As settlement offers are concentrated at 0, we may want to 
plot the settlement offers conditional on their being greater than 0 (figure 4). Again, 
the distributions for high versus low unemployment are essentially the same.
We proceed to do the same analysis for our second measure of economic conditions, 
namely the bankruptcy rate. We thus plot the distribution of case quality in low versus 
high bankruptcy conditions, for all cases (figure 5) and for cases with positive offers
12 We do not have to assume here that the firm is perfectly informed. It is enough that the firm makes 
unbiased estimates of the workers’ probability of winning at trial.
13 In t certain number of cases, we only observe B if the offer was indeed accepted by the worker. 
Treating these cases separately in the analysis does not change the main results; hence, for simplicity, 
we ignore this distinction.
14 The basic award is calculated by adding up the following amounts, but only continuous employment 
within the last 20 years can count: one and a half weeks1 pay for each complete year of employment 
when an employee was between the ages of 41 and 65 inclusive; one week's pay for each complete year 
of employment when an employee was between the ages of 22 and 40 inclusive; half a weeks' pay for 
each complete year of employment when an employee was below the age of 22. As it happens, the 
basic award can be reduced or increased by the judge due to the specificities of each case. In fact, the 
award is almost never reduced, but rather increased. Thus, the basic award represents a good lower 
bound approximation for what the worker would get if he won at trial.
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(figure 6 ). Although the distributions in high versus low bankruptcy rate are not as 
close to identical as in the case of the unemployment rate, they are still very similar so 
that it cannot be concluded that there is any significant difference, be it positive or 
negative.
As a further robustness check, I regressed the firm’s settlement offer as a share of the 
workers’ legally determined award on unemployment rate, bankruptcy rate, and the 
set of control variables. The results (not reported here) confirm the graphical analysis, 
showing no significant effect of either the unemployment or bankruptcy rate on case 
quality.
In conclusion, the tests performed are consistent with the hypothesis that case quality 
o f applicants does not depend on the unemployment rate or the bankruptcy rate. We 
can therefore now concentrate on the selection of cases for trial within the sample of 
applicants.
5 The selection of applicants’ cases to trial
Having established that the available empirical evidence is consistent with the 
absence of a correlation between case quality and economic conditions in the sample 
of applicants to Employment Tribunals, we can now concentrate on modelling the 
selection process of cases from application to trial. Modelling this process will 
ultimately allow us to give a behavioural basis to the selection equation (5).
5.1 A model of the selection of cases for trial
The only paper investigating the same question as ours, i.e. Ichino et al. (2004), uses a 
divergent expectations framework inspired by Priest and Klein (1984) to model the 
selection of cases for trial; to this divergent expectations framework, they add 
asymmetric stakes. Thus, a trial occurs for two possible reasons. First, a trial can 
occur because of divergent expectations. In this case, the worker and the firm disagree 
about the quality of the worker’s case, the worker thinking his case is better than the 
firm thinks, and a trial occurs if the extent of the disagreement is big enough to make 
parties willing to incur the costs of a trial instead of agreeing on a settlement award, 
i.e. agreeing on how much the firm should pay the worker in order for the latter to 
drop his case. Second, a trial can occur because of asymmetric stakes, i.e. if the 
worker gains more than the firms loses from a trial. The resulting model predicts a 
lower quality of cases when unemployment is higher: this is because the alternative
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for the fired employee is either accepting dismissal and looking for a job in the labour 
market, or incurring trial costs and, if he/she wins, being reintegrated in his/her former 
job. The value of reintegration being higher in a depressed labour market, the cut-off 
for going to trial is lower: workers with less strong cases litigate when unemployment 
is higher, i.e. there is a negative selection bias. Because Ichino et al. find that, 
empirically, workers dismissed in a high unemployment context litigate more, have a 
lower case quality and at the same time win more often, they conclude that judges 
have a pro-worker bias.
The model designed by Ichino et al. is not applicable as such to the British case. In the 
United Kingdom, victory at trial is in practice almost never followed by reintegration, 
because losing firms are not forced to take back the victorious ex-employee. Instead, a 
financial compensation is awarded to the dismissed worker if the firm is found to have 
behaved unreasonably. As the financial compensation is set by a legal formula and 
does not depend on the unemployment rate, the worker does not gain more by going 
to trial in a high unemployment context. Hence, a negative selection bias is unlikely. 
But we cannot rule out the possibility that, for example, the time cost of trial is lower 
when unemployment is higher because job search is less efficient, which would also 
induce a negative selection bias.
To deal with this potential problem, we pursue our investigation of the typical process 
a case goes through before reaching trial in the United Kingdom: thus, figure 7 
illustrates the decisions taken by parties from application to trial. As in figure 2, each 
circle determines a decision point for an agent, F being the firm, W the worker, and J 
the judges. If the worker applies, the firm decides on the amount of the settlement 
award it wishes to offer (node 3). Finally, if the worker rejects the firm’s offer at node 
4, the case proceeds to trial (node 5). These decisions will influence the distribution of 
quality among the cases reaching trial and will be the basis for the selection equation
(5).
I now discuss the likely effect of economic conditions on decisions taken at each node 
in figure 7, looking at the quality of cases that proceed towards trial. I assume, as in 
section 4, that whichever effect economic conditions have on case quality at each 
decision node, the effect on unobserved case quality goes in the same direction, or is 
null.
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Figure 3: parties' behaviour before trial
Settlement offer: B, > 0
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I build a model of the selection process of cases in the United Kingdom to determine 
how economic conditions can affect unobserved case quality through parties’ 
decisions before trial.
The assumptions of the model are, as in Ichino et al.(2004), divergent expectations, to 
which we add an element of asymmetric information. The basic idea is that workers 
and firms start off with different beliefs about case quality because they have different 
information. The actions of each one of them act as signals and allow the other to 
update his beliefs. Economic conditions do not alter the information each party gets 
about case quality, but rather affect the decisions that are made based on this 
information. In other words, if economic conditions modify the pay-offs associated 
with different decisions, they modify the optimal decisions taken by agents and 
therefore the distribution of case quality for cases reaching trial.
First, we have to define the parties’ beliefs about case quality. Assume the beliefs can 
be represented by probability distributions, in the Bayesian style. The belief of the 
worker involved in case i is then represented by a random variable Q™ and the belief 
of the firm involved in case i is represented by a random variable Q f ; because the
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beliefs of the parties are about the same quantity, i.e. case quality qn Q" and Q{ are 
positively correlated. Assume, moreover, that the best subjective estimate of the value 
of a variable about which the individual holds such a probabilistic belief, i.e. Q” , is
the expectation of that belief, i.e. E(Q”). If the belief has a normal distribution, this 
amounts, not surprisingly, to assuming that the best estimate is the mean of the 
distribution. An important assumption simplifying further reasoning is that the 
probability distributions of the beliefs of all firms on the one side, and of all workers 
on the other side, have the same shape and scale, and only differ in location. 
Intuitively, this means that all workers on the one side, and all firms on the other side, 
have the same degree of uncertainty in their beliefs, the only variation in beliefs 
coming from E(Q”). Thus, assuming, as seems reasonable, that beliefs reflect case
quality, a worker with higher case quality has, on average, a higher E(Q f) but is not
more or less certain of his case quality than a worker with a lower case quality. 
Because each party updates her beliefs to incorporate what she learns from the other 
party’s behaviour, we need to define beliefs about beliefs. Thus, Q f  is the firm’s 
belief about the worker’s belief, Q f"  is the worker’s belief about the firm’s belief 
about the worker’s belief, etc.
In this framework, subjective probabilities of the worker’s winning can be defined as 
follows:
In the same vein, beliefs about beliefs generate corresponding probabilities of the 
worker’s winning, such as for example: P f  = P {Q f > q + ecu)
The firm makes an offer Bt >0 to the applicant. If the applicant accepts this offer, the 
parties’ payoffs are:
where S/ and Sw are settlement costs, and the superscript S stands for settlement. 
Assuming that the parties are risk neutral, we can define their expected utilities if they 
go to trial as follows:
Pr=P(Q ?>q +ctu) 
P.f  =P(Qf >q +au)
(11)
(12)
(13)
(14)
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U '  = - P f  A, - c f  
U f  = P,w2A ,-C ?  -c(u)
(15)
(16)
where the superscript T stands for trial, P™2 is the belief of the worker about his
probability of winning given the offer B, , C{ and C” are litigation costs, for the firm 
and the worker respectively and At is the size of the stake, or award the worker would 
get if he won. c(u) is a cost or benefit incurred by the worker if he litigates, and it is 
assumed to be a function of economic conditions. Indeed, at first, the dismissed 
worker is unemployed, and bad economic conditions render job search less efficient. 
If searching for a job and taking care of an Employment Tribunal case are alternative 
uses of time and money, then a change in the returns to job search will affect the 
decision to invest in an Employment Tribunal case. However, the effect of economic 
conditions on the latter decision is ambiguous. Indeed, on the one side, a lower return 
to job search would all other things equal encourage unemployed workers to pursue 
their cases. But if the negative impact of litigation on the prospects of finding a job is 
considerably amplified by worse economic conditions, then this would incite 
unemployed workers to litigate less. To simplify, one can assume that once the 
dismissed worker finds a new job, economic conditions do not affect him any more. 
So, if the worker is employed when he decides whether to settle or to take the case to 
full tribunal hearing, then the current economic conditions have no effect on his 
decision. To summarize, then, if the worker is not unemployed, we can assume that 
c(u)=0, so that economic conditions have no effect on the selection of cases for trial. 
How is P”2, the updated belief of the worker about his probability of winning 
defined? First, note that for the firm to make an offer B,>  0 to the applicant, it must 
be true that the value of a settlement for the firm is higher than the value of going to 
trial:
Therefore, relying on the above observation, the updated probability of the worker’s 
winning according to the worker is:
U f  > <^ >Bt < P /A i + C{ -  S{  o  P / > B‘ C,/ +5</- (17)
(18)
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Let Q”2 be the updated belief of the worker about the quality of his case. Q”2 is 
defined by its cumulative distribution function:
B, -  C f + S fFQr ( x )  = P Q7<x\pr>
A
= P(Q72 <X) (19)
The formation of Q™2 sheds some light on the reason why many firms choose to
make an offer equal to zero. Indeed, a zero offer tells the worker that his case quality 
is below a certain threshold, whereas a positive offer tells him that his case quality is 
above the threshold. When case quality is low, the expected value of case quality 
above the threshold is much higher than the case quality. Therefore, when the 
worker’s case quality is relatively low, any positive offer will result on average in the 
worker updating his belief upwards to a considerable degree, which in many cases 
will lead him to decline the firm’s offer and go to trial. Anticipating this, the firm does 
not make any positive offer in the first place.
In general, the worker decides to reject the firm’s offer and go to trial if:
• wS  ^ t  t WT  . . n  n w  .  n w 2  4 . . ryw 2  v  ^ i  C ( l t )  C {^  B _  S < P WZA ' _  _ C „ ^  >
A (20)
n / s \ w 2  * ,  B t - S 7 + C ( u )  +  C 7
< = >  P(Qi >q +cai)> — — — — — -
A
Remember that probability distributions of Q”1 only differ among workers by their 
location. We can hence define a function h such that condition (20) for going to trial 
can be rewritten as:
E (Q ?)> h —----   —------ ,q  +au (21)
The above condition gives behavioural foundations to the selection equation 5: it says 
that if the plaintiffs best estimate of case quality is above a certain threshold15, then 
the plaintiff proceeds to trial. As h is increasing in its two arguments, we can derive 
the effect of an increase in any of the variables.
We have:
-^ -> 0
dB;
15 If we did not assume that all workers have beliefs with the same shape and scale, this threshold 
would also depend on the distributional form of each worker’s belief, and not only on the specified 
variables.
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Indeed, the higher the offer Bi , the less workers are willing to go to trial. 
Then:
^ < 0
8A,
because higher awards make workers more willing to go to trial.
And:
dh >0ac;
because as trial gets more costly, workers are less willing to go to trial.
Symmetrically, we have:
dh <0as;
because as settlement gets more costly, it is relatively less costly to go to trial.
The effect of u on h is ambiguous, as it depends on the unknown function c(u) and a . 
We note that c(u) plays the same role as C ; , so:
dh >0
dc(u)
Hence, for a given a , if c(u) goes up with u, then less bad cases go to trial, and 
conversely. However, as argued above, if the worker is employed then we assume that 
c(u)=0.
As for a , we have:
^ > 0
da
So, if a  > 0, then h goes up with u, and conversely. This means that if judges are 
more severe with workers when economic conditions are worse, then workers are 
more likely to settle instead of going to trial as economic conditions deteriorate, and 
the opposite holds if judges are less severe with workers when economic conditions 
are worse.
We are now ready to proceed to the empirical specification.
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5.2 Empirical specification
5.2.1 The selection equation
Using condition (21), we can derive a probit model for a case going to trial. Define 
trial as a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the worker goes to trial and 0  
otherwise. To derive the empirical counterpart of the condition for going to trial, we 
must specify the worker’s estimate of case quality E(Q”2) and the h threshold as a 
function of observed variables.
Assuming that E(Q”2) is unbiased, we can define E(Q"2) as:
E {Q f)  = qt + = X tfix + + *4I (2 2 )
where e4l is normally distributed with zero mean, and eu is the error defined in 
equation (2 ), i.e. the error associated with the distribution of case quality among 
applicants. The reader is reminded that the vector X, includes the offer B, made by
the firm, so that the empirical specification is consistent with the definition of Q”2 in 
(19).
Assume moreover that the costs C” and S™ are defined by linear combinations of the
variables in X t . Given that we have also included the variables determining A, in
X t , we may now approximate h as a linear function:
h = X ,r l +uS + e5l (23)
where e5i is normally distributed with zero mean.
Therefore, the empirical counterpart to equation (21) is the probit model given in 
equation (5) which we can now reformulate as:
P(lrial = 1 ) = P(X(pt - r t) + uS+ ev +et i - e it >0)
= P(X,r  + uS + eu - £)i>0) 
where = - e 4i +£sr Thus, whereas in the formulation in section 3.2, equation (5),
we explicitly included a single error term, e3j, for the selection of a case for trial, we
have now shown that this error has two empirically undistinguishable components,
s4i, the error in worker’s belief about his case quality, and e5i, the error coming from
our failure to perfectly observe the threshold h.
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8 represents the effect of economic conditions on the decision to go to trial. 
Remember that if 8 -  0, then the correct estimation of a  in equation 4 on the 
selected sample does not require an explicit modelling of the selection process.
5.2.2 The win equation
As argued in section 3.2, the correct specification for the win equation depends on 
assumptions about the correlation between unobserved case quality and economic 
conditions in the sub-sample of cases reaching trial.
First, we can make the very restrictive assumption that there is no effect of economic 
conditions on case quality (observed or unobserved) at trial. If so, we can use a macro 
time series of the percentage of cases reaching the trial stage that have been concluded 
with a worker victory and directly regress this variable on the time series of 
unemployment rates using ordinary least squares.
Second, we can relax the previous assumption and assume that while economic 
conditions may have an effect on dismissed workers’ decision to go to trial, this effect 
is fully captured by observed variables other than u, so that 8 = 0. Then, the correct 
specification is given by equation (4), i.e.:
P(win, = 1) = P(q, > q* + ua )
(4)
In all the probit specifications we use, standard errors are clustered by region as our 
main variable of interest, the unemployment rate, is taken at the regional level. 
Moreover, for cases tried in the same region, decisions may be taken by the same 
judges.
Remember that the economic conditions variables are defined by month and region 
for the unemployment rate, and by year, region Mid industry for the bankruptcy rate. 
One can thus ask to what extent cross-sectional versus temporal variation is important 
in explaining trial outcome: are workers from regions or industries facing a worse 
economic situation more likely to win/lose at trial, or is it the change in economic 
conditions over time that determines whether workers are more or less likely to 
prevail at trial? To answer this question, we run the probit specification with different 
sets of fixed effects: region effects, region and industry effects, and finally region, 
industry and year effects.
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Third, we can further relax our assumptions, allowing for selection on unobservables. 
Thus, assuming that £u —£2i is correlated with sXi -  e3i, we have to estimate equation
(6):
/ >(wzw/ = 111, = 1) = P{XtP - q * -u a  + eu - e2i > 0 1 X ty + uS + £u - e3i > 0) (6)
For this purpose, one can use a Heckman-style strategy (Heckman, 1979, Van de Ven 
and Van Praag, 1981), and a maximum likelihood technique. This technique has the
advantage of giving an estimation of p  (rho) the correlation between £u —€2i and 
eu -  e3i. However, as argued by Sartori(2003), the estimator may perform poorly as 
the same variables are included in both the selection (trial) and outcome (win) 
equations. The mediocre performance of Heckman estimators is particularly 
problematic in small samples, and our sample is indeed relatively small, especially if 
we want to include the variable documenting the worker’s employment status in the 
estimation. However, given the structure of our problem it seems reasonable to
assume that £u —£2i is strongly correlated with eu - s 3i. Radicalizing this
assumption to £u ~£2i = £u —€3i, so that the unobserved component of case quality is 
the same in the decision of the worker to go to trial as in the decision of the judge, we 
can use the maximum likelihood Sartori estimator to derive an estimation of a. Note 
that in both the Sartori and Heckman estimations, we do not include any region, 
industry or year fixed effects, as the maximum likelihood estimation algorithm does 
not converge if any fixed effects are included.
However, the Sartori estimator will only be more accurate than the simple probit if the 
hypothesis of identical errors is justified. In general, given the properties of the Sartori 
estimator, we know that it will provide an upper bound (in absolute value):
|Oprobit| 1^ ®true| ^ |ttSartori| (25)
Without going into technical details, we can intuitively explain why the Sartori 
estimator is an upper bound in our framework. Indeed, assuming that the worker is 
aware that, say, atme>0 , i.e. judges are more severe on workers when economic 
conditions are worse, the worker will be less willing to go to trial in bad times, and 
this will lead to relatively higher unobserved case quality at trial. Therefore ctprobit, not 
taking into account this selection bias, would underestimate the real effect of
204
economic conditions. This implies that, by contrast, if there is no selection bias, asarton 
will overestimate the effect of economic conditions.
The Sartori identifying hypothesis of identical errors may not be accurate in two 
cases. First, the hypothesis is not justified if our observed variables are an excellent 
measure of case quality so that there is no systematically unobserved case quality but 
mainly noise. Second, the hypothesis is flawed if the unobserved component of case 
quality according to the worker is largely uncorrelated with the unobserved 
component of case quality according to the judge. We have good reasons to believe 
that the correlation is less than one, as both firms and workers are likely to be 
surprised by judges’ decisions. For example, 30% of firms and 64% of workers say 
they did not expect the outcome of the trial. Moreover, among cases reaching trial 
with the firm certain that it would win, 40% still end up with a worker victory!
5.2.3 Taking into account the employment status of the worker
We have argued that case quality is unlikely to be correlated with economic
conditions for workers who were employed at all nodes where they had to take a 
decision. Therefore, selection bias due to worker behaviour before trial depends on 
the worker’s employment status. Moreover, distinguishing between employed and 
unemployed workers allows us to test whether, assuming judges’ objective is the 
parties* welfare, it is indeed the case that judges are relatively more lenient with 
unemployed workers when economic conditions are worse, i.e. whether a pwu < a pwe
(table 3).
As explained in section 2.2, we know whether the worker was unemployed or not at 
the time of the survey for a sub-sample of our data. The survey takes place shortly 
after the case is finished. Hence, we can reasonably hypothesise that if a worker is 
unemployed at the time of the survey, he was unemployed at all the moments when he 
had to take decisions (node 2 in Figure 2, and node 4 in Figure 7). Hence, observing 
the effect of economic conditions on the selection of unemployed workers for trial 
allows us to estimate /?, in equation (24). Conversely, if a worker is employed at the 
time of the survey, we are not sure what his employment status was before the survey; 
however, as interviews generally take place shortly after the end of the case, it is 
likely that the worker had found a job by the time he/she reached the trial stage.
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The number of unemployed workers in the sample is small (84 in the dataset, of 
which 35 reach the trial stage), hence estimating on the sample of unemployed 
workers alone is likely to lead to unreliable results. Moreover, I want to compare the 
effects of economic conditions on unemployed vs. employed workers. Therefore, I 
use a dummy for the employment status and interact economic conditions with this 
dummy. Thus, let C/be a dummy taking the value 1 if the worker is unemployed at the 
time of the survey, and 0  if the worker found a new job16.
We re-run the probit, Heckman and Sartori regressions adding the U dummy variable 
for being unemployed, and the interaction terms between the unemployment rate and 
Ut and bankruptcy rate and U. This yields equation (26) for the probit estimator and 
equation 27 for the Heckman and Sartori estimators.
P(win. = 1) = P(q, > q* +ua + Uq> + uUav + e2l)
(26)
= P(£n ~ £n < x i (A - f i 2)-u a -U < p -u U a u )
Piwin, = 1 1/f = 1)= P (X ,fi-q * -u a -U < p -u U a v + eu - £ 2i>0
| X j  + uS + USV + uUSUu + eu -  ev > 0)
Note however that because we have a nonlinear model, the marginal effects are not
rendered by the coefficient on the interaction term but must instead be computed
separately. For probit models, the Stata programme inteff takes care of this
calculation. However, for the Heckman and Sartori estimators, no such calculating
module exists, which means that the coefficients on the interaction terms in the
outcome equation should not be interpreted as marginal effects. For the selection
equation (24) however, we can run separately a probit and calculate the marginal
effects for the interacted terms; these marginal effects will be the same for Heckman
and Sartori, because the selection equation is a probit in both cases, and if coefficient
estimates may be slightly different, it is due to different numerical approximations.
We are now ready to examine the empirical results.
6 Empirical results
This section analyses the results stemming from the estimation of the models 
discussed in the previous section.
16 This variable is constructed in such a way that inactive workers are excluded. There are only 4 
inactive workers in the sample, and our prior about judges’ attitude towards them is not clear-cut; 
therefore we concentrate on estimating the difference between employed and unemployed workers.
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First, we assume that there is no effect of economic conditions on case quality 
(observed or unobserved) at trial, which allows us to use a macro time-series. The 
micro data we use only covers a period of two years. To get a broader picture, we plot 
the yearly win rate in unfair dismissal cases (from Burgess et ali., 2001) against the 
unemployment rate on the period 1985-2001 (Figure 8 ). The graph shows a negative 
relationship between the percentage of workers’ victories and the unemployment rate, 
which is confirmed by the corresponding OLS regression. Thus, a one-point increase 
in the unemployment rate is significantly associated with a one-point decrease in the 
proportion of workers prevailing at trial, implying that a  > 0 .
Assuming that the effect of economic conditions on case quality, if any, is captured by 
our control variables, we can directly retrieve a  by estimating equations (4) (without 
control for the worker’s employment status) and (26) (with control for the worker’s 
employment status) by a probit model (Table 4). Columns 1 to 4 of table 4 estimate 
equation (4) with different fixed effects, whereas columns 5 to 8  estimate equation 
(26), again with different fixed effects.
Bear in mind that our favourite estimates for the effect of economic conditions on 
judges’ decisions are to be found in columns 1-4, for reasons that will become clearer 
as we proceed.
Coefficients on control variables are reported in table A-l of the annex and, for the 
sake of brevity and focus, they will only be partially discussed here.
The negative effect of worse economic conditions on workers* probability of 
prevailing at trial is consistent across all estimations in table 4. In column 1, where no 
fixed effects are added, the effect of being in a month and region with an 
unemployment rate higher by one point is to significantly diminish the probability of 
the workers’ winning by 3.3 points. Similarly, the effect of being in an industry- 
region-year with a bankruptcy rate higher by one point is to decrease the worker’s 
probability of winning by 1.6 points. Note that excluding the characteristics controls 
leads to similar point estimates, although slightly lower in absolute value for the 
unemployment rate (results not reported here). This suggests that the inclusion of 
individual characteristics does not have a big effect on the estimates of the effect of 
economic conditions. Therefore, assuming that there is no selection on unobservables, 
the results obtained on the macro series and reported on figure 8  above give a 
reasonable approximation for the effect of the unemployment rate on judges’ 
decisions.
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Moving to column 2, the addition of region effects has little impact on the coefficient 
on the bankruptcy rate, but, interestingly enough, it more than doubles the coefficient 
on the unemployment rate, implying that a worker applying to the Employment 
Tribunal in a month where the unemployment rate is higher by one point sees his 
probability of prevailing at trial diminish by 7.7 points. This result is important as one 
may have been worried ex ante about the fact that unobserved differences across 
regions drive the results. Instead, in both macro and micro data the time variation in 
unemployment does make a difference to Employment Tribunals outcomes.
Adding industry dummies in column 3 does not affect the size of the coefficient on 
the unemployment rate, although significance is reduced, falling slightly below the 
10% level. However, the inclusion of industry dummies doubles the coefficient on the 
bankruptcy rate: thus, a worker applying to the Employment Tribunal in a year where 
the bankruptcy rate is higher by one point sees a 2.7 point decrease in his probability 
of winning his case. This implies that for the bankruptcy rate as for the unemployment 
rate, time variation has larger effects than cross-sectional (region and industry) 
variation.
In column 4 at last, we also include a year dummy to account for time variation. This 
does not have any dampening impact on the estimates of the effect of economic 
conditions: on the contrary, both coefficients are still significant and higher in 
absolute value, with the coefficient on the unemployment rate even doubling again.
In columns 5 to 8, the sample is reduced as we now want to control for the 
employment status of the worker. First, note that the effect of being unemployed on 
the worker’s probability of winning is extremely strong and significant in all 
specifications: being unemployed makes the worker 64% to 82% more likely to lose 
his case17. This suggests that the case quality of unemployed people is lower. 
However, this may be for two reasons: either unemployed workers indeed come to 
trial with lower quality cases, one of the possible reasons being that, all other things 
equal, they litigate more (we will test this in the next table). Or judges believe that 
unemployed workers are worse. This occurs because of the signalling problem 
described in section 3.1: i.e. if judges are not perfectly informed, observing that a 
worker was unable to find a job signals to them that this worker is likely to be a
17 If we perform a probit estimate without controls, we find that the marginal effect of being 
unemployed on the probability of winning is significantly negative at the 1% level and of similar 
magnitude (61%).
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lemon, and that therefore the firm legitimately fired him. The observed coefficient on 
the interaction between the unemployed dummy and the unemployment rate is 
however positive (columns 5-8), indicating that unemployed workers have a higher 
probability of winning their cases when the unemployment rate is higher. This 
interaction effect, at first significant (column 5), becomes larger when adding fixed 
effects (columns 6 -8 ), though is falls short of statistical significance in columns 6-7. It 
is worth noticing that if we perform the specification in column 1 on the set of 
unemployed workers only (28 observations available), thus allowing the coefficients 
on control variables to differ for the unemployed, we find a significant positive 
coefficient on the unemployment rate, the magnitude of the coefficient being very 
similar (0.058) to the one found in column 5. If instead we interact the unemployed 
dummy with the bankruptcy rate, results are weaker and often insignificant (results 
not reproduced here). This confirms our hypothesis (section 3.1) about the difference 
between the unemployment rate and the bankruptcy rate taken as measures of 
economic conditions when judges are maximizing the parties’ welfare: as unemployed 
workers are more affected by the unemployment rate than by the bankruptcy rate, a 
change in the unemployment rate has a bigger and more significant effect for them 
than a change in the bankruptcy rate.
Let us now comment on the coefficients on the economic conditions indicators. 
Overall, the inclusion of different sets of fixed effects has an effect on the coefficients 
that is very similar to the one observed in columns 1-418. Noticeably, coefficients on 
both economic conditions variables tend to be higher in columns 5-8 than in columns 
1-4. However, this is not due to the explicit inclusion of the employment status 
variable, but rather to the sub-sample used: indeed, performing the regressions 5-8 on 
the same sample but excluding the employment status dummy and the interaction of 
the latter with the unemployment rate yields very similar estimates, except for column 
1, where the estimate of the unemployment rate coefficient in the absence of control 
for unemployment status is lower (-0.032). Although, due to the small sample, some 
doubt about the precise magnitude of the coefficients in columns 5-8 is permitted, 
using the employment status of the worker has allowed us to confirm that, assuming
18 The only noticeable difference is the very sizeable jump in the coefficient on the unemployment rate 
when moving from column 7 to column 8 (adding the year dummy), whereas the jump from column 3 
to column 4 was less important (though still big). I explored this issue to find out that the main jump in 
the coefficient is due to including together region and year dummies. I do not have a good explanation 
why this jump should be so important and hypothesize that it is simply a random variation due to the 
small number of observations (93).
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that there is no selection on unobservables, we have arpwu < crpwe (table 4), i.e. worse
economic conditions decrease more the probability of winning for employed relative 
to unemployed workers. Moreover, a new finding emerges: unemployed workers, 
while having a significantly lower probability of winning on average, are actually 
favoured by judges when the unemployment rate is higher, i.e. a  < 0  if the
unemployment rate is used as the measure for economic conditions.
Now, in a third stage, we allow for economic conditions to influence the selection of 
cases for trial, even conditionally on observed variables (table 5). As discussed above, 
we use two estimation techniques, namely Heckman and Sartori. We note that in the 
selection equation (lower part of the table), the effect of economic conditions on a 
case being selected for trial is very close to 0  and insignificant in all columns. 
Therefore, unsurprisingly, the outcome equation of the Heckman estimator (columns 
1 and 3) gives results that are almost identical to the probit models (columns 1 and 5 
of table 4), although somewhat less significant. Not only is the effect of economic 
conditions unaffected by the inclusion of the selection equation, but the likelihood 
ratio test does not reject the hypothesis that the outcome equation and the selection 
equation are independent, i.e. that there is no selection on unobservables. However, as 
explained in section 5.2.2 above, we may be concerned about the fact that the 
Heckman estimator is inefficient due to the inclusion of the same variables in the 
selection and outcome equations. Therefore, as a robustness check, we use the Sartori 
estimator in columns 2 and 4, which also yields significant and negative coefficients 
on the economic conditions variables. In column 1, the Heckman estimation technique 
gives us an estimator of rho, 0.689, which happens to be closer to 1 than to 0; thus, the 
basic assumption of the Sarotri estimator, i.e. a rho equal to 1 appears to be a 
reasonable if somewhat poor approximation. As expected, the coefficients on 
economic conditions tend to be bigger in absolute value in column 2  than in column 1 . 
In column 3, the best estimate of rho is negative, which explains why assuming a 
positive correlation equal to 1 yields this time lower estimates (in absolute value) on 
economic conditions in column 4 versus column 3. We will not delve more into 
comparing the Heckman and Sartori estimators as it appears that taking into account 
the effect of economic conditions on case selection does not significantly change the 
results given by the simple probit estimation. To close the discussion of table 5, we 
observe that unemployed workers are not more likely to go to trial than employed
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workers; the point estimate, though insignificant, even indicates that unemployed 
workers are less likely to go to trial19. Moreover, worse economic conditions do not 
make it more likely for unemployed workers to go to trial, and therefore, we cannot 
reject that /?, = 0 in equation (24).
Before concluding this section, let us make a few comments on the effects of control 
variables reported in the annexes. First, the variables we thought proxy best for case 
quality do indeed yield consistent results: a higher settlement offer is generally 
associated with a higher probability of the worker winning, and the bad misconduct 
dummy always has a negative and significant effect on the worker’s probability of 
winning. Second, we do distinguish dismissals for economic reasons, and we find that 
these cases usually lead to a lower probability of the worker winning the case20. Third, 
contrary to what the formulation of the law would make us expect (section 2 .1), it 
does not seem that the size and administrative resources (personnel department) of the 
firm have a significant impact on trial outcomes, even when explicitly controlling for 
case selection. Fourth, consistent with the lesson from the trucker’s example (section 
2 .1), the use by the firm of an internal procedure makes it more likely for the firm to 
prevail at trial. Finally, all other things equal, workers with higher wages in their lost 
job are more likely to lose at trial than workers with lower wages. We hypothesise 
that this is due to the fact that workers with higher wages would get higher awards if 
they were to win, and judges may be more demanding with cases implying higher 
payments from the firms to the workers, i.e. judges’ threshold increases with the 
worker’s (past) wage.
Given the above discussion, our favourite set of estimates is to be found in columns 1- 
4 of Table 4. Indeed, controlling for the employment status of the worker does not 
change the basic probit estimates of the effect of economic conditions on judges’ 
decisions, but only forces us to work with a smaller sample; it is only interesting to 
control for the worker’s employment status to determine the specific effect on 
unemployed workers, but not to compute the overall average effect. As for the
19 One may ask whether unemployed workers are also those who apply to Employment Tribunals 
multiple times. First, most workers in the sample (97.7%) are bringing forward their first application 
ever, and the unemployed are if anything less likely to have brought an application before, the 
difference between the two groups being statistically insignificant
20 Note that excluding altogether economic dismissals from the whole analysis does not change the 
basic results.
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selection models presented in table 5, they are rejected by the data, and should 
therefore better be seen as a robustness check.
7 Conclusion
This study has shown that economic conditions such as the unemployment rate and 
the bankruptcy rate affect the implementation of Employment Protection Legislation. 
In the United Kingdom, judges tend overall to decide more frequently in favour of 
firms when unemployment or bankruptcy rates are higher. However, judges’ decision 
rule is different depending on the dismissed worker’s employment status: the 
unemployment rate has a negative effect on the probability of dismissed workers who 
have found a new job winning their cases, whereas the effect for unemployed workers 
is positive.
Among the theories of judges’ decision discussed in section 3.1, the empirical results 
mostly support the theory that judges’ objective is to maximize the joint welfare of the 
parties involved in each case. The results do not rule out that judges also try to 
maximize social welfare or their chances of remaining in office, but make these 
objectives less likely. First, assuming that judges try to maximize welfare, the finding 
that unemployed workers get a different treatment is somewhat suiprising. To 
understand this point, assume that the function relating optimal firing costs to 
economic conditions is monotonic. Given that judges in general are more pro-firm 
when economic conditions are worse, they may think that firing costs should be lower 
under such circumstances. But then it is not quite consistent for them to decide more 
often in favour of unemployed workers when unemployment is higher. Indeed, the 
higher the unemployment rate, the more likely it is that dismissed workers will remain 
unemployed. Therefore judges would tend to be less and less favourable to firms as 
economic conditions get worse, which would defeat their initial purpose.
Now, assuming that judges try to maximize their probability of remaining in office, 
the differential treatment of employed and unemployed workers does not seem to be 
justified either. Judges representing workers must have the support of workers’ 
unions, and of firms’ groups for judges representing firms. However, whereas it is 
reasonable to assume that these organizations have an idea about how often judges 
decide in favour of workers, it is difficult to believe that members of organizations 
who are not directly involved in the case would have any information about whether 
the worker was employed or not in that particular case. Even if they did have this
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information, it is not clear whether they would retain it as relevant. This means that it 
is difficult for outsider observers to spot the beneficial treatment that judges confer on 
unemployed workers in high unemployment contexts, and therefore such beneficial 
treatment should be of no or little interest to judges only concerned about maximizing 
their popularity. Therefore, I conclude that the observed behaviour of judges is mostly 
consistent with their maximizing the joint welfare of the parties involved in each case. 
However, judges’ maximizing the joint welfare of the parties may generate a negative 
externality. Indeed, judges’ behaviour implies that in an economic downturn, effective 
firing costs are lower: this would all other things equal encourage firms to fire and 
hence amplify the economic cycle, at least up to the point where most dismissed 
workers stay unemployed21, in which case worse economic conditions would again 
favour workers. This line of reasoning implies however that firms are aware of 
judges’ sensitivity to economic conditions, which may not be the case. Indeed, we 
have shown that the distribution of firms’ settlement offers is unaffected by economic 
conditions, whereas one would expect that, all other things equal, firms lower their 
offers when economic conditions are worse, reflecting the lower probability of the 
workers* winning. However, only firms with personnel departments seem to be 
somewhat more likely to make no offer when economic conditions are degraded, 
which implies that only the most informed among firms may actually be aware of 
judges’ decision patterns. Although most firms in our sample do not seem to be aware 
of the dependence of judges’ decisions on economic conditions, if firms who do 
realize it are responsible for an important fraction of the dismissals, then judges’ 
behaviour can have a macroeconomic effect. This study thus suggests that one should 
include indicators of EPL enforcement, such as workers’ winning rate, in any study of 
the effect of EPL on macroeconomic outcomes.
An interesting avenue for future research would be to extend the analysis to countries 
such as the United States who, while not possessing any widespread dismissal 
legislation, operate similar institutions. Specifically, in the United States, one could 
investigate whether economic conditions influence committees and judges when 
deciding on appeals against unemployment benefits disqualification, or arbitrators 
when deciding about the regularity of dismissals in unionized firms. Given the
21 A back of the envelope computation shows that one would need an unemployment rate of more than 
20% to reverse judges’ overall tendency to decide in favor of firms as the unemployment rate gets 
higher. However, such unemployment rates were never observed in the UK outside major depressions, 
so that overall judges’ behavior, even in a high unemployment context, favors firms.
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similarity in institutions, one would expect to find similar results to those found for 
the decisions of judges in labour courts in the United Kingdom and France.
To get a deeper understanding of the causes and consequences of the results reported 
in this paper, one should also examine to what extent firms and workers are aware of 
judges’ decision rules and how such awareness affects their decisions. This, combined 
with a closer analysis of the reasons behind judges’ sensitivity to economic 
conditions, would allow further examining whether judges’ behaviour is efficient in 
maximizing social welfare and, armed with this knowledge, suggesting some suitable 
changes in the regulation. More generally, examining the influence of the socio­
economic context in judges’ decisions in other areas of law would likely permit to 
uncover interesting yet undiscovered patterns.
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics (no employment status)
All applicants Applicants proceeding to trial
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Judaes' decision 
Worker wins 471 0.43 0.50 0 1 471 0.43 0.50 0 1
Economic conditions 
Unemployment rate (%) 1288 6.03 1.67 2.40 10.10 459 6.01 1.62 2.40 10.10
Bankruptcy (deregistration) 
rate (%) 1289 0.12 0.02 0.03 0.18 459 0.12 0.02 0.04 0.18
CONTROLS: X 
Case characteristics 
Settlement offer/legal award 1073 0.22 0.51 0 5.20 392 0.05 0.29 0 3.61
Severe misconduct 1311 0.15 0.36 0 1 471 0.18 0.38 0 1
Economic dismissal 1311 0.29 0.45 0 1 471 0.25 0.43 0 1
Redundancy payment 1311 0.09 0.29 0 1 471 0.09 0.29 0 1
Internal formal procedure 
followed 1311 0.29 0.46 0 1 471 0.34 0.47 0 1
Firms' settlement offer 
(thousands of pounds) 1311 0.75 1.98 0 30 471 0.13 0.71 0 10
Worker characteristics 
Manager or professional 1311 0.21 0.40 0 1 471 0.24 0.42 0 1
Weekly wage (hundreds of 
pounds) 1173 2.02 1.25 0.15 15.38 423 2.11 1.29 0.30 12.50
Tenure at dismissal (years) 1278 7.00 6.45 0.08 41.00 460 7.42 6.50 0.08 35.00
Age (tens of years) 1227 4.02 1.19 1.70 7.10 445 4.11 1.15 1.80 6.40
Female 1311 0.32 0.47 0 1 471 0.28 0.45 0 1
Firm characteristics 
Size (hundreds of 
employees) 1271 2.30 9.20 0.01 240 459 2.47 7.71 0.01 80
Personnel department 1311 0.18 0.39 0 1 471 0.21 0.41 0 1
Source: 1992 survey of Employment Tribunal Applications in Great Britain, UK National Statistics,
claimant count series and Small Business Service, VAT Deregistration.
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Table 3 Descriptive statistics (with employment status)
Variable_____________________
Judges' decision 
Worker wins 
Economic conditions 
Unemployment rate (%) 
Bankruptcy (deregistration) 
rate (%)
CONTROLS: X 
Case characteristics 
Settlement offer/legal award 
Severe misconduct 
Economic dismissal 
Redundancy payment 
Internal formal procedure 
followed
Firms' settlement offer 
(thousands of pounds) 
Worker characteristics 
Worker unemployed 
Manager or professional 
Weekly wage (hundreds of 
pounds)
Tenure at dismissal (years) 
Age (tens of years)
Female 
Firm characteristics 
Size (hundreds of 
employees)
Personnel department
All applicants
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
135 0.36 0.48 0 1
358 6.05 1.78 2.40 10.10
358 0.13 0.02 0.04 0.18
304 0.19 0.40 0 3.90
365 0.16 0.37 0 1
365 0.33 0.47 0 1
365 0.01 0.12 0 1
365 0.31 0.46 0 1
365 0.72 1.71 0 15
365 0.23 0.42 0 1
365 0.23 0.42 0 1
328 2.05 1.14 0.24 10.58
361 7.17 6.56 0.08 40
346 3.94 1.16 1.70 7.10
365 0.31 0.46 0 1
361 1.92 6.36 0.01 75
365 0.16 0.37 0 1
Applicants proceeding to trial
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
135 0.36 0.48 0 1
131 5.94 1.74 2.40 10.10
131 0.13 0.02 0.04 0.18
111 0.02 0.11 0 0.83
135 0.16 0.37 0 1
135 0.26 0.44 0 1
135 0.02 0.15 0 1
135 0.34 0.48 0 1
135 0.08 0.45 0 4.50
135 0.26 0.44 0 1
135 0.23 0.42 0 1
122 2.12 1.26 0.35 10.58
133 6.97 6.14 0.08 30.58
126 3.98 1.14 1.80 6.20
135 0.31 0.46 0 1
135 2.13 6.58 0.01 48
135 0.18 0.38 0 1
Source: 1992 survey of Employment Tribunal Applications in Great Britain, UK National Statistics, 
claimant count series and Small Business Service, VAT Deregistration.
Figure 4: Distribution of case quality: low versus high unemployment rate
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Figure 5: Distribution of case quality: low versus high unemployment rate (excluding zero offers)
Distribution of c a se  quality: low versus high unemployment rate 
(excluding zero offers)
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Source: 1992 survey of Employment Tribunal Applications in Great Britain, UK National Statistics, 
claimant count series.
Figure 6: Distribution of case quality: low versus high bankruptcy rate
Distribution of c a se  quality: low versus high bankruptcy rate
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Figure 7: Distribution of case quality: low versus high bankruptcy rate (excluding zero offers)
Distribution of c a se  quality: low versus high bankruptcy rate 
(excluding zero offers)
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Figure 8: yearly win rate in unfair dismissal cases and unemployment rate (1985-2001)
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Source: Burgess et ali. (2001) and UK National Statistics
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Table 4: probit estimations for trial outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
P(win=1) P(win=1) P(win=1) P(win=1) P(win=1) P(win=1) P(win=1) P(win=1)
Unemployment rate (%) -0.033 -0.077 -0.073 -0.144 -0.068 -0.183 -0.149 -0.591
(0.013)*** (0.044)* (0.048) (0.064)** (0.031)** (0.130) (0.106) (0.236)**
Bankruptcy -0.016 -0.012 -0.027 -0.036 -0.001 -0.007 -0.106 -0.156
(deregistration) rate (%) (0.008)* (0.010) (0.013)** (0.016)** (0.014) (0.022) (0.053)** (0.050)***
Worker unemployed -0.638 -0.683 -0.825 -0.796
(0.087)*** (0.123)*** (0.128)*** (0.157)***
Unemployment rate* 0.132 0.157 0.168 0.212
worker unemployed (0.045)*** (0.079)** (0.077)** (0.148)*
Regional dummies No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Year dummy No No No Yes No No No Yes
Observations 387 387 387 387 112 108 93 93
Pseudo R squared 0.092 0.101 0.123 0.126 0.187 0.261 0.321 0.360
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by region in parentheses. Marginal effects reported; the 
marginal effect of the interaction term is calculated using inteff All regressions include controls for 
case characteristics (settlement offer/legal award, severe misconduct dummy, economic dismissal 
dummy, redundancy payment dummy, dummy for internal procedure having been followed, firm’s 
settlement offer), worker characteristics (manager or professional dummy, weekly wage, tenure at 
dismissal, age, female dummy), and firm characteristics (size, dummy for personnel department). In 
columns 5 to 8, the sample is reduced because whether the worker is unemployed or not is only known 
for a subsample of cases (see text for more explanations).
Source: 1992 survey of Employment Tribunal Applications in Great Britain, UK National Statistics, 
claimant count series and Small Business Service, VAT Deregistration.
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Table 5: Heckman and Sartori estimations for trial selection and outcomes
(1) Heckman (2) Sartori (3) Heckman (4) Sartori
Outcome Outcome Outcome Outcome
equation: equation: equation: equation:
P(win=1/trial=1) P(win=1/trial=1) P(win=1/trial=1) P(win=1/trial=1)
Unemployment rate (%) -0.034 -0.042 -0.075 -0.049
(0.017)* (0.020)** (0.042)* (0.026)**
Bankruptcy -0.016 -0.027 -0.001 -0.006
(deregistration) rate (%) (0.012) (0.013)** (0.026) (0.018)
Worker unemployed -0.624 -0.697
(0.207)*** (0.294)***
Unemployment rate* 0.179 (a) 0.111(a)
worker unemployed (0.098)* (0.039)***
Selection Selection Selection Selection
equation: equation: equation: equation:
P(trial=1) P(trial=1) P(trial=1) P(trial=1)
Unemployment rate (%) -0.007 -0.006 -0.007 -0.007
(0.009) (0.008) (0.012) (0.008)
Bankruptcy -0.009 -0.008 -0.005 -0.003
(deregistration) rate (%) (0.006) (0.005)* (0.008) (0.006)
Worker unemployed -0.011 -0.028
(0.148) (0.084)
Unemployment rate* 0.0151 (b) .0151 (b)
worker unemployed (0.033) (0.033)
Rho 0.689 -0.689
(0.323) (0.874)
Likelihood ratio test chi2(1)=0.04 chi2(1)=0.37
of indep. eqns. (rho=0) Prob>chi2=0.844 Prob>chi2=0.542
Observations 1063 1063 305 305
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by region in parentheses. Marginal effects reported, except for 
(a), (b): marginal interaction effects calculated with inteff from a probit estimation of P(trial=l). All 
regressions include controls for case characteristics (settlement offer/legal award, severe misconduct 
dummy, economic dismissal dummy, redundancy payment dummy, dummy for internal procedure 
having been followed, firm’s settlement offer), worker characteristics (manager or professional 
dummy, weekly wage, tenure at dismissal, age, female dummy), and firm characteristics (size, dummy 
for personnel department). In columns 3 and 4, the sample is reduced because whether the worker is 
unemployed or not is only known for a subsample of cases (see text for more explanations).
Source: 1992 survey of Employment Tribunal Applications in Great Britain, UK National Statistics, 
claimant count series and Small Business Service, VAT Deregistration.
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ANNEXES
Table A-l: probit estimations for trial outcomes; full results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
P(win=1) P(win=1) P(win=1) P(win=1)
Economic conditions
Unemployment rate (%) -0.033**'1 (0.013) -0.077* (0.044) -0.073 (0.048) -0.144** (0.064)
Bankruptcy (deregistration) 
rate (%) -0.016* (0.008) -0.012 (0.010) -0.027** (0.013) -0.036** (0.016)
Case characteristics
Severe misconduct -0.252**'' (0.058) - 0 . 2 5 0 * ” ' (0.061) -0.266**'' (0.066) -0.260*** (0.067)
Economic dismissal -0.074 (0.050) -0.068 (0.051) -0.094* (0.049) -0.095** (0.048)
Redundancy payment 0.145 (0.122) 0.134 (0.123) 0.133 (0.123) 0.122 (0.120)
Internal formal procedure 
followed -0.091** (0.044) -0.097** (0.045) -0.104** (0.048) -0.102** (0.050)
Firms' settlement offer 
(thousands of pounds) 0.041* (0.022) 0.044* (0.023) 0.053** (0.023) 0.050** (0.022)
Worker characteristics
Manager or professional 0.101* (0.057) 0.098* (0.058) 0.086 (0.066) 0.093 (0.069)
Weekly wage (hundreds of 
pounds) -0.059** (0.025) -0.056** (0.027) -0.057** (0.026) -0.059** (0.024)
Tenure at dismissal (years) -0.005 (0.005) -0.005 (0.006) -0.004 (0.006) -0.004 (0.006)
Age (tens of years) -0.013 (0.021) -0.011 (0.020) -0.011 (0.020) -0.011 (0.020)
Female 0.063 (0.053) 0.051 (0.060) 0.036 (0.062) 0.036 (0.063)
Firm characteristics
Size (hundreds of employees) -0.001 (0.004) -0.001 (0.005) -0.001 (0.005) -0.001 (0.005)
Personnel department -0.115 (0.073) -0.117 (0.082) -0.133 (0.085) -0.130 (0.086)
Realonal dummies ldefau!t=East
Midlands!
East -0.063 (0.050) -0.075 (0.056) -0.162** (0.079)
London -0.010 (0.037) 0.008 (0.057) 0.027 (0.061)
North East 0.278 (0.170) 0.255 (0.195) 0.466*** (0.146)
North West 0.034 (0.100) 0.012 (0.111) 0.164 (0.147)
South East -0.151** (0.060) -0.158** (0.069) -0.267*** (0.087)
South West 0.046* (0.024) 0.078* (0.042) 0.027 (0.055)
Scotland 0.061 (0.126) 0.033 (0.130) 0.193 (0.159)
West Midlands 0.074 (0.053) 0.059 (0.048) 0.096** (0.046)
Wales -0.033 (0.076) -0.012 (0.085) 0.103 (0.104)
Yorkshire and the Humber 0.112 (0.071) 0.085 (0.078) 0.183** (0.090)
Industrv dummies
(default=Aariculturel
Catering 0.457*** (0.104) 0.498*** (0.087)
Construction 0.244* (0.127) 0.294** (0.129)
Finance 0.212*** (0.068) 0.250*** (0.072)
Other services 0.286** (0.118) 0.362*** (0.129)
Production 0.252** (0.109) 0.307*** (0.111)
Retail 0.081 (0.123) 0.153 (0.125)
Transport 0.105 (0.125) 0.184 (0.124)
Wholesale 0.276 (0.184) 0.346** (0.173)
Year dummv f defaults990!
1991 0.123* (0.072)
Observations 387 387 387 387
Pseudo R squared 0.092 0.101 0.123 0.126
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by region in parentheses. Marginal effects reported.
Source: 1992 survey of Employment Tribunal Applications in Great Britain, UK National Statistics, 
claimant count series and Small Business Service, VAT Deregistration.
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Table A-2:: probit estimations for trial outcomes controlling for employment status; full results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
P(win=1) P(win=1) P(win=1) P(win=1)
Economic conditions and
emolovment status
Unemployment rate (%) -0.068 (0.031)“ -0.183 (0.130) -0.149 (0.106) -0.591 (0.236)**
Bankruptcy (deregistration) -0.001 (0.014)rate (%) -0.007 (0.022) -0.106 (0.053)“ -0.156 (0.050)*“
Worker unemployed -0.638 (0.087)*“ -0.683 (0.123)*“ -0.825 (0.128)“* -0.796 (0.157)*“
Unemployment rate*worker 
unemployed 0.132 (0.045)“* 0.157 (0.079)“ 0.168 (0.077)“ 0.212 (0.148)*
Case characteristics
Severe misconduct -0.263 (0.066)“* -0.303 (0.081)“* -0.463 (0.064)“* -0.419 (0.089)*“
Economic dismissal -0.045 (0.116) -0.097 (0.141) -0.087 (0.203) -0.052 (0.202)
Redundancy payment -0.133 (0.188) -0.232 (0.135)* 0.025 (0.337) 0.163 (0.376)
Internal formal procedure
followed -0.123 (0.088) -0.104 (0.120) -0.142 (0.140) -0.136 (0.151)
Firms' settlement offer
(thousands of pounds) -0.019 (0.174) 0.008 (0.186) 0.241 (0.265) 0.212 (0.250)
Worker characteristics
Manager or professional 0.026 (0.124) 0.027 (0.133) -0.098 (0.172) -0.141 (0.164)
Weekly wage (hundreds of
pounds) -0.100 (0.054)* -0.159 (0.080)“ -0.133 (0.071)* -0.143 (0.060)“
Tenure at dismissal (years) -0.025 (0.012)“ -0.025 (0.015)* -0.041 (0.017)“ -0.042 (0.018)“
Age (tens of years) 0.013 (0.037) -0.001 (0.047) -0.022 (0.049) -0.020 (0.041)
Female -0.021 (0.094) -0.103 (0.138) -0.189 (0.144) -0.184 (0.135)
Firm characteristics
Size (hundreds of employees) -0.184 (0.135) -0.006 (0.008) -0.004 (0.011) 0.001 (0.014)
Personnel department -0.180 (0.122) -0.081 (0.182) 0.086 (0.255) -0.002 (0.285)
Reaional dummies fdefauK"East
Midlands)
East -0.134 (0.156) 0.202 (0.286) -0.322 (0.162)**
London 0.267 (0.158)* 0.345 (0.172)“ 0.449 (0.124)*“
North East 0.736 (0.169)*“ 0.623 (0.230)“* 0.856 (0.077)*“
North West 0.308 (0.320) 0.256 (0.229) 0.809 (0.106)*“
South East 0.094 (0.345) 0.176 (0.358) -0.393 (0.107)*“
South West 0.336 (0.128)*“ 0.269 (0.142)* -0.007 (0.196)
Scotland 0.076 (0.322)
West Midlands 0.354 (0.126)*“ -0.059 (0.129) 0.209 (0.138)
Yorkshire and the Humber 0.470 (0.145)*“ 0.431 (0.107)*“ 0.753 (0.065)*“
Industry dummies
(default=Aariculture)
Construction -0.518 (0.029)“* -0.475 (0.141)*“
Finance -0.520 (0.044)“* -0.457 (0.176)***
Other services -0.612 (0.059)“* -0.338 (1.062)
Production -0.945 (0.032)“* -0.444*“ (0.147)
Retail -0.575 (0.057)*“ -0.450 (0.414)
Wholesale -0.476 (0.025)*“ -0.362 (0.504)
Year dummv f defaults990)
1991 0.651 (0.254)“
Observations 112 108 93 93
Pseudo R squared 0.187 0.261 0.321 0.360
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; “* significant at 1%
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by region in parentheses. Marginal effects reported; the 
marginal effect of the interaction term is calculated using inteff. The sample is reduced compared to
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table A-l because whether the worker is unemployed or not is only known for a subsample of cases 
(see text for more explanations).
Source: 1992 survey of Employment Tribunal Applications in Great Britain, UK National Statistics, 
claimant count series and Small Business Service, VAT Deregistration.
230
Table A-3: Heckman and Sarotri estimations for trial selection and outcomes
(1) Heckman (2) Sartori (3) Heckman (4) Sartori
Outcome equation: 
P(win=1/trial=1)
Outcome equation: 
P(win=1/trial=1)
Outcome equation: 
P(win=1/trial=1)
Outcome equation: 
P(win=1ftrial=1)
-0.034 (0.017)* -0.042 (0.020)** -0.075 (0.042)* -0.049 (0.026)**
-0.016 (0.012) -0.027 (0.013)** -0.001 (0.026) -0.006 (0.018)
-0.624 (0.207)*** -0.697 (0.294)***
0.179(a) (0.098)* 0.111(a) (0.039)***
-0.262
-0.073
0.147
(0.067)***
(0.067)
(0.099)
-0.247 (0.099)*** 
-0.105 (0.077)* 
0.118 (0.109)
-0.271
-0.047
-0.136
(0.131)**
(0.136)
(0.273)
-0.172
-0.050
-0.020
(0.119)*
(0.098)
(0.281)
-0.097 (0.062) -0.088 (0.075) -0.144 (0.127) -0.114 (0.088)*
0.022 (0.055) -0.288 (0.068)*** -0.059 (0.235) -0.529 (0.131)***
0.094 (0.074) 0.200 (0.088)** 0.029 (0.156) 0.059 (0.110)
-0.063 (0.029)** -0.044 (0.033)* -0.101 (0.075) -0.050 (0.049)
-0.006 (0.005) -0.005 (0.006) -0.029 (0.017)* -0.020 (0.009)**
-0.014
0.064
(0.026)
(0.067)
0.027 (0.029) 
0.032 (0.075)
0.024
-0.018
(0.061)
(0.130)
0.051
0.043
(0.037)*
(0.091)
-0.001 (0.005) 0.001 (0.006) 0.000 (0.009) 0.001 (0.007)
-0.12
0.705
(0.078)
(0.717)
-0.093 (0.100) 
0.167 (0.659)
-0.199
2.427
(0.158)
(1.078)**
-0.163
0.441
(0.145)
(0.838)
Economic conditions and 
employment status 
Unemployment rate (%) 
Bankruptcy (deregistration) 
rate (%)
Worker unemployed 
Unemployment rate*worker 
unemployed 
Case characteristics 
Severe misconduct 
Economic dismissal 
Redundancy payment 
Internal formal procedure 
followed
Firms’ settlement offer 
(thousands of pounds) 
Worker characteristics 
Manager or professional 
Weekly wage (hundreds of 
pounds)
Tenure at dismissal (years)
Age (tens of years)
Female
Firm characteristics 
Size (hundreds of 
employees)
Personnel department 
Constant
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Table A-3: Heckman and Sarotri estimations for trial selection and outcomes (continued)
(1) Heckman (2) Sartori (3) Heckman (4) Sartori
Selection equation: Selection equation: Selection equation: Selection equation:
_____________________________ P(trial=1)_________ P(trial=1)_________ P(trial=1)_________ P(trial=1)
Economic conditions and 
employment status 
Unemployment rate (%)
Bankruptcy (deregistration) 
rate (%)
Worker unemployed 
Unemployment rate*worker 
unemployed 
Case characteristics 
Severe misconduct 
Economic dismissal 
Redundancy payment 
Internal formal procedure 
followed
Firms’ settlement offer 
(thousands of pounds)
Worker characteristics 
Manager or professional 
Weekly wage (hundreds of 
pounds)
Tenure at dismissal (years)
Age (tens of years)
Female
Firm characteristics 
Size (hundreds of 
employees)
Personnel department 
Constant 
Rho
Likelihood ratio test of 
indep. eqns. (rho=0)
Observations
-0.007 (0.009) -0.006 (0.008) -0.007 (0.012) -0.007 (0.008)
-0.009 (0.006) -0.008 (0.005)* -0.005 (0.008) -0.003 (0.006)
-0.011 (0.148) -0.028 (0.084)
.0151 (b) (0.033) .0151 (b) (0.033)
0.032
-0.026
-0.007
(0.043)
(0.035)
(0.053)
0.026 (0.036) 
-0.022 (0.031) 
-0.007 (0.048)
0.039
-0.013
0.073
(0.056)
(0.044)
(0.174)
0.021
-0.009
0.035
(0.034)
(0.029)
(0.090)
0.013 (0.033) 0.011 (0.028) -0.028 (0.038) -0.016 (0.026)
-0.19 (0.017)*** -0.165 (0.016)*** -0.350 (0.033)*** -0.221 (0.037)
0.096 (0.044)** 0.082 (0.035)** 0.018 (0.057) 0.003 (0.039)
0.013 (0.014) 0.009 (0.012) 0.024 (0.021) 0.016 (0.013)
0.002 (0.003) 0.002 (0.002) -0.001 (0.003) -0.001 (0.002)
0.029
-0.013
(0.014)**
(0.034)
0.025 (0.012)** 
-0.01 (0.030)
0.033
0.045
(0.018)*
(0.049)
0.018
0.026
(0.012)
(0.029)
0.002 (0.002) 0.002 (0.002) 0.002 (0.003) 0.001 (0.002)
0.023
-0.158
0.6894
(0.043)
(0.329)
(0.323)
0.019 (0.036) 
-0.156 (0.636)
-0.014
-0.282
-0.689
(0.049)
(0.683)
(0.874)
-0.007
-0.111
(0.034)
(0.681)
chi2(1)=0.04 chi2(1)=0.37
Prob>chi2=0.844
1063 1063
Prob>chi2=0.542
305 305
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by region in parentheses. Marginal effects reported, except for 
(a), (b): marginal interaction effects calculated with inteff from a probit estimation of P(trial=l). In 
columns 3 and 4, the sample is reduced because whether the worker is unemployed or not is only 
known for a subsample of cases (see text for more explanations).
Source: 1992 survey of Employment Tribunal Applications in Great Britain, UK National Statistics, 
claimant count series and Small Business Service, VAT Deregistration.
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Chapter 4
Cyclical Budgetary Policy and Economic 
Growth: What Do We Learn from OECD
Panel Data?*
Philippe Aghion! and Ioana Marinescu
A b stra c t: This paper uses yearly panel data  on OECD countries to 
analyze the relationship between growth and the cyclicality of the budget 
deficit. We develop new yearly estimates of the countercyclicality of the 
budget deficit, and show that the budget deficit has become increasingly 
countercyclical in most OECD countries over the past twenty years. How­
ever, EMU countries did not become more countercyclical. Using panel 
specifications with country and year fixed effects, we show that: (i) an in­
crease in financial development, a decrease in openness to trade, and the 
adoption of an inflation targeting regime move countries toward a more 
countercyclical budget deficit; (ii) a more countercyclical budget deficit 
has a positive and significant effect on economic growth, and this effect is 
larger when financial development is lower.
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very helpful comments and editorial suggestions of Daron Acemoglu, Olivier Blanchard, 
Ken Rogoff, and Michael Woodford. We also thank Ricardo Caballero and Anil Kashyap 
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versations with Philippe Bacchetta, Tim Besley, Laurence Bloch, Elie Cohen, Philippe 
Moutot, Jean Pisani-Ferry, Romain Ranciere, and of our colleagues in the Institutions, 
Organizations and Growth group at the Canadian Institute for Advanced Research. We 
are very grateful to Ann Helfman, Julian Kolev and Anne-Laure Piganeau for outstand­
ing research assistance. Finally, we thank Konrad Kording for his collaboration on the 
first stage analysis section and more specifically for helping us implement the MCMC 
methodology.
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1 Introduction
A common view among macroeconomists, is that there is a decoupling 
between macroeconomic policy (budget deficit, taxation, money supply) 
which should primarily affect price and income stability1, and long-run 
economic growth which, if anything, should depend only upon structural 
characteristics of the economy (property right enforcement, market struc­
ture, market mobility and so forth). That macroeconomic policy should not 
be a key determinant of growth, is further hinted at by recent contributions 
such as Acemoglu et al (2004) and Easterly (2005), which argue tha t the 
correlation between macroeconomic volatility and growth (Acemoglu et al) 
or those between growth and macroeconomic variables (Easterly), become 
insignificant once one controls for institutions.
The question of whether macroeconomic policy does or does not affect 
(productivity) growth is not purely academic. In particular, it underlies 
the recent debate on the European Stability and Growth Pact as well as 
the criticisms against the European Central Bank for allegedly pursuing 
price stability at the expense of employment and growth.
In this paper we question tha t view by arguing that the cyclicality of 
the budget deficit is significant in explaining GDP growth, with a more 
countercyclical budgetary policy being more growth-enhancing the lower 
the country’s level of financial development. We also identify economic 
factors that tend to be associated with more countercyclical policies. These 
results hold in a sample of OECD countries with comparable institutional 
environments.
1For example Lucas (1987) analyzes the welfare costs of income volatility in an econ­
omy with complete markets for individual insurance, taking the growth ra te  as given. 
Atkeson and Phelan (1994) analyze the welfare gains from countercyclical policy in an 
economy with incomplete insurance markets but no growth. Both find very small effects 
of volatility (or of countercyclical policies aimed a t reducing it) on welfare.
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The idea that cyclical macroeconomic policy might affect productivity 
growth, is suggested by previous work by Aghion, Angeletos, Banerjee and 
Manova (2006), henceforth AABM. The argument in AABM is tha t credit 
constrained firms have a borrowing capacity which is typically conditioned 
by current earnings (the factor of proportionality between earning and debt 
capacity is called credit multiplier, with a higher multiplier reflecting a 
higher degree of financial development in the economy). In a recession, 
current earnings are reduced, and so is firms’ ability to borrow in order 
to maintain growth-enhancing investments (e.g in skills, structural capital, 
or R&D). To the extent that higher macroeconomic volatility translates 
into deeper recessions, it should affect firms’ incentives to engage in such 
investments. This prediction finds empirical support, first in cross-country 
panel regressions by AABM who show on the basis of cross-country panel 
regressions that structural investments are more procyclical the lower the 
country’s level of financial development; and second, in firm-level evidence 
by Berman et al (2007). Using French firm-level panel data on R&D in­
vestments and on credit constraints, Berman et al. show that: (i) the share 
of R&D investment over total investment is countercyclical without credit 
constraints; (ii) this share turns more procyclical when firms are credit 
constrained; (iii) this effect is only observed during down-cycle phases - i.e. 
in presence of credit constraints, R&D investment share plummets during 
recessions but doesn’t  increase proportionally during up-cycle periods2.
These findings in turn suggest that countercyclical macroeconomic poli­
cies, with higher government investment or lower nominal interest rates
2 As pointed out by several authors, some of these results may be biased because of an 
endogeneity problem which may come from the the potential simultaneous determ ination 
of sales and investment. BE A AC check the robustness of their results by instrumenting 
the variation in sales by an exchange rate exposure variable, which depends on exchange 
rate variations and firms’ export status. This variable is strongly correlated w ith sales 
variation without being affected by investment decisions. Their results are robust to 
this instrumentation.
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during recessions, may foster productivity growth by reducing the magni­
tude of the output loss induced by market failures (in particular by credit 
market imperfections) in a recession, which in turn should allow credit- 
constrained firms to preserve their growth-enhancing investments over the 
business cycle. For example, the government may decide to stimulate the 
demand for private firms’ products by increasing spending. This could fur­
ther increase firm’s liquidity holdings and thus make it easier for them to 
face idiosyncratic liquidity shocks without having to sacrifice R&D or other 
types of longer-term growth-enhancing investments. On the other hand, in 
a recession, more workers face unemployment, so that their earnings are re­
duced. Government spending could help them overcome credit constraints 
either directly (social programs, etc.) or indirectly by fostering labor de­
mand and therefore employment; this relaxation of credit constraints in 
turn would allow workers to make growth-enhancing investments in hu­
man capital, re-location, etc. The tighter the credit constraints faced by 
firms and workers, the more growth-enhancing such countercyclical policies 
should be .3
Our contribution in this paper is three-fold. It is first to compute and 
analyze the cyclicality of the budget deficit on a panel of OECD countries, 
that is, how the budget deficit responds to fluctuations in the output gap 
over time. Second, it is to investigate some potential determinants of the 
countercyclicality of the budget deficit. Third, it is to use these yearly panel 
data to assess the relationship between growth and the countercyclicality 
of budgetary policies at various levels of financial development. Our main 
findings can be summarized as follows: (i) the budget deficit has become
3T hat government intervention might increase aggregate efficiency in an economy 
subject to  credit constraints and aggregate shocks, has already been pointed out by 
Holmstrom and Tirole (1998). Our analysis in this section can be seen as a  first a ttem pt 
to  explore potential empirical implications of this idea for the relationship between 
growth and public spending over the cycle.
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increasingly countercyclical in most OECD countries over the past twenty 
years, but this trend has been significantly less pronounced in the EMU; 
(ii) within countries, a more countercyclical budgetary policy is positively 
associated with a higher level of financial development, a lower level of 
openness, and the adoption of an inflation targeting regime; (iii) a more 
countercyclical budgetary policy has a greater positive impact on growth 
when financial development is lower. While we argue that our results likely 
reflect the causality from budgetary policy to growth, at the very least 
they document statistical relationships between macroeconomic variables 
tha t are consistent with the theory and microevidence on volatility, credit 
constraints and growth-enhancing investments.
While we do not know of any previous attem pt at analyzing the growth 
effects of countercyclical budgetary policies, analyses of the determinants 
of the cyclicality of budgetary policies already exist in the literature. For 
example, Alesina and Tabellini (2005) argue that more corrupt democra­
cies will tend to run a more procyclical fiscal policy. The idea is that, 
in good times, voters demand that the government cut taxes or provide 
more public services instead of reducing debt, because they cannot observe 
the debt reduction and can suspect the government of appropriating the 
rents associated with good economic conditions. In equilibrium, this leads 
to a more procyclical policy as the moral hazard problem worsens, in the 
sense that governments are more likely to divert public resources in booms. 
They also show that this mechanism tends to be more powerful in explain­
ing the variation observed in the data than borrowing constraints alone. 
While Alesina and Tabellini (2005) are using a large sample of countries 
and explore cross-sectional variations, in this study we use panel analysis 
on OECD countries. This makes the use of corruption indices impractical 
for two reasons. First, there is almost no cross-sectional variation in cor­
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ruption indices within the OECD. Second, there is even less variation of 
these indices across time for individual countries.
In a similar vein, Calderon et al. (2004) show that emerging market 
economies with better institutions are more able to conduct a countercycli­
cal fiscal policy4. Their empirical analysis is based on the International 
Country Risk Guide. Although the variation in this indicator is limited 
across OECD countries and time, it presents somewhat more variation 
than corruption indexes5.
Other papers such as Gali and Perotti (2003) and Lane (2003) focus, as 
we do, on OECD countries. Gali and Perotti investigate whether fiscal pol­
icy in the European Monetary Union (EMU) has become more procyclical 
after the Maastricht treaty. They find no evidence for such a development. 
They do find however that while there is a trend in the OECD towards a 
more countercyclical fiscal policy over time, the EMU is lagging behind tha t 
trend. Lane (2003) is probably the paper that comes closer to the analysis 
developed in the third section of our paper. Lane examines the cyclical 
behavior of fiscal policy within the OECD. He then uses trade openness, 
output volatility, output per capita, the size of the public sector and an 
index for political power dispersion to examine cross-country differences 
in cyclicality. The reason why power dispersion may play a role is taken 
from Lane and Tornell (1998): when multiple political groups compete for 
public spending, the latter may become more procyclical. No group wants
4There is also the paper by Talvi and Vegh (2000), where it is argued th a t high 
output volatility is most likely to  generate a procyclical government spending. The 
idea is th a t running a budget surplus generates political pressures to  spend more: the 
government therefore minimizes th a t surplus and becomes pro-cyclical. This movement 
is then accentuated by a volatile output, and therefore a  volatile tax  base.
5We have also used these indicators in our analysis. However, they typically have no 
significant effect on GDP growth over time in our sample. Moreover, as they are less 
widely available than  our main variables of interest, their use considerably restricts the 
available sample, leading to less precise estimates. We have therefore decided not to  use 
these indicators in the results reported here.
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to let any substantial fiscal surplus subsist because they are afraid that this 
will not lead to debt repayment, but rather to other groups appropriating 
that surplus. Lane finds in particular evidence that GDP growth volatility, 
trade openness and political divisions lead to a more procyclical spending 
pattern, even though the effect of political divisions is not present for all 
categories of spending. We contribute to this literature by using yearly 
panel data to analyze the cyclicality of budgetary policy and its determi­
nants within OECD countries, and we show that the degree of financial 
development is an important element to explain within country variations 
in such policies, while future or present EMU membership explains cross­
country variations. Moreover, we show that inflation targeting is associated 
with a more countercyclical budgetary deficit.
Most closely related to our second stage analysis of the effect of coun­
tercyclical budgetary policy on growth, are Aghion-Angeletos-Banerjee- 
Manova (2005), henceforth AABM, and Aghion-Bacchetta-Ranciere-Rogoff 
(2006), henceforth ABRR. AABM develop a model to explain why macroe­
conomic volatility is more negatively correlated with productivity growth, 
the lower financial development, and they test this prediction using cross­
country panel data. ABRR move from a closed real to an open monetary 
economy and show that a fixed nominal exchange rate regime or lower real 
exchange rate volatility are more positively associated with productivity 
growth, the lower financial development and the lower the ratio of real 
shocks to financial shocks.
The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2  
discusses the estimation of the countercyclicality of the budget deficit for 
each OECD country and each year covered by our panel data set. Sec­
tion 3 uncovers some main determinants of the countercyclicality of the 
budget deficit. Section 4 regresses GDP per capita growth on financial
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development, the countercyclicality coefficients computed in section2 , the 
interaction between the two, and a set of controls. Finally, Section 5 con­
cludes.
2 The countercyclicality of the budget deficit 
in the cross-country panel
In this section we compute time varying measures of the cyclicality of bud­
getary policy in our cross-country panel, and compare the extent to which 
budgetary policy became more countercyclical over time in some countries 
than in others. A main finding is that budgetary policy in the US and the 
UK have become significantly more countercyclical over the past twenty 
years, whereas it has not in the EMU area.
2.1 D ata
Panel data on GDP, the GDP gap (ygap), the GDP deflator, and govern­
ment gross debt (ggfl) are taken from the OECD Economic Outlook annual 
series6. Our measure of budgetary policy is the first difference of debt di­
vided by the GDP, which is the same as the budget deficit over GDP. Note 
th a t debt and other government data refer to general government. Finan­
cial development is measured by the ratio of private credit to GDP, and 
annual cross-country data for this measure of financial development can be 
drawn from the Levine database7. In this latter measure, private credit 
is all credit to private agents, and therefore includes credit to households. 
The ” ‘average years of education in the population over 25 years old” ’ se-
6Codes in parenthesis indicate the names of variables in the dataset. Full documen­
tation  available a t www.oecd.org. D ata can be downloaded from sourceoecd.org for 
subscribers to  th a t service.
7D ata downloadable from Ross Levine’s homepage.
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ries is directly borrowed from the Barro-Lee dataset; this measure is only 
available every five years and has been linearly interpolated to obtain a 
yearly series. The openness variable is defined as exports and imports over 
GDP and data on it come from the Penn World Tables 6.1. The popula­
tion growth, government share of GDP and investment share of GDP also 
come from the Penn World Tables 6.1. The inflation targeting dummy 
is defined using the dates when countries adopted inflation targeting, as 
summarized in Vega and Winkelried (2005). All nominal variables are de­
flated using the GDP deflator. Summary statistics can be found in Table 
1. The sample is an unbalanced panel including the following countries: 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, 
United Kingdom, Germany8, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, 
New Zealand, Portugal, Sweden, USA.
2.2 Public deficit and growth: the empirical chal­
lenge
We are interested in evaluating the impact of the cyclicality of the budget 
deficit on the growth of GDP per capita, and how this effect may depend on 
the degree of financial development. Our expectation is that a more coun­
tercyclical budget deficit is more likely to enhance growth when financial 
development is lower. Empirically, we wish to identify this effect from time 
variation of budgetary policy within countries. Figure 1 illustrates this idea 
for a hypothetical case: we distinguish between the situation where, in the 
base period t  — 1 , financial development is low (upper panels), and the sit­
8A11 level variables are adjusted for the German reunification. The adjustm ent in­
volves regressing each variable of interest on time and a  constant in the ten  years before 
1991 (data based on West Germany only). We then use the estim ated coefficients to 
predict the values for 1991 to  2000. We take the average ratio between actual and pre­
dicted values in the years 1991 to 2000. We use this ratio to proportionally adjust values 
before 1991.
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uation where financial development is high (lower panels). We start with a 
baseline depicted in the left-hand side panels of Figure 1: the budget deficit 
is thus initially assumed to be pro-cyclical. The right-hand side panels of 
Figure 1 illustrate the growth response in period 2 after an increase in the 
countercyclicality of the budget deficit in period 1 , such that the budget 
deficit becomes strongly countercyclical. If financial development is low, 
then trend growth in period 2  increases substantially (upper left panel in 
Figure 1). If, on the other hand, financial development is high , then trend 
growth increases by a smaller amount9 (lower left panel of Figure 1).
F IG U R E  1 H E R E
Looking at Figure 1 , the most obvious method one can think of to 
compute cyclicality is to regress the public deficit on the GDP growth using 
ordinary least squares (OLS) on the observations in period t. In practice, it 
seems more reasonable to regress the public deficit on the GDP gap (defined 
as (G D P —G D P*)/G D P*, where G D P * is the trend GDP) rather than the 
GDP growth. Indeed, the GDP gap is very much like a detrended measure 
of the GDP growth, and a forward-looking government’s budgetary policy 
should respond to shortfalls from trend rather than to GDP growth per 
se (for a theory of why fiscal policy should depend on the GDP gap, see 
Barro(1979)).
This type of regression based approach to measure the cyclicality of 
fiscal policies is now common in the literature and can be found for example 
in Lane (2003) and Alesina and Tabellini (2005). However, the methods 
used in these papers give rise to only one (or a few) observation of cyclicality 
per country. Since we want to investigate the impact of time variation in
9The effect of a decrease in the countercyclicality of public deficit could become neg­
ative a t high enough levels of financial development, if the government’s deficit crowds 
out more efficient private borrowing and spending.
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cyclicality, we need to compute for each country time-varying measures 
for the countercyclicality of budget deficit. Specifically, as we wish to use 
a yearly panel of countries, we need a measure of countercyclicality that 
varies yearly. This means that period t — 1 and period t in Figure 1 are 
reduced to one single year each! A regression is not defined for a single 
observation, so we must use observations from a few years in order to 
compute countercyclicality. The next subsection discusses what methods 
can be used to compute countercyclicality.
2.3 Econom etric m ethods to  com pute countercycli- 
cality
Generally, one would like estimate the following equation for each country 
i:
—— =  - Q - u t y gap,it +  o>2u +  £ iu  where eit ~  N ( 0 ,a2), (1)
Hit
where am  measures the countercyclicality of budgetary policy. Note that 
there is a minus sign in front of ygap,u: when the economy is in a recession 
and the GDP gap is negative, the opposite of the GDP gap is positive, and 
so a positive am  means that the budget deficit increases when the economy 
is in a recession, i.e. the budget deficit is countercyclical. Both am  and the 
constant a2u 10 are both time-varying, which is why we write aja to  denote 
the coefficient on the variable j  in country i at year t.
The variables in equation 1 are defined as follows:
•  bu • gross government debt in country i at year t
10The constant a2it can be interpreted as a  measure of structural budgetary deficit: 
indeed, by construction it corresponds to  the part of budget deficit th a t does not depend 
upon the business cycle.
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• ya : the GDP in country i and year t, in value
•  V gap ,it • the GDP gap in country i and year t. It is computed as (yu — 
y*t)/y*t, where y*t is the prediction of yu using the Hodrick-Prescott 
filter. A lambda parameter of 25 was chosen, following OECD (1995). 
Note that the GDP gap computed by the OECD using a production 
function approach is also smoothed by a Hodrick-Prescott technique, 
so that in practice the difference between the OECD measure of the 
GDP gap and the measure used here is very limited: the correlation 
between the two variables is 77%. Our measure of the GDP gap is as 
expected positively correlated with the GDP per capita growth: the 
correlation is however not so strong at 36%.
Note that bu — is exactly equal to the opposite of the budget 
balance, so that our left-hand side variable is equal to the budget deficit as 
a share of GDP, which we will simply refer to as ’’budget deficit” . We now 
examine how the coefficients dju can be estimated econometrically.
One way to implement this is to compute finite (for example 1 0 -years) 
rolling window ordinary least squares estimates. The ten-year rolling win­
dow OLS method simply amounts to estimating the countercyclicality of 
the budget deficit at year t  in country i by running the following
regression for each country i, and all possible years r:
—— =  - a u tygap,iT +  CL2it +  £ir, for t  6  ( f - 5 , f +  4). (2)
Vit
that is, one uses a ten year centered rolling window to estimate the counter­
cyclicality of budget deficit at any date t. This method suffers however from 
serious shortcomings. First, by definition, we lose the first five years and 
the last four years of data for each country. Second, because the method
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involves estimating a coefficient by discarding at each time period one old 
observation and taking into account a new one, the coefficient can vary 
substantially when the new observation is very different from the one it 
replaces. This implies that the series may be jagged and affected by noise 
and transitory changes; moreover, a sudden jump in the series would not 
be coming from changes in the immediate neighborhood of date t, but from 
changes 5 years before and 4 years after.
To deal with the shortcomings of the 10-years rolling window method, 
one can use smoothing such that all observations are used for each year, but 
those observations closest to the reference year are given greater weight. 
The ’’local Gaussian-weighted ordinary least squares” method is one way of 
achieving this. It consists in computing the ajit coefficients by using all the 
observations available for each country i and then performing one regression 
for each date t, where the observations are weighted by a Gaussian centered 
at date t 11
6^ — 6^  j j
=  a u tV g a p M  “1“ it £zt) i y )
Vit
where £jr ~  N (0 , a2/ w t(r)) and wt(r) =  — exp
<t v 2II
While the local Gaussian-weighted OLS method is less noisy than the 
1 0 -years rolling window method, it suffers from a similar shortcoming when 
it comes to testing the idea illustrated in Figure 1. Indeed, these two 
methods use observations from both the past and the future (previous 
years and future years) to calculate yearly countercyclicality. Ultimately, 
we want to look at the impact of year t — 1 changes in countercyclicality
11 In practice, we chose a value of 5 for a. While this choice is somewhat arbitrary, 
changing this smoothing value slightly does not qualitatively affect the results.
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on year t  growth, but if countercyclicality is computed using some future 
observations, then in practice we are examining the impact of both past 
and (some) future countercyclicality on growth. Thus, it is hard to be 
certain that year t  — 1 countercyclicality causes year t  growth, and reverse 
causality becomes a problem. One way to address this issue is to use longer 
lags of countercyclicality (t — 2 or t — 3 or t — 4, etc.), but this requires 
us to assume that the effects of countercyclicality on growth at year t  are 
delayed for a specific number of years.
An alternative method that gets around this problem by making current 
countercyclicality depend essentially upon past observations, is to assume 
tha t coefficients follow an AR(1 ) process. Namely, using the notation from 
equation 1 , for each country i and for each coefficient j:
ajn =  ajit- 1  +  ,£% ~  N (0, a l .). (4)
The main challenge in implementing this method is to estimate al 
(the variance of the coefficients) at the same time as the variance of the 
observation, i.e. the variance al  in the formulation of equation 1. Once 
these variances are estimated, applying the Kalman filter gives the best 
estimates for aju.
The optimal estimates for these variance are extremely hard to compute. 
While finding analytical closed form solutions turns out to be virtually im­
possible, Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods provide a feasible 
numerical approximation. We implement the method in Matlab, assum­
ing tha t the variances of the coefficients and equation are the same for all
countries12. We are thus left with three variances to estimate: two for the
12This assumption is reasonable since the OECD countries in our sample share similar 
institutions and degrees of economic development. Moreover, this assumption is similar 
to assuming no heteroskedasiticty across panels when estimating a  panel regression, 
which is the standard assumption. Finally, assuming country-specific variances would
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coefficient processes (<t* , j  = 1 , 2 ) and one for the variance of the error 
in the equation (&%)• Intuitively, the MCMC method explores randomly 
(using a Markov chain, hence the name) a wide spectrum of possible values 
for the variances, and one then retains a set of values that is representative 
of probable values given the data13. An advantage of the MCMC method 
over maximum likelihood type methods is that it does not get stuck in local 
solutions and properly represents uncertainty about the variances14. Once 
we obtain the estimates of these three variances, the aju coefficients can be 
calculated using the Kalman filter.
AR(1 ) MCMC is to be preferred over the previous methods for two 
reasons. First, it reflects a reasonable assumption about policy, i.e. that 
policy changes slowly and depends on the immediate past. Second, and 
most importantly, it is econometrically appealing in that it makes policy 
reflected in the aju coefficients mainly depend on the past (because of the 
AR(1 ) specification)15; thus, when the aju coefficients are used as explana­
tory variables in panel regressions, it is less likely that there should be a 
reverse causation problem.
2.4 R esults
We now use the AR(1 ) method as described above to characterize the level 
and time path of the countercyclicality of budget deficits in the OECD 
countries in our sample. We also report some basic results with the 10
make estimates much more imprecise due to the fact th a t our relatively small number 
of observations would have to  be used to  identify many more parameters.
13See appendix 1 for more details on the implementation of this method.
14It is indeed also possible to  use maximum likelihood type methods to  estim ate the 
variances, bu t these are precisely liable to  get stuck in local solutions. In a  previous 
version of this paper, we used such a  method, amended so th a t it does not systematically 
get stuck in a local solution. In practice, the estimates of the coefficients dju  we had 
obtained using th a t method are highly correlated with the ones obtained here using 
MCMC.
15The coefficients also depend on the future in as much as their variance is calculated 
using the full sample of available observations.
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years rolling window and Gaussian weighted OLS methods.
Table 1 summarizes the descriptive statistics of our main variables of 
interest. For all three measures, the budget deficit is countercyclical (pos­
itive coefficient), which is consistent with Lane’s (2003) finding that the 
primary surplus is procyclical. It is worth noting that the three different 
methods used in the first stage to estimate countercyclicality give very sim­
ilar results in terms of the mean: a mean of about .5 means that on average 
in our sample a 1 percentage point increase in the opposite of the GDP gap 
(i.e. a worse recession) lead to about .5 percentage points increase in the 
budget deficit as a share of the GDP. In terms of the variance of these mea­
sures, we can see that the standard error is largest for the 1 0 -years rolling 
window method, as expected; it is smaller for the Gaussian method, and 
even smaller for the AR(1 ) MCMC method.
T A B L E  1 H E R E
We now look at the evolution of the countercyclicality of budget deficit, 
as measured by the estimated coefficients am  from equation 1. Figure 2  
shows the evolution of the countercyclicality of the budget deficit for the US 
estimated by the three methods described above. We can readily see that, 
as expected given the construction of these measures and their empirical 
standard errors, the 1 0  years rolling window yields the most volatile results, 
and the AR(1 ) method is the smoothest with the Gaussian-weighted OLS 
method lying in between. Overall, all three methods show an increase in 
countercyclicality over time, with a recent trend towards decreasing coun­
tercyclicality shown by the 1 0  years rolling window and Gaussian-weighted 
OLS methods.
F IG U R E  2 H E R E
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In Figure 3, we then show the countercyclicality of the budget deficit 
estimated through the AR(1 ) method for a few countries in our sample. US 
and UK countercyclicality tends to increase over time, especially since the 
1980’s. On the contrary, the average countercyclicality of budgetary policy 
in EMU countries slightly decreases over time. Also, one can observe some 
divergence between EMU and non-EMU countries: at the beginning of the 
period, the countercyclicality of the budget deficit in EMU countries was 
very similar to that in the US, however, as of the 1990’s, the US and the 
UK became significantly more countercyclical whereas the EMU did not.
F IG U R E  3 H E R E
In Figure 4, we plot the same evolution, this time based on coefficients 
that are estimated using the Gaussian-weighted OLS. Trends in estimates 
are very similar to those obtained using the AR(1 ) method.
F IG U R E  4 H E R E
These results are consistent with Gali and Perotti (2003), who show, 
splitting their sample by decades, that in general fiscal deficits in the OECD 
have become more countercyclical, but less so in EMU countries. Here, we 
confirm these results using a full-fledged time-series measure of counter­
cyclicality.
To summarize our descriptive results, we found that the budget deficit 
has become more countercyclical in the US and the UK than in EMU 
countries since the 1990s. In the next section we investigate possible expla­
nations for these observed differences in the countercyclicality of budgetary 
deficit across countries and over time.
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3 First stage: determinants of the counter­
cyclicality of budgetary policy
In this section, we use the series of cyclicality coefficients derived using 
the AR(1 ) MCMC method and regress the countercyclicality of budgetary 
policy over a set of macroeconomic variables. Since our sample is restricted 
to OECD countries, little variation should be expected from the corrup­
tion or other institutional variables considered by the literature so far16. 
Instead, we focus on the following candidate variables: financial develop­
ment, openness, EMU membership17, and whether the country has adopted 
inflation targeting. We also include GDP growth volatility as measured by 
the standard error of GDP growth, lag of log real GDP per capita and the 
government share of GDP as control variables.
Financial development is a plausible suspect as it influences both the 
ability and the willingness of governments to borrow in recessions in order to 
finance the budget deficit. Lower financial development should thus trans­
late into lower countercyclicality of budget deficit. While OECD countries 
are arguably less subject to borrowing constraints than other countries in 
the world, there is still a fair amount of cross-country variation in financial 
development among OECD countries. Openness is also a plausible candi­
date as one can expect foreign capital to flow in during booms and flow 
out during recessions, implying that the cost of capital is higher during 
recessions than during booms. This in turn tends to increase the long-run 
cost of financing countercyclical budget deficit policies while maintaining
16As mentioned above, using ICRG indicators turns out not to  be of interest for our 
analysis.
17This d u m m y  variable takes a value of 1 for all countries th a t currently belong to 
the EMU, and 0 for all the other countries. This is because the EMU has been prepared 
for many years so th a t the countries th a t would eventually join might be different even 
before the EMU is fully effective.
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the overall debt constant on average over the long run. The EMU dummy 
is also a plausible candidate, given: (i) our observation in Figures 2 and 3 
that the budget deficit is less countercyclical in the Eurozone than in the 
US or the UK; (ii) the deficit and debt restrictions imposed by the Sta­
bility and Growth Pact and also the restrictions that individual countries 
imposed on themselves in order to qualify for EMU membership.
Inflation targeting should also improve a country’s willingness or ability 
to conduct countercyclical budgetary policy. In particular, one potential 
factor that might discourage governments to borrow in recessions, is peo­
ple’s expectation that such borrowing might result in higher inflation in 
the future, for example as a way for the government to partially default on 
its debt obligations. This in turn would reduce the impact of current gov­
ernment borrowing on private (long-term) investment. Inflation targeting 
increases the effectiveness of government borrowing in recession by making 
such expectations less reasonable.
Table 2, where the countercyclicality measures are derived using the 
AR(1 ) MCMC method, shows results that are consistent with these conjec­
tures, namely: (i) while countries that are more financially developed tend 
to have a less countercyclical budgetary policy (column 1 ), as a country gets 
more financially developed, it exhibits a significantly more countercyclical 
budget deficit (column 2 ); using the results from column 2 , our estimates 
imply that a 10 percentage points increase in private credit over GDP is 
associated with an increase of about 0.0196 in the countercyclicality of the 
budget deficit; in other words, it is precisely when the countercyclicality of 
the budget deficit is more positively correlated with growth, namely when 
financial development is low, that budgetary deficit countercyclicality seems 
hardest to achieve; (ii) when using country and year fixed effects (column 
2 ) more trade openness is positively and significantly associated with bud­
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getary deficit countercyclicality (the table shows a positive coefficient on 
openness); (iii) EMU countries and countries with a larger standard error 
of GDP growth appear to have a harder time achieving budgetary deficit 
countercyclicality (column 1 ) ; the EMU dummy implies that on average 
EMU countries’ budgetary policy countercyclicality is lower by 0.127, which 
is about a fourth of a standard deviation; the effect of the EMU dummy 
is more likely to be explained by rigidities already imposed by the precur­
sor EMS regime and then reinforced by the Maastricht Treaty, rather than 
the 1999 implementation of the EMU itself18; further investigation of this 
question is however beyond the scope of this paper; (iv) a higher share 
of government in the GDP is associated with a more countercyclical bud­
getary policy; (v) pursuing inflation targeting is associated with a more 
countercyclical budget deficit. Note that the coefficient on the inflation 
targeting dummy in column 2  is of the same magnitude as the coefficient 
on the EMU dummy in column 1 , but of opposite sign.
T A B L E  2  H E R E
Hence, a lower level of financial development, a higher degree of open­
ness, belonging to the EMU group, and the absence of inflation targeting, 
are all associated with a lower degree of countercyclicality in the budget 
deficit. In the next section we move to second stage analysis of the effect 
of budget deficit cyclicality on growth.
18We have experimented with an interaction between the EMU dummy and a  post- 
1999 dummy, but this interaction was typically insignificant, indicating th a t there is no 
substantial change occurring with the full implementation of the EMU in 1999.
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4 Second stage: cyclical budget deficit and 
growth
In this section we regress growth on the cyclicality coefficients for budgetary 
policy derived in Section 2, financial development, the interaction between 
the two variables, and a set of controls. Our discussion of the theory and 
microeconomic evidence on volatility, credit constraints and R&D/growth 
in the Introduction suggests that the lower financial development, the more 
positive the correlation should be between growth and the countercyclical­
ity of budgetary policy: the idea is that a more countercyclical budgetary 
policy can help reduce the negative effect tha t negative liquidity shocks 
impose on credit-constrained firms that invest in R&D and innovation.
4.1 Empirical specification and results
Our empirical specification is:
&Vit =  PlO>li,t-l +  p2Pi,t-l +  fh<k,t-lPi,t-l + X it(3±  +  7i + St +  Sit» (5)
where Ayit is the first difference of the log of real GDP per capita in coun­
try i and year t; au^-i is the countercyclicality of the budget deficit as 
estimated by the AR(1 ) MCMC method. Since is an estimated co­
efficient, we weigh each observation by the inverse of the variance of this 
coefficient (aweights in Stata), thus giving higher weight to coefficients that 
axe more precisely estimated in the first stage, p^t-i is the ratio of private 
credit to GDP borrowed from Levine (2001); X it is a vector of control 
variables that vary with the specification considered, 7 * is a country fixed 
effect, St is a year fixed effect, and £u is the error term.
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In Table 3, we first report results with a limited set of controls repre­
senting the most widely accepted determinants of growth: lag of log real 
GDP per capita, population growth and investment over GDP (column 
1). We then add more controls, namely schooling, trade openness, infla­
tion, government share of GDP and inflation targeting (column 2). Note 
tha t since we control for inflation, we indirectly control for the impact of 
monetary policy on growth.
The prediction is that of a positive (3i coefficient for the effect on growth 
of the countercyclicality of the budget deficit when private credit over GDP 
is 0 , and of a negative /?3 coefficient on countercyclicality interacted with 
financial development. In the first column of Table 3, using a limited set 
of controls, we see that the corresponding coefficients have the anticipated 
signs and are statistically significant: a more countercyclical budget deficit 
is positively correlated with growth, but the interaction term between coun­
tercyclicality and financial development is negative. Including a richer set 
of controls in column 2 does not change the results. If anything, the point 
estimates axe larger: a coefficient of 0 .1 1  of the lagged countercyclicality 
of budget deficit means that if private credit over GDP is 0, then increas­
ing the countercyclicality of the budget deficit by one percentage point 
increases growth by 0.11 percentage points. For each percentage point in­
crease in private credit over GDP, this positive effect of countercyclicality 
diminishes by 0.0004. The effect of the interaction is thus small: private 
credit over GDP would need to be larger than 2.75 for a countercyclical 
budgetary policy to become growth-reducing. Such a high value of private 
credit over GDP is not observed in our sample: the US in 2000, at 2.24, 
has the highest value of this variable in our sample.
Then, in columns 3 and 4, we repeat the same specifications as in 
columns 1 and 2 , but allow the impact of the interaction between the coun­
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tercyclicality of the budget deficit and private credit over GDP to differ by 
quartiles of the private credit over GDP (the first quaxtile is then the ex­
cluded category). For example, the dummy ” ‘2ndq (Private Credit/G D P)” ’ 
is equal to one if the Private Credit/GDP ratio lies in the second quaxtile, 
and is equal to zero otherwise. As the results in these columns show, the in­
teraction between cyclicality and financial development is non-linear, with 
a significant jump occurring when the private credit ratio moves from the 
second to the third quaxtile. In other terms, it is only at fairly high lev­
els of financial development that countercyclical budgetary policy becomes 
noticeably less growth enhancing.
T A B L E  3 H E R E
Table 3 is thus consistent with the prediction of a positive effect of a 
countercyclical budget deficit on growth, whereas we see a negative and sig­
nificant interaction effect between private credit and the countercyclicality 
variable. Thus the less financially developed a country is, the more growth- 
enhancing it is for the government to be countercyclical in its budgetary 
policy. In particular, we observe that EMU countries have budgetary poli­
cies that axe on average fax less countercyclical than in the US (0.37 vs. 
0.61), even though the US axe more financially developed than the EMU: 
thus, the ratio of private credit to GDP in 2000 in the EMU is equal 1.02 
against 2.24 in the US. Then, to the extent that it reflects the causality 
from cyclical budgetary policy to growth, the regression in Table 3 sug­
gests that increasing the countercyclicality of the budgetary policy would 
be more growth-enhancing for the EMU than for the US.
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4.2 R obustness te s ts
This section discusses various potential issues with our Table 3 estimates. 
We take as the reference specification for this discussion the specification 
shown in Table 3, column 2. Therefore, when we report on alternative 
specifications, they axe all based on this reference specification.
A potential first source of concern for our estimation strategy is auto­
correlation of residuals, which is typical in panel growth regressions. This 
implies that the standard errors may be biased. To correct for this potential 
bias, we used Newey errors to adjust the standard errors in the reference 
specification. Allowing for autocorrelation of errors up to lag 1 increased 
the standard errors very slightly and left the coefficients significant at the 
1% level. Allowing for autocorrelation up to 5 lags leaves the effect of the 
countercyclicality of the budget deficit at the same level of statistical sig­
nificance, but makes the interaction between the countercyclicality of the 
budget deficit and private credit be only significant at the 2 % instead of 
the 1 % level. Globally, it does not seem that autocorrelation of residuals 
substantially affects the standard errors of our estimates.
Second, the reader may wonder about what components of the budget 
deficit increase growth when they are more countercyclical. For example, is 
it the countercyclicality of total government spending that ultimately mat­
ters for growth? W hat about transfers and social security spending? We 
have run the same analysis for these variables as for the budget deficit19 
and found that their countercyclicality was not significant in explaining 
economic growth. This indicates that the cyclical behavior of automatic 
stabilizers is unlikely to fully account for our results: namely, it is not the 
case that just increasing transfers and social security spending in recessions
19Specifically, in equation 1, we replaced the first difference of debt by the first differ­
ence of each of these variables.
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increases economic growth. W hat matters for growth is not the counter­
cyclicality of spending per se (be it discretionary or not) but rather the 
degree to which this spending is financed by debt, i.e. the degree to which 
the government injects extra liquidity in the economy.
Third, the reader may be interested in knowing what happens if we 
replace the AR(1 ) MCMC estimate of countercyclicality by the Gaussian- 
weighted or the 1 0 -years rolling windows OLS. In the case of the Gaussian, 
the coefficients on the countercyclicality of the budget deficit and on its 
interaction with private credit have the same sign as in the reference spec­
ification and are significant at the 1% level. The only difference is that 
the value of the coefficient on the countercyclicality of the budget deficit is 
lower. In the case of the 10-years rolling windows method, the coefficients 
of interest are of the same sign, but are not statistically significant, which 
is not surprising since these estimates are much noisier.
Fourth, one may still be skeptical about the causal interpretation of 
our estimates. As mentioned in section 2 , our AR(1 ) MCMC estimate of 
countercyclicality should be in principle mostly uncorrelated with the fu­
ture, reducing the endogeneity problem. First, to check whether indeed 
future countercyclicality is independent of growth, we include both the lag 
and the lead of the countercyclicality measure in the reference specifica­
tion. Doing so does not significantly change the coefficient on the lagged 
countercyclicality but yields an insignificant and positive coefficient on the 
lead of procyclciality. These results are consistent with countercyclicality 
causing growth and not the reverse. Second, we noticed that inflation tar­
geting is associated with a less countercyclical budget deficit (Table 2) but 
is insignificant in explaining growth (Table 3). This raises the possibility of 
using inflation targeting as an instrument for countercyclicality in a GMM 
framework. In the GMM estimation, we instrument both the countercycli­
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cality variable and the lagged GDP per capita. For the latter, we use the 
classic instruments second and third lag of GDP per capita. Excluded in­
struments in our GMM regression are thus second and third lag of GDP per 
capita and the inflation targeting dummy. Moreover our GMM estimates 
allow for Newey errors of lag 1. We have thus re-estimated the reference 
specification using GMM. First stage estimates are significant, but the 
explanatory power of inflation targeting for countercyclicality is limited. 
Overidentifying restrictions are not rejected by the J test. However, we 
do not reject that countercyclicality and its interaction with private credit 
are exogenous, which means that GMM is not more appropriate than OLS. 
The coefficients on countercyclicality and its interaction with private credit 
are of similar magnitudes as in the reference specification but they are not 
significant (P-values around 30%). This exercise thus confirms that our 
countercyclicality measure is unlikely to be endogenous.
Finally, one may be interested in the time horizon of our effects: when 
the countercyclicality of the budget deficit changes in a given year, how 
far in the future does the effect on growth persist? One way to answer 
this question is to modify the reference specification by replacing the lag 
of the countercyclicality of the budget deficit, private credit over GDP and 
the interaction of the two by further lags. When using the second lag of 
these variables, the coefficients of interest (fa and fa) are still significant 
and of the same sign, but the R 2 diminishes slightly. When using the 
third lag of these variables, the coefficient on the countercyclicality of the 
deficit is still significant, but the interaction with private credit is no longer 
significant. Using even further lags makes the coefficients of interest become 
insignificant. Thus, it seems that an increase in the countercyclicality of 
budgetary policy affects GDP growth up to 2 or 3 years later.
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5 Conclusion
In this paper we have analyzed the dynamics and determinants of the 
cyclicality of budgetary policy on a yearly panel of OECD countries, and the 
relationship between this cyclicality, financial development, and economic 
growth. Our findings can be summarized as follows: first, countercyclicality 
of budget deficits has generally increased over time. However, in EMU 
countries, the budget deficit became slightly less countercyclical. Second, 
countercyclicality of budgetary policy appears to be facilitated by a higher 
level of financial development, a lower degree of openness to trade, and a 
monetary policy committed to inflation targeting. Third, we found that 
countercyclical budget deficits are more positively associated with growth 
the lower the country’s level of financial development.
The fine of research pursued in this paper bears potentially interesting 
growth policy implications. In particular, our second stage regressions 
suggest that growth in EMU countries could be fostered if the budget deficit 
in the eurozone became more countercyclical. Our first stage regression 
suggests that this in turn could be partly achieved by having the EMU 
area move toward inflation targeting, e.g following the UK lead in this 
respect, and also by improving the coordination among finance ministers 
in the eurozone on fiscal policy over the cycle so as to make it become more 
countercyclical20.
The analysis in this paper should be seen as one step in a broader re­
search program. First, one could try  to perform the same kind of analysis 
for other groups of countries, e.g middle income countries in Latin Amer­
ica or in Central and Eastern Europe. Second, one could take a similar 
AABM-type of approach to volatility, financial development and growth
20The Sapir report (Sapir et al (2003)) recommended the setting-up of ’’rainy day” 
funds supervised by the European Commission.
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to further explore the relationship between growth and the conduct of 
monetary policy. For example, to which extent allowing for higher pro­
cyclicality of short term nominal interest rates, can help firms maintain 
R&D investments in recessions and/or improve governments’ ability to im­
plement growth-enhancing countercyclical budgetary policies? Finally, one 
could investigate the possible interactions in growth regressions between 
countercyclical budgetary policy and structural reforms in the product and 
labor markets.
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Table 1: Summary statistics
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
GDP gap 756 0.000 0.019 -0.070 0.071
G ross government debt/GDP 756 0.548 0.295 0.046 1.686
Budget deficit/GDP 756 0.048 0.046 -0.065 0.321
Countercyclicality of budget deficit 
(AR(1)) 641 0.511 0.563 2.686 -0.342
Countercyclicality of budget deficit 
(Gaussian weighted rolling window) 756 0.578 0.752 3.337 -1.112
Countercyclicality of budget deficit (10- 
years rolling window) 532 0.608 1.065 8.972 -3.011
Growth of GDP per capita 689 0.025 0.026 -0.092 0.116
Private credit/GDP 585 0.801 0.392 0.128 2.240
Average years of schooling for the 
population over 25 years old 585 8.236 1.989 2.510 12.250
O penness 605 53.633 35.641 8.705 266.883
Inflation 756 0.061 0.066 -0.025 0.762
Population growth 689 0.006 0.005 -0.018 0.047
Government share of GDP (in %) 605 12.440 5.709 3.008 27.848
Investment/GDP (in%) 605 24.106 4.983 12.867 41.635
Inflation targeting dummy 756 0.112 0.316 0 1
Note: sample restricted to observations where the countercyclicality of budget deficit computed 
using Gaussian weighted rolling windows is not missing.
Source: OECD Economic Outlook, Levine dataset, Barro Lee dataset, Penn World Tables 6.1.
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Figure 2: the countercyclicality o f the budget deficit in the USA
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Note: the graph plots the a Ul coefficients, i.e. the coefficients on the opposite of the output g ap  in
equation 1, using various estim ation techniques.
Source: OECD Economic Outlook.
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Figure 3: The countercyclicality o f budget deficits using the AR(1) MCM C method
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Note: the graph plots the a Ul coefficients, i.e. the coefficients on the opposite of the output gap  in
equation 1, using the AR(1) MCMC m ethod. For EMU countries (i.e. countries who a re  or will be 
part of the EMU), the line represen ts the average  of the estim ated coefficients for the EMU 
countries p resen t in the sam ple; the average  is only com puted for those  years w here all EMU 
countries have non-m issing observations.
Source: OECD Econom ic Outlook.
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Figure 4: The countercyclicality o f budget deficits using the Gaussian-weighted OLS method
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Note: the  graph plots the a lu coefficients, i.e. the coefficients on the opposite of the output g ap  in
equation 1, using the G aussian-w eighted rolling window OLS m ethod. For EMU countries (i.e. 
countries who are  or will be part of the EMU), the  line rep resen ts the average  of the estim ated  
coefficients for the  EMU countries p resen t in the sam ple; the average  is only com puted for those  
years w here all EMU countries have non-missing observations.
Source: OECD Econom ic Outlook.
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Table 2: The determinants of the countercyclicality of budget deficits
(1) (2)
Year Country
f.e. year f.e.
Private credit/GDP -0.453 0.196
(0.115)*** (0.018)***
EMU country -0.127
(0.038)***
S tandard  error -3.364
of GDP grow th (0.818)***
Lag(log (real GDP 0.011 0.072
per capita)) (0.017) (0.071)
G overnm ent sh a re 0.000 0.004
of GDP (in %) (0.005) (0.001)***
Inflation targeting 0.292 0.112
(0.081)*** (0.015)***
O p en n ess -0.007 -0.002
(0.001)*** (0.001)***
O bservations 515 515
R -squared 0.21 0.99
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Note: The explained variable is the coefficient on the opposite of the GDP gap in equation 1, 
estimated using the AR(1) MCMC method. EMU country is a  dummy variable equal to 1 for all 
countries that are part of the EMU as of 2006.
Source: OECD Economic Outlook, Levine dataset, Barro Lee dataset, Penn World Tables 6.1.
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Table 3: The effect of the countercyclicality of budget deficits on growth, AR(1) MCMC method
(1) (2) (3) (4)
lag(Countercyclicality of budget 0.075 0.110 0.058 0.081
deficit) (0.021)*** (0.024)*** (0.016)*** (0.018)***
lag(Private credit/GDP) -0.010 -0.005 -0.014 -0.008
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007)** (0.007)
lag(Countercyclicality of budget -0.030 -0.040
deficit*Private credit/GDP) (0.012)*** (0.014)***
lag(Countercyclicality of budget -0.006 -0.009
deficit*2ndq(Private credit/GDP)) (0.003)** (0.003)***
lag(Countercyclfcality of budget -0.022 -0.024
deflcit*3rdq(Private credlt/GDP)) (0.007)*** (0.008)***
lag(Countercyclicality of budget -0.023 -0.030
deficit*4thq(Private credit/GDP)) (0.008)*** (0.010)***
lag(log (real GDP per -0.140 -0.132 -0.142 -0.131
capita)) (0.022)*** (0.022)*** (0.022)*** (0.022)***
Investment/GDP (ln%) 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Population growth -1.490 -1.702 -1.484 -1.635
(0.268)*** (0.284)*** (0.272)*** (0.290)***
Average years of schooling for 0.002 0.003
the population over 25 years old (0.003) (0.003)
Government share of GDP (in %) -0.001 -0.001
(0.000)*** (0.000)**
Inflation -0.049 -0.053
(0.022)** (0.021)**
Inflation targeting -0.004 -0.001
(0.005) (0.005)
O penness 0.001 0.001
(0.000)** (0.000)***
Observations 477 467 477 467
R-squared 0.60 0.64 0.62 0.65
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Note: The explained variable is the first difference of the log of real GDP per capita. All 
specifications include country and year fixed effects. Columns 3 and 4 allow for the effects of 
countercyclicality of the budget deficit to differ with quartiles of private credit/GDP.
Source: OECD Economic Outlook, Levine dataset, Barro Lee dataset, Penn World Tables 6.1.
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Appendix 1: the AR(1) MCMC method for 
calculating cyclicality in the first stage
The aim of this section is to give a brief description of how we used the 
Kalman filter together with Markov Chain Monte Carlo methods (MCMC) 
in order to estimate the coefficients aja from equation 1 under the assump­
tion th a t they follow an AR(1 ) process as desribed by equation 4. The 
implementation was carried out in Matlab.
Estimating the means and variances of the coefficients of interest - 
th a t is a,jit in equation 4 - involves two procedures: Kalman filtering1 and 
MCMC.
To compute the coefficients with the Kalman filter for each country, we 
need to know the values of three variances :
•  c r in equation 4, for j  =  1,2, i.e. the process variances in the 
terminology of the Kalman filter.
•  the variance of the error term et in equation 1 , i.e. the measure­
ment error variance in the terminology of the Kalman filter.
Moreover, to use the Kalman filter, we need a prior for the first period of 
observation for each country, that is a specification of our expectation over 
the values a jit at the first time step. As we do not have any meaningful prior 
information about cyclicality at the first observed period, we use a very high 
variance around the prior mean, so that this prior has a negligible effect on 
the estimates. Specifically, the set of initial values for the coefficients were 
chosen to be the OLS estimates of the coefficients using the first 1 0  years
1For an excellent overview of the Kalman filter and smoother, see 
the notes by Max Welling ’’Kalman Filters” , available on the web a t 
http://w w w .ics.uci.edu/‘'welling/classnotes/classnotes.html.
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of data for each country, and the value of the intial variance is set to be 
1 0 0 0 0 0  times the estimated variance of these coefficients.
However, the process variances and the measurement error variance 
o\ are unknown and we do not have any meaningful prior over them. We 
therefore need a method to find reasonable values for these three unknown 
variances. This is where MCMC methods are useful .
One can think of MCMC as the opposite of simulating. In the case of 
simulation we know the parameters of our process, for example the vari­
ances, and every time we run a simulation program, it gives us a set of 
possible observed data. More specifically, the probability of getting any set 
of observed data is the probability defined by the model that we have and 
the parameters. MCMC is the opposite: we assume that we have a given 
dataset, and we are producing a set of possible parameters. This is done in 
such a fashion that the probability of accepting a parameter value is identi­
cal to the probability that this parameter value has actually produced the 
data.
Specifically, in our implementation, we use the classic Metropolis-Hastings 
(MH) sampler to do MCMC (for an introduction to MCMC and Metropolis- 
Hastings, see for example Chib and Greenberg (1995)). In MH one starts 
with arbitrary parameters values. Every iteration one proposes a random 
change (in our case a small gaussian change) of the parameters. This is 
what is called the proposal distribution. Subsequently, this change is either 
accepted or rejected. The probability of acceptance is:
• (+ p(data\new-parameters) \  ...
Paccept =  min  ( 1, . . ; - r I (1)
\  p(aata\previous-parameters) J
It is easy to prove that this procedure is actually sampling from the correct 
posterior distribution over the parameter values.
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MCMC algorithms go through two different stages. In the first stage the 
sampler converges to a probable interpretation of the data in terms of the 
parameters. This stage is called burn-in and took about 500 iterations in 
our case. Within these 500 iterations, probabilities increased dramatically 
and then converged to a stable high level. Afterwards, the MCMC algo­
rithm  is exploring the space of relevant parameters. Over 3 runs, we took 
10000 samples per run after the end of burn-in. To avoid the autocorrela­
tion th a t typically characterizes a Markov Chain, we only retain samples 
every 100 iterations in order to compute the final estimates. From these 3 
runs, we thus get a total of 300 essentially uncorrelated samples for each 
of the three parameters we wish to estimate. Convergence of the Markov 
chain was assessed comparing the within chain correlation with the across 
chain correlation. From these 300 samples, we can then directly estimate 
means and variances of the three parameters of interest.
In order to correctly infer the effect of cyclicality on growth in our 
second stage regressions, we need to determine not only the value of the 
cyclicality (ai**), but also the uncertainty we have about it. To estimate 
this uncertainty, or in other words the standard deviation of the cyclicality 
estimates, it is necessary to consider the relevant sources of uncertainty. 
Two sources are relevant in our case. One is the uncertainty that is rep­
resented by the Kalman filter that stems from the finite number of noisy 
observations. The other source of uncertainty is uncertainty about the three 
parameters that are modeled by the MCMC process. To combine them, we 
use the approximation variancetotoi = variancem c m c  +  variance K alm an , 
where variance Kalman denotes the average variance over the 300 Kalman 
filter runs using the 300 samples that we retained from the MCMC esti­
mates of the three variances. This approximation becomes correct if the 
variance as estimated by the Kalman filter is similar over different runs of
273
the Markov chain, which was a good approximation for our data.
Finally, a full general statistical description of the methods used here 
can be found in Kording-Marinescu(2006).
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Conclusion
Promoting productivity, job security, and investment are all essential 
objectives of public policy. In this thesis, I have provided new evidence on the 
economic impact of firing costs and countercyclical macroeconomic policy.
In the first chapter, I investigated the impact of a reduction in the 
length of the probationary period in the UK from two years to one year in 
1999. I started with a simple model of firms’ behavior, where firms learn 
about the quality of their match with a given worker through signals of the 
worker’s performance. Firms decide to fire depending on firing costs and their 
belief about match quality. The model shows that firms fire more right before 
the end of the probationary period and less afterwards; moreover, the 
shortening of the probationary period form two to one year entails a lower 
firing hazard for workers with one to two years tenure. Firm may also react to 
the shortening of the probationary period by recruiting better workers or 
monitoring more efficiently the workers they already have. The model allows 
me to predict the effect of such reactions on the firing hazard. The empirical 
analysis shows a 30% decrease in the firing hazard for workers with one to 
two years tenure, as predicted by the model. Moreover, the hazard of firing for 
workers with zero to one year tenure decreases by about 30% as well. This 
latter result is consistent with firms having increased recruitment quality after 
the reform. The calibration of the model shows that recruitment quality indeed 
increased most after the reform, but monitoring intensity also increased
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somewhat. Finally, there is no evidence of the reform having had a negative 
impact on employment or unemployment. Thus, the decrease in the 
probationary period likely increased productivity, with limited or no negative 
impact on unemployment.
In the second chapter, I generalize the model of firm’s firing decision 
used in the first chapter. First, I note that the firm’s situation in the firing 
context generalizes to all situations when a person or organization is in a 
relationship and has to decide whether to continue or separate from the 
relationship. In chapter 2, I develop in more detail the logic of the simple 
model used in chapter 1, and I analyze more general cases. Thus, in chapter 1, 
I had assumed that match quality can only take two values. In chapter 2, I 
examine the case when match quality is normally distributed. I also allow 
match quality to vary over time, following an AR(1) process; in this case, I use 
the Kalman filter to solve the agent’s problem. I show that most of the basic 
conclusions from the simple two-quality model carry over to more general 
assumptions. In particular, the effect of firing costs (or, more generally, 
separation costs), is particularly insensitive to these assumptions: in all cases, 
higher firing costs decrease the agent’s willingness to fire at all relationship 
lengths, and hence decrease the hazard of separation. By contrast, the effect on 
the separation hazard of particular sources of uncertainty does depend on 
whether match quality is allowed to vary over time; differences are very small 
at short tenures but become bigger at longer tenures. This is explained by the 
dynamics of the evolution of match quality over time. If match quality is 
constant over time, then after a while, all low quality relationships have been 
terminated, and only high quality relationships remain, which drives the
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hazard to 0, irrespective of the value of uncertainty parameters1. If, on the 
other hand, match quality can change over time, then a good relationship 
always has a positive probability of turning bad in the future, and so the 
separation hazard never declines to 0. The model developed in chapter 2 is 
useful to analyze relationships such as the employment relationship, marriage 
or firm-supplier relationships. The model allows us to understand which 
factors drive the separation hazard and how, and such knowledge is useful 
when analyzing the impact of some variable (such as the firing cost) on the 
separation hazard. Moreover, the model can be used for structural estimation, 
whereby underlying parameters can be estimated2.
In chapters 1 and 2 ,1 analyzed the impact of firing costs generated by 
the workers* right to claim unfair dismissal. In these chapters, I implicitly 
assumed that these costs are fixed and known ex ante. This may be a 
reasonable approximation, but in practice the actual costs of firing depend on 
how judges apply the law when a worker sues for unfair dismissal. In chapter 
3, I thus analyze the determinants of judge’s decisions in unfair dismissal 
cases, concentrating on the effect of economic conditions. The idea is that if 
unemployment rates are higher, then it is harder for workers to find a job and 
thus judges may be inclined to decide in their favor. On the other hand, higher 
unemployment rates also usually go hand in hand with worse market 
conditions for firms and judges may be more willing to listen to firms’ 
arguments. The question is then which party judges’ decisions favor when 
economic conditions are worse. The empirical analysis of the effect of
1 This is only true as long as uncertainty is not total, of course.
2 Obviously, the more we know about the parameters, the more precise is the estimation. If we 
don’t know anything but the shape of the separation hazard, it is not possible to disentangle 
the effect of some of the parameters.
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economic conditions on judges’ decisions is complicated by the fact that cases 
reaching trial are a selected sample of all possible cases. However, the nature 
of my dataset allows me to control very well for such selection biases. I find 
that a higher unemployment or bankruptcy rate induces judges to decide more 
often in favor of firms, thus rejecting workers* demands. However, if the 
worker is still unemployed at the moment of the trial, then a higher 
unemployment rate makes judges more likely to decide in the worker’s favor. 
Judges thus seem to compromise between firms’ and workers’ interests. It may 
be that judges consider that if the worker has found a new job, then it is more 
important to avoid firms having to pay firing costs, since such financial burden 
may increase the risk of bankruptcy and further job destruction. However, the 
action of judges can only have a limited impact on bankruptcy, because their 
decisions do not directly contribute to fostering economic recovery.
Traditionally, macroeconomic policy has been assigned the role of 
stabilizing the economy over the cycle, thus promoting economic growth. In 
recent years, however, it has been argued that macroeconomic policy may not 
be able to increase long run growth, the latter mainly determined by 
institutions. In chapter 4, Philippe Aghion and I argue that countercyclical 
debt policy can and does increase economic growth. The theoretical argument 
is as follows. During recessions, the opportunity cost of investing in new 
technologies and products decreases because the returns to simply increasing 
production diminish. However, firms are often credit constrained and thus 
cannot borrow enough to engage in those growth-enhancing investments. We 
argue that the government can alleviate firms’ credit constraints by borrowing 
and spending more in bad times, and repaying its debt in good times. This
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positive effect of government intervention should be stronger the more 
widespread credit constraints are; in other terms, the effect should be stronger 
the lower the level of financial development. Empirically, we use a panel 
dataset of OECD countries to test whether countercyclical debt policy is more 
growth enhancing when private credit is less abundant. In order to test this 
hypothesis, we first estimate a time-series of public debt countercyclicality 
using a series of different methods. Our preferred method assumes that 
government policy follows and AR(1) process, i.e. that it changes over time 
but only slowly; as in chapter 2, the use of Kalman filtering techniques is 
necessary to solve the problem. We find that indeed countercyclical debt 
policy is more growth-enhancing when private credit over GDP is lower.
The findings presented in this thesis contribute to essential 
contemporary debates about public policy. In particular, they contribute to 
explain the difference in the economic performance of European countries 
versus the United States. Indeed, firing costs have often been blamed for less 
flexible labor markets and higher unemployment in Europe, the so-called 
Eurosclerosis. The findings presented in this thesis contribute to the literature 
establishing that this explanation is probably misleading: firing costs do not 
necessarily have big negative effects on employment, and they may even 
contribute to increasing productivity. On the other hand, part of the growth 
differential between the Eurozone and the US may be explained by the fact 
that the Eurozone has a less countercyclical debt policy, even though it is less 
financially developed than the US. The Eurozone may thus increase its growth 
by becoming more countercyclical.
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The papers forming this thesis analyze specific economic problems, 
starting from clear theoretical premises, and using appropriate statistical tools. 
They make a contribution to our knowledge of the economic impact of firing 
costs and countercyclical macroeconomic policy. They also develop useful 
methods which should lead to fruitful new empirical research. For example, 
one could use the model from chapter 2 to infer how heterogeneous the 
population of potential matches is and thus shed some light on job transitions, 
wage changes and the tenure-wage profile. Chapter 4 has analyzed the impact 
of countercyclical debt policy on economic growth within the OECD. Using 
the same technique to compute countercyclicality, one could analyze the effect 
of other macro policies. Moreover, it would be interesting to see if the effects 
found for the OECD carry over to developing countries, where credit 
constraint problems are more severe. These are but some of the questions that 
could be investigated using insights from the work presented here.
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